

PERSONAL HISTORY

My name is Klaas A. de Weerd. I am a Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

I was born in Roermond, Limburg, the Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I am of Netherlands nationality.

After having studied law at the University of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers' office at Sourabaya (Java) on 28 August 1929 and practised in the Law Courts of East-Java, Bali and the South East of Borneo until the middle of 1937.

In 1938, after having been on leave in the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year in the Labour Office (Labour Legislation Section) of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands Indies Government at Batavia. From the beginning of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers' office at Medan (Sumatra).

On the 12th of December 1941 I was mobilized as an officer of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java.

After the capitulation of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of war of the Japanese and was confined in several camps in West-Java until the middle of September 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted as Camp translator of the Java newspapers in the Malay language. The Japanese camp authorities allowed Malay language newspapers to be brought into the camps until the end of January 1944.

As the situation in the islands interested me in particular I spent much time in translating these items extensively into Dutch and, together with several friends, I indexed these data according to personalities and to subjects.

Our intention was to prepare several studies concerning the Japanese occupation, treating subjects such as Administration, Propaganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour, Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data about Japanese authorities

EXHIBIT NO. 13511

I had already prepared notes for several of these studies when it became increasingly difficult to keep this work secret from the Japanese guards. As in January 1944 it became clear that we would shortly be moved to another camp we soldered copies of our compilations and indexes in tins and buried them in various places in the camp grounds.

From February 1944 until September 1945 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Netherlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated) Japanese language newspapers occasionally smuggled in, and by listening-in secretly to the Japanese local broadcasts in Malay. During that period I continually exchanged information and observations with new arrivals and through every other channel available.

After 15 August 1945 I once more regularly received Malay newspapers and in the beginning of September 1945 I recovered one complete copy of my compilations and indexes from their hiding place. In the middle of the same month I was released from the prison camp and was assigned to the Political Section of the Chief Commanding Officer of the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), later called the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in order to complete my work of collecting data about the Japanese occupation. A special section with a staff of twenty was created for this purpose under my direction; this section became a special branch of Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Headquarters at Batavia) in January 1946.

In close cooperation with the Japanese Affairs Section of said N.E.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C. (South East Asia Translators and Interpreters' Corps) and other offices and bureaus I collected such data regarding the Japanese occupation as were available. These data were contained in, inter alia, the practically complete newspapers and the complete Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the 16th Army in Java, and a fairly complete



set of the official gazettes of the other islands, edited during the occupation period, further reports and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesian and other military and civilian authorities and private persons, seized Japanese and Malay official and non-official documents, interrogations of Japanese and Indonesian authorities, etc.

In May 1946 I joined the Office of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, with the special task of collecting such documents as would be needed for the preparation of the Prosecution of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo and in this capacity I continued my work of collecting data on the Japanese occupation of the East Indies.

In the middle of September 1946 I arrived at Tokyo as a representative of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search for further data here.

From this collected information I have prepared the attached report, entitled: "the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies".

PREPARED STATEMENT

of

K.A. de WEERD, Attorney-at-Law,  
Major R.N.I.A.

Subject: The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies.

International Prosecution Section  
Netherlands Division  
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## THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

## INTRODUCTION

The Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies for convenience has been chronologically divided into five phases,

- I. The period from March to August 1942, which can be designated the transition period.
- II. The second phase, which is characterized by the consolidation of Japanese rule, lasting from August 1942 to July 1943.
- III. The period from July 1943 to September 1944, which is governed by an attempt at winning over the population by promises.
- IV. The period from September 1944 to the beginning of August 1945, involving further development of the policy of promises.
- V. The period from the beginning of August 1945 to the end of September 1945, involving at the last moment an attempt to create a state, friendly to Japan, in the South.

The phases mentioned above have been more and less arbitrarily divided into periods and consequently these limits must be treated as being approximate. Occasionally for a better understanding a certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one of the phases, even if the events in question extended beyond a particular phase.

Japan's policy in regard to the Southern Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions alike, so that only insignificant local modifications were made, and then solely in the application and not in the principle itself. Therefore, what happened in Java is treated as basic and mention will only be made of modifications in other regions of the Netherlands Indies which reveal important deviations from events in Java.

## I. THE TRANSITION PHASE

Beginning of 1942 to approximately August 1942.

Throughout the East Indies, the entire Occidental group of influential persons in the administration and in commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systematically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

Exceptions were provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japanese replacing them arrived, this group was also interned. A small remaining group of workers was also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer world was as much as possible restricted.

In addition a large group of prominent Chinese, mainly on the ground of <sup>their past support of</sup> the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude, was interned.

The policy of internment became stricter in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.

By the end of 1943 the position had become more or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both male and female, had been interned, with a few local exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born in the Netherlands Indies who still showed <sup>apparent</sup> affinity with the Occidental world were interned, and those Asiatics, too, who were "suspected" of having Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According to official Japanese returns as of 1 September 1945, 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java. Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave labour elsewhere.



Of the former Western community, only three groups were still "free"; namely, the group of Axis subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their "freedom" in many other ways.

This non-interned Occidental community was subjected to very heavy pressure. Besides being spied upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial were such that the victims were deprived of all rights, and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation methods.

Occidentals were, whenever possible, dismissed from their official and private positions and appointments, thus depriving the greater part of this section of the community of its means of livelihood. All bank balances were immediately frozen, Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from Occidentals. The few non-interned Occidentals were faced with practically no alternative than gradually to sell all their possessions. They were further handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned whatever took their fancy, generally without payment of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registration and the payment of registration fees - (150 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military authorities made the position still more difficult for these communities.

Along with this, the use of Western languages was soon forbidden in public and business communications, and in certain places the speaking of Western languages was prohibited even within the home. Those who spoke a Western language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and subjected to methods employed by that organization.

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At the same time, the Japanese immediately began to close down all schools. During the second period Occidental schools and education remained definitely banned.

In April 1942 a ban on listening-in to radio broadcasts from outside the East Indies was promulgated. This prohibition was enforced by compulsory sealing and registration of all wireless sets, to make them unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts from abroad. In July 1942, sentences were pronounced and published by the Japanese Court Martial, that persons who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter alia, sentenced to death.

Throughout Japanese occupation, persons suspected of having failed to comply with this prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei, tortured and sometimes tried.

The possession of certain numerous specified books in enemy languages constituted a punishable offence. Such books had to be handed over and were burnt.

Old monuments, - reminders of former Occidental influence - were carried away, partly destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

In most places, the names of streets and towns were changed into Japanese, or sometimes Imlay.

Names of shops, commercial concerns, trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese or Malay.

Since the Kempei-methods were practised not only on the Occidental community, but also upon members of the other communities, all expression of democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies was silenced.

All existing Councils wherein, hitherto, the opinion of various communities could be freely expressed on problems of administration were abolished.



The first to be dissolved was the Peoples' Council, established in 1918, which exercised legislative and budgetary functions.

Next, in Java, the Provincial, Municipal and Regency Councils, which similarly had legislative and budgetary powers, were abolished.

In regions outside Java, too, the various councils which had been established on a democratic basis to give the people an opportunity of participation in the administration of their country, were liquidated.

By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 29 April 1942, all existing law courts were abolished; and in their stead Japanese "Law Courts of the Military Government" (Gunsei Hoojin) were established. This new judiciary was provisional and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

There was no provision for appeals. The decisions in all pending cases of the lower courts were declared to be deemed to have been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their respective associations.

The only associations excepted were those concerned with sports and recreation, and scientific, cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

Even associations not prohibited were restricted in their activities; they were subjected to police supervision, and could only resume their activities after obtaining permission from the police, and registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the police.

In practice, activities were permitted only those associations, which accented Japanese leadership and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as, e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian Sport League).

From the outset, the Japanese authorities built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

Along with the first troops to land on Java, came the vanguard.

These Japanese propagandists, organized in the Propaganda Section ("Barisan Propaganda") of the Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish immediate contact with Indonesian and Chinese politicians, known to be disaffected. With the assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April 1942 the so-called "Tiga A" movement was established. Local committees of Indonesians were set up to carry on the activities of this movement; but such committees had no function other than to carry out activities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

These propagandists immediately seized control of all means of public expression. All public and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic activities as well as the entire Press were immediately placed under their control. For about two months after the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers were still permitted to be transmitted and to appear in Dutch. As soon as the propaganda machine had been sufficiently organized, all newspapers were forbidden, and in their stead new papers were introduced in the Malay language under the direction of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen by the Japanese propaganda service. On the Emperor's birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay language daily paper in Java, the "Asia Raya" (Greater Asia) was established, and continued to appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda. At first it was under Japanese direction;



but after the Indonesian staff had proved themselves "matured" the direction was officially handed over to them; but in reality, the direction remained in Japanese hands.

Other places in Java soon followed suit, so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers in Malay were issued in five places in Java.

In addition a Japanese language paper, the Java Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

In her propaganda Japan referred to herself as the "liberator", come to establish a "New Order". It stated, that "New-Java" was to be educated to become a worthy member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

The Japanese instituted a rigid censorship, which not only affected all postal-, telegraphic- and telephonic-communication, but also extended to all photographs given to professional photographers for development.

Furthermore, all public utterances were subject to censorship. This did not alone extend to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to the theater, sermons, etc. Gradually theatrical companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda service.

The publication of books was also subject to censorship, and only works emanating from the propaganda service appeared during the period of occupation. By these methods the Japanese had control of all expressions of public opinion.

During the period now being treated Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun. For instance, the use of Japanese words was immediately introduced for designating official services, offices, etc. and this usage gradually became prevalent during the occupation, so that ultimately the reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely possible without knowledge of the offices, services, institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred to by Japanese words.

The Japanese authorities introduced the Japanese system of dating years, the Japanese time system and the Japanese budgetary year.

The police wore the Japanese flag for cap badges. Emperor worship - offensive to Mohammedans - was introduced. All public gatherings and meetings began with the obligatory bow in the direction of the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the words: "Tenno Heika - banzai". All Japanese days of celebration were introduced. The display of any flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flag had to be flown on all official and private buildings under strictly prescribed rules.

Portraits of members of the Dutch and Allied Governments were forbidden. These had to be handed over and were burned.

The possession of portraits and other pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no "lese-majesty".

Postage- and revenue- stamps were marked "Dai Nippon", and later new stamps were issued with texts in Malay and Japanese reading "Dai Nippon".

The Japanese at once began to establish schools which taught only the Japanese language. When later schools for Indonesians were reopened the curriculum was revised to meet Japanese requirements and important subjects in the new schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs and dances, etc.

In the fields of finance and economics the programs applied in the East Indies were similar despite the fact that some areas were administered by the Army, and some by the Navy.

Java and Sumatra were occupied by different Japanese armies and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Japanese Navy, with practically no contact with each other. Nevertheless the basic principles upon which these regions were administered were entirely similar in reality.



The first Ordinance of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1, introduced Japanese military paper currency with the text in Dutch, reading: "The Japanese Government. One half guilder". Paper money was issued similarly in other denominations. The East Indies guilder was reduced to the value of the yen. At first, the paper money already in circulation was retained; but later, when this old currency had considerably greater value in the open market than the Japanese occupation money, it was withdrawn and its possession constituted a punishable offence. The Japanese paper money revealed differences in the various occupied areas. In Sumatra, which was originally under the same military administration as Malaya, the same text appeared on the same background as in the case of the paper money issued in Java, but in English, whereas in the other regions of the East Indies, and in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

In 1944, new paper money was designed and printed in Batavia, with the text in Japanese and Malay.

This paper money was issued in unlimited quantities without backing, which soon led to inflation, which began early in 1943 and continued to increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth of its original purchasing value.

All banks, both official and non-official, were closed down at once. During the course of 1942 and 1943 the Java Bank (the circulation bank) and private banks were liquidated. The Post Office Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened under Japanese names and under Japanese direction, but the balances due at the time of the closing remained frozen. Later, the cash deposits of Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen while the deposits of Occidentals and internees and prisoners remained frozen, and were transferred to the Japanese established Enemy Property Administration Bureau (Tekisan Kanibu), which

was charged with the "custody" of enemy property. This institution liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and credited in its books the owners thereof, when known, with the proceeds in Japanese paper money.

Later, after May 1945, this liquidation was hastened. In Batavia the Kenpei and its members were frequently the purchasers at so-called public auctions, and the proceeds in Japanese occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the real price for the same article in the same paper money in the open market.

All stocks of Occidental importers, as well as private possessions in the form of movables and claims for payment (when capable of realisation) owned by Occidentals were translated into claims in Japanese paper money on the above-named Tekisan Kanribu. Possession of "enemy property" constituted a punishable offence and the holder was obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese. Unsold property was delivered upon request to Japanese officials and individuals, and their proteges.

Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies, big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals, had been invested in agricultural enterprises and industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting sugar-factories, which were organized in the "Java Togyo Rengo Kai") were brought by the Japanese under the "Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan". This organization had charge of the administration of "enemy" agricultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the control over all other agricultural enterprises including those operated with Indonesian or Chinese capital. Little attention was paid to the interests of owners. This body executed a policy directed towards carrying out a rigorous war effort and to the maintenance of production required by the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enterprises and industries which were of no importance



to the immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched over to other production, or when that was not feasible, were retained if such retention were deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. Tea- and rubber-plantations suffered seriously, because the Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation, gave precedence to foodcrops. Tea-plants and rubbertrees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates being parcelled out amongst local farmers to increase areas for foodcrops.

A large part of the Western-owned agricultural enterprises was liquidated. The entire sugar industry was allotted in 6 or 7 blocks to the large Japanese sugar companies, and was exploited by them under the continued direction and control of the abovementioned body.

Sugar production was reduced considerably and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar-factories was partly scrapped or carried off, when the factories were not switched over to produce other commodities more important for the war effort, such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

The possession of immovable property belonging to Occidentals or governmental institutions, was transferred by the Japanese to the "Hudoosan Kanrikoodan" established by them, which handed over the property as required to the Japanese military or civil authorities for business and for personal purposes.

Ownership of immovable property was drastically changed by the Japanese.

The so-called "private estates" were appropriated by the Military Government without the payment of any compensation to the owners, under Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 1 June 1942.

In the other islands too, such expropriations took place, as for instance in the Celebes, by virtue of an Ordinance No. 11 of the Minseifu (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March

1943.

These privately owned, were seized by the Military Administration and were operated without compensation, and in some cases were allotted to private Japanese companies.

Private railway, tramway and bus companies were amalgamated with the State Railways. The equipment of private railway companies was for a large part shipped to the Burma Siam railway. Direction of railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sookyoku (Railway Head Office), and all trace of former independent operation by private companies was obliterated. The personnel of these companies was pooled and Japanese rank designations and terminology were introduced.

Private or semi-governmental gas- and power- companies as well as privately owned mining concerns were taken over and operated by either the Military Government or Japanese companies.

The policy of exploitation of natural resources of the East Indies<sup>was</sup> carried on partly by the Military Administration itself, partly through monopolies granted to certain big Japanese business concerns and partly by Japanese "national policy companies".

The Southern Development Bank (Nanpoo Kaihatu Ginko), an entirely government owned and operated bank had as its chief function the financing of the development and exploitation of natural resources in the Southern Regions and the control of circulation and finance in those areas. This bank was directed by the Ministry for Greater East Asia and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to the Japanese Army.

The Japanese Government also divided up natural resources in the Southern Regions between the various Japanese applicants and allotted each of them part of those areas, usually according to their monopolies.



Donei was granted a news service monopoly although a local agency had started first,

Press monopolies in the Southern Regions were divided among various big Japanese newspaper concerns.

In the field of banking, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to operate in Java, and took over the functions of private Occidental banks.

The liquidation of these banks and the introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts were declared to be claimable on 25th November 1942 to apply to the Japanese banks for new credits backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks.

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## II. THE SECOND PHASE

August 1942 to July 1943

During the period just discussed the Japanese administrative machinery was relatively simple. The Chief of Staff to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java was concurrently Chief of the Military Government (Gunseikan) and was assisted by a simple "central organ" and by three Army officers each administering his respective area in East, West and Central Java. Administration was carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occupational detachments.

Original plans drawn up in Tokyo, envisaged sending out parties consisting of Japanese experts in colonial administration, technical sciences, and economy, immediately following the occupational troops. It was not, however, until the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

The Military Government, which at first was part and parcel of the Army, was next developed into a separate body.

The gist of its functions was laid down in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he assumed all powers which hitherto had been exercised by the Governor-General. The military administration (Gunsei) was divided into nine Departments under the supervision of the Gunseikan. The Departments were Soomubu (General Affairs), the guiding and policy making body; Koimubu (Internal Affairs); Zaimubu (Finance); Shooibu (Justice); Keimubu (Police); Kootubu (Public Works); Sangyoibu (Economic Affairs); Kaikai Kantokubu (Audition); and Sendonbu (Propaganda).

In addition from time to time a number of Bureaus, and other governmental bodies, without the standing of the Departments but under the Gunseikan and equally independent, were created to handle various matters, such as the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Bureau), the Zoosen Kyoku (Ship-building Bureau), the Tokisen Kenribu (Enemy Property Bureau); the Toogyoo Rengoo Kai (Sugar Producers' Corporation) etc. From time to time some changes were made, which did not affect the system.



The structure of the pre-war Central Administration was changed thoroughly and in its entirety. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a Propaganda Department had formerly existed. Police were under the Internal Affairs Department, while Public Health, Education and Labour (now under *Waimubu*) were handled by separate Departments or Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious Affairs had been handled by the Education and Religion Department.

The Government Secretariate, the Council of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Departments of general administration, corresponding in name with the new Japanese Departments (e. g. Justice Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

All leading positions in the Departments were occupied by Japanese. According to official Japanese information, on 1 September 1945 23,242 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military Government in Java, amounting to half the number of service personnel proper stationed there.

Legislative powers were exercised by the Imperial Government at Tokyo, the Supreme Commander in the Southern Area, the Commander-in-Chief of Java, and the Chief of Military Administration (*Gunsuikan*). The laws and ordinances of the first two bodies were not published locally, although thousands were arrested, tortured and sentenced under them, while those of the two last mentioned organs were published in Java, in the *Osamu Kan Po*, the official bi-monthly Gazette, printed in Japanese and Malay. Some secret ordinances appeared only in the Japanese edition.

The institution of Advisory Councils at a later stage did not affect the legislative position in any way.

Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942 laid down an entirely new system of local administration. Under this Java was divided into 17 "Syuu", comparable geographically to the former "Residencies" and one "Tokubetu Si" ("Special City Area") comprising Batavia. The four Sultanates in Central-Java were administered by two "Kooti Zimu Kyoku" (Sultanates' Bureaus).

The former "Provinces" of West-, Central- and East-Java were eliminated. In early 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three "Gunseisibu", coinciding geographically with the former Provinces but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

All these local bodies supplanted the former decentralized and autonomous local administration, and were placed directly under the Gunseikanbu in a rigidly centralized system. Local councils were not mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular participation in local administration came to an end.

The Syuu were subdivided into smaller units in accordance with the Japanese pattern. These were given Japanese names such as Ken, Gun, Son, Ku, Si and Siku. During this second period the organic laws governing the functions of administrative bodies under the old system were abolished, and replaced by Japanese regulations, on which the centralized new administration was based.

The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable to the former "Resident") and of other local officials was, on one hand, considerably strengthened, and on the other made far more dependent on the Central Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced. These officials, responsible only to their superiors, had a large measure of liberty in the execution of their duties: they had powers of dismissal and appointment, and almost unrestricted disciplinary powers over their staffs.

They were empowered to issue regulations to implement ordinances promulgated by higher authority and also regulations concerning matters not yet covered by such ordinances. However, they were subject to the authority of their superiors and were responsible to them in all cases. According to statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authorities, the object the Japanese had in mind was to build up an administration which in its final form should be on the same lines as those followed in their colonies in Formosa and Korea.

The four ruling Sultans were maintained, not, as having hereditary title to their positions, but as newly invested Rulers called "Ko" owing allegiance



to the Japanese Army in the same way as all civilian officials did.

All key-positions in the new establishment were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indonesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The Mentoyo, however, was, from 1944 onward, assisted by Japanese advisers.

The composition of the Administrative Corps was modified later pursuant to Prime Minister Tojo's promises. However, leading positions remained in the hands of Japanese and if an Indonesian held an important post there was always a Japanese who was the real executive.

It was not until the end of August 1945 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority to their Indonesian colleagues.

According to the biographies of the Japanese officials, published by the propaganda service, this corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and Korea, and some had been engaged in administrative functions in Japan proper.

The establishment of a new administrative system in islands other than Java developed along the same lines.

In the initial stage, Sumatra along with Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army Commander at Singapore, but later Sumatra was placed under a separate Gunseikanbu.

The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Headquarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages by Itagaki, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under the Southern Theater ~~was~~ commanded by Field Marshal Terauchi.

The Military Administration operated pursuant to both orders issued through the ordinary channels of command and issued directly from the Ministry of War.

In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east of a line running north and south through Bali and Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. While the terminology varied, the system was not substantially different. The same principles of centralized administration were applied and relations between Japanese and Indonesian officials were the same.

Administration in territory under Naval Occupation (Minsei) was executed by the Minseihu (Headquarters) at Macassar (Celebes).

The Minseihu at Macassar was under the command of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th Southern Squadron at Singapore.

Parallel with reorganization of the Administration, the Judicial System was entirely revised. In addition to the Gunsei Kocin (Courts of the Military Administration), set up in the first period to replace the former Courts, there were the Gun Kaigi, a Court Martial proper, to try Japanese service personnel and others subject to Court Martial, and the Gunritu Kaigi, a Court Martial to try violations of the Army Ordinances.

The Gunsei Kocin itself had jurisdiction to try violations of Military Government Ordinances and Regulations, and former Ordinances declared in force by the Military Government. This jurisdiction was shared with the Gunritu Kaigi.

Ordinance No. 14, of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 26 September, 1942, gave the Gunsei Kocin their final form.

Eight type of courts were set up, all bearing Japanese names, and including the Saikoo Kocin (Final Court of Appeal) and the Kootoo Kocin (Intermediary Courts of Appeal), the personnel of both of which at first was entirely Japanese. The lower courts comprised the Police Court, the District Court and other local courts corresponding to the local administrative subdivisions, and two special religious courts, all manned by Indonesians and directly controlled by the Intermediary Courts of Appeal.

To each court a Kensatu-kyoku (prosecution Section) was attached. This system was strongly centralized under the Justice Department. At a later stage it was detached from the Justice Department, and combined with the police force under the Police Department which was renamed Public Security Department (Tianbu).

In criminal courts with Indonesian members a representative of the Kempei attended the sessions, seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku.



In the initial stages the former Penal Code was maintained. Having determined that this criminal law was based on excessively democratic foundations the Japanese introduced a new Penal Code in 1944, in which criminal acts were defined in vague terms, leaving wide scope for interpretation. High minima of punishment were introduced for special offenses.

During the Japanese occupation interference by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in trials by Indonesian courts. In practice it was the Kempei representative, attending criminal sessions, who determined the sentence in criminal cases.

During the session only Japanese and Malay languages were allowed.

Trials by the Courts Martial proper were conducted in Japanese and proper interpretation was seldom available.

In the other islands of the East Indies judicial powers were administered in the same manner. Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts established.

At the outset of the occupation the Japanese authorities took over the Police School at Sukabumi, Java. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, permanent courses for the training of police personnel, led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda courses for personnel already in the service were conducted regularly, in which the ideals of Greater East Asia and Japan's right were taught. A system of corporal maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the police station, for the settlement of minor infractions was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for insignificant offences was seen daily in the streets. A certain section of the Indonesian Police Force adopted the tactics of the Kempei.

A separate Police Department, later the Public Security Department, was established along centralized lines and all executive functions were taken over by the Japanese.

The existing Force was felt to be insufficient by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy this situation were attempted.

The Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of the Kempei, trained by Kempei personnel in Kempei methods, was organized. It was both feared and hated by the people.

In April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Village Guards) was organized as an auxiliary police force in all villages and municipalities. This reinforced the regular police by approximately 1,300,000.

The Keiboodan had a variety of duties. It had to go into action in case of fire or other calamities, it had to assist the regular police in apprehensions of crashed allied air crews, paratroopers and others, did 24-hour guard duties in its area, turned out in force during public propaganda meetings etc. Its main duty consisted of spying, chiefly in a general campaign against enemy spies.

In 1945, these Keiboodan were used to train the population in guerilla action, such as cutting lines of communication, destruction of small enemy detachments, etc., with wholly inadequate weapons such as bamboospears. This training taught the simple farmer fear of foreigners and hate for Occidentals and led to barbarous display of cruelty to these foreigners.

A third force auxiliary to the police, was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai, which operated only in towns and served the same purposes as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruited chiefly from among the Chinese.

The Kempei-Hoo was part of the Kempei, while both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai although Japanese-led, and trained, formed no part of the official Army organization. The members of the two latter were "volunteers", if the required numbers were not filled, the remainder were drafted.

The prison system was similarly reorganized under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for the training of newly recruited personnel as well as for the "improvement" of personnel with previous service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings were introduced. The treatment of prisoners was inhumane.

The Military Government proceeded to lay down a revised educational program with a view to reopening schools for Indonesians.

Elementary education in the People's Schools was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language, songs and dances, and the Japanese type of physical training was introduced. Instruction in reading and mathematics, was substantially reduced and the remainder of the curriculum abolished.



The several types of intermediate schools, with their varied curricula, were abolished to make place for one standard type of intermediate school with a uniform curriculum. This school was divided into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum was very much simplified with foreign languages and general history dropped to make place for Japanese language and history. Textbooks on the history of the islands were burned and a new textbook was introduced, which emphasized racial affinities and ties of common destiny with Japan.

An entirely new subject was the "Seisin" (Spirit), which taught Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideals to the younger generation, such as the Spirit should be able to overcome all material obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo spears if necessary.

Vocational schools were reorganized to conform with Japanese conceptions.

Batavia Medical College was reopened on 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the "Foundation of New Java", under the name of Iku Daigaku. Its first president was a Japanese professor, assisted by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most of them former associate professors at that College. Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors were demoted to associate professors and succeeded by Japanese professors, brought from Japan, who lectured in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese language had been obligatory from the outset.

The students pledged themselves to enter the Japanese Military Government service after graduation. Students were billeted and were subject to a strict and semi-military regimentation under specially appointed Japanese, who instructed them in the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The curriculum of the Medical College was reduced from six to four years.

The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a limited program covering three years was opened. Students were subjected to the same routine.

Law College was supplanted by one year courses for the training of civilian officials and lawyers. Much time was spent on instruction in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideals and the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of students was in force. Instruction in the Japanese language played an important part.

Private education remained taboo for a long time. In 1943 and 1944, certain former private schools for Indonesians and for Chinese were allowed to reorganize but the curriculum had to conform to the official program.

Western teaching and education to Occidentals were prohibited throughout the occupation. This prohibition was strictly enforced, and the mere suspicion of having taught Occidentals was sufficient to involve the suspect with the Kempo.

Considerable numbers of Indonesian College students as well as graduates and prominent personalities from the Indonesian community were sent to Japan. A party of journalists from all the islands were taken to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia Journalists' Conference.

All sections of society were organized into corporations along fascist lines.

The organization and political coordination of society was carried out among all racial and political groups as well as among practically all professions and trades, practically all economic sections of society, all cultural groups, all religious groups, the younger generation, sports organizations, and women's movements. The Japanese authorities kept a close grip on a particular social group through these organizations and used them to command aid and support from its members for the Army or the Military Government. The corporations were required regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings. They were utilized for disseminating propaganda among the members. The Japanese used these corporations to keep abreast of public opinion and to conduct espionage.

The Propaganda Department maintained close relations with these organizations. Addresses by Indonesian officials in these organizations were not only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by the Propaganda



Department. These corporations were under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu. The various corporations, all serving uniform purposes and all modeled on the same lines, were instituted by Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same for practically all corporations, and stated that the corporate objective was support to the Japanese Military Government.

The executives in these corporations were appointed by the Japanese authorities; Branch executives were responsible to the central executive; Both were assisted by advisory councils appointed by, or with approval of the Japanese authorities.

The executive body within a corporation was authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its members and membership was obligatory for all within a given group.

A typical example is provided by the organization of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the Java Izi Hookookai (Corporation for the Public Service by Medical men in Java), established by Ordinance No. 28, of the Commander in Chief in Java, dated 3 August 1943, which provided inter alia:

"Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookookai is established with the purpose of coordinating those engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise their capability in curing, and the care for sanitation, so that in this way they can give their contribution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical affairs.

"Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medical experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals, must become a member of the Izi Hookookai, except enemy nationals.

"Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned in Article 7, the Izi Hookookai carries out special work necessary for conducting the Military Government at the order of the Gunseikan.

"Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookookai can issue orders and instructions necessary for carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 to the members after obtaining

approval from the Gunseikan.

"Article 21.: The Izi Hookokai is supervised by the Gunseikan.  
The work of the branch officers is supervised by  
the Syuutyookan (Japanese Local Governor)."

The lawyers, newspapermen, and most, if not all, other professions were similarly organized into single corporations.

In all fields of economic activity there was the same picture of obligatory membership, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects and Japanese executives.

All artists and scholars were organized in the Keimin Bunka Sidosya.

The importance of a truly Oriental artistic expression was emphasized and Occidental influences were considered inimical. Paintings and other artistic expressions were to be and were adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This organization, established in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as the other corporations: Japanese executives, obligatory support to the Army and the Military Government, etc.

The Japanese attached much importance to the spiritual moulding of youth and they took the matter into their own hands completely. The Indonesian Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized, was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

As early as December 1942 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training of the younger generation to be good citizens of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was of such paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer was not considered good enough. The matter of guidance and training of youth was kept an exclusively Japanese concern. The organ of control was established by the creation in April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java Youth Corps).

Its aims were laid down as follows:

"In order to convince the youth of Java so that they will energetically cooperate with the Military Government and render assistance in the building up of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia, it is necessary that they be given guidance and training."



In every Syuu a Japanese Training Centre for local instructors was established, and a Central Training Camp was opened near Batavia, all under the direction of Japanese.

Later, a Seinendan was organized in every Ken and Si, each approximately at battalion strength. Some factories had their own Seinendan. These were organized into the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and commanded by Japanese officers of the Army and the Military Government.

Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and those were tested as to their enthusiasm for the Greater East Asia

#### Co-prosperity Sphere.

The official training comprised instruction in the Japanese language oral and written, spiritual and military training, Japanese physical training, air raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc.

The manpower for the Boeki Giyu Gun (Defence Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September 1943, largely came from the youth corps. Soon after its establishment all other youth organizations were prohibited.

Sports were also brought in line. On 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized. The Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other corporations. In the official explanation of the applicable Ordinance it said: "The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java, from office-employees to school-children, and also that of the Keiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering how important sports is for our spiritual and corporal training, for learning and developing discipline, and for strengthening the spirit and the determination to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to the War of Greater East Asia."

In every Ken and Si a branch was established; these branches were organized in their respective Syuu and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa Iku Kai.

The Indonesian women of Java were organized in the Kuzin Kai, founded in August 1943.

Its objects and duties were laid down as follows:

"The purpose of this organization is to help the Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position of the women of the original inhabitants and also to raise the women's virtue.

In order to assist in the conduct of the Military Government, the Zigyotu (Working Section), is created within the Hujin Kai; this body has to carry out work necessary for the improvement of conditions behind the front-line and in the field of savings, education, public safety and public health.

In order to deepen the conviction of women in their duties towards the efforts of the defence of the country in wartime, in the first place to give instruction in first aid the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish a close contact with the Seinendan and Heibooden in conducting exercises so that in future when there is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as possible."

Developments in the other islands, were roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with a lower standard of efficiency among their own Japanese personnel, and at the same time less dependent on the cooperation of the local population than they were in Java, their chief granary and supply base, they tackled the process of political coordination more sketchily.



## III. THE THIRD PHASE

From July 1943 until September 1944.

As early as in the first period, there was some activity by Japanese authorities in the political field, but the policy adopted locally was characterized by the Naval Liaison Officer at Batavia as a policy of "wait and see."

Immediately after the occupation a prohibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March 1942, which read as follows:

"Until further notice it shall be strictly prohibited to commit the following acts:

"a. participation in any organization; attending any meetings; conducting propaganda in favour of the enemy; the posting of printed or illustrated placards."

By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942, it was further prohibited to "discuss, engage in activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning the organization and structure of the Government."

By virtue of these prohibitions certain Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by the Kempei in April 1942, some of whom were only released much later.

In December 1942 to January 1943 a large scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who had engaged in any underground activities of a kind that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not released until September 1945. Even after January 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard against and spy upon all underground activity, which cost a very large number of victims.

In 1942 the Japanese initiated the "AAA" Movement. This name was announced on big placards displaying the following slogans:

Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Protector of Asia)

Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader of Asia)

Nippon Chahaya Asia (Japan the Light of Asia)

The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more striking colour than the other letters. The themes which this movement elaborated were "Asia for

the Asiatics" and hate against "foreigners belonging to the white race" and against the "Western exploiters". The Japanese, on the contrary, were stated to be of the same race and stock as the Indonesians. The language "the Indonesian people who have the same ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese," appeared in Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7 March 1942. Western influence was represented as being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples, and the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under the "paternal" leadership of Japan was represented as liberating the Asiatic peoples. Apart from the slogan "New Java" or "a New Order in Java", the meaning to Java of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was not defined. Use of the word "Indonesia" in a political sense was not permitted. In most official publications the Indonesians were referred to as "the original inhabitants."

While the AAM Movement was in full swing, further contact was sought with the Indonesian world, and especially with those who were dissatisfied with the former rule and the rate at which that rule prepared for independence.

Chief among these was Sukarno, who was brought to Java by the Kempei in July 1942, and who formed the so-called "Empat Serangkai" (four-leaved clover) with three other nationalists. These became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of those nationalists who were prepared to cooperate with Japan. The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese promises a means of attaining the early independence for which they were striving. They believed in these promises and advocated complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Government.

The Japanese also sought to approach the group of Indonesian intellectuals who were not discontented with the former rule and had held high office thereunder. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukan Seido Tyoosa Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former Customs and Political Systems): "in order to survey and study the customs and the former governmental systems of the country, and to contribute towards the Administration of Java." Nine Japanese including the chairman



and ten Indonesians, including the "Four-leaved Clover" and certain former Chiefs of Departments, former professors and members of the former People's Council, sat on this Committee. It never played an important role and was abolished by the Japanese in November 1943.

The first request to the Japanese authorities made by the "Four Serangkai" was to be allowed to form a party. This request was considered until 8 December 1942, when at the commemoration of Pearl Harbour, a big propaganda meeting was held in Batavia, and the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that a single party for Indonesians only would be permitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to wait for a decision from Tokyo.

On 9 March 1943 the "Putera" Movement was created, deriving its name from a symbolic abbreviation of "Pusat Tenaga Rakyat" denoting "Center of the People's Spiritual Power," while "Putera" means "knight's son."

Its aims and policy were approximately similar to those of the previously discussed corporations, except that the name of this people's movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera was not a party, but only a "movement" with leaders and advisory councils.

The leaders were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and were assisted by the advisory council in which there were approximately equal numbers of Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan. Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with Japanese approval.

The organization of the Putera was governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, and its aims were officially described by the Japanese as follows:

"The object in arousing the strength and efforts of the people is  
"no other than to support all measures for winning final victory in  
"the Greater East Asia War. Since the work of this Movement is very  
"closely linked with the policy of the Dai Nippon Military Govern-  
"ment, all leaders must bear in mind that they should have a  
"profound knowledge of, and faith in, the aims and objectives  
"of the Dai Nippon Army."

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In this address the Putera leaders were further urged:

"Do your utmost always to be fully aware of the existing limitations  
"in the present situation, and never lead the common people astray.  
"I hope you will do your best to fulfill the aims and objectives  
"of this Movement, and that you will cooperate in the establish-  
"ment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and build  
"a New Java to be a member in the family of nations within the  
"Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia."

The functions of the Putera were officially set out in the following ten points:

1. To impress upon the Indonesian population their duties and responsibilities in regard to the establishment of a "New Java."
2. To eliminate Occidental influences.
3. To participate in the defence of Greater East Asia.
4. To foster self-discipline in bearing all mental and physical privations necessary for winning ultimate victory.
5. To deepen mutual understanding between the Japanese and Indonesians.
6. To encourage the study of the Japanese language.
7. To raise the standards of the Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.
8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physique of the population.
9. To encourage thrift and savings.
10. To encourage higher production in every field and to develop a love of work.

The Putera was only for Indonesians. The new social hierarchy introduced by the Japanese comprised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; 4. mixtures of Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. Thereby, Indonesians, being the "original inhabitants", were treated as a privileged category, while groups 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, with the Europeans and Eurasians receiving the worst treatment.



About the same time as the institution of the Putera, the restrictions on travel by so-called "foreigners" were strengthened. Moreover, it was ordered that everyone must immediately inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his residence. "Forbidden zones" were introduced, covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern and Western extremities of Java, where no "foreigners" were allowed to enter and for which even Indonesians needed a pass.

The first great enthusiasm for the Putera dwindled when it became apparent that the activities of this body, to which the population had looked forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda service. There was great disappointment when the originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead their own youth movement.

Meanwhile, outside the East Indies great changes had taken place. Japan had been forced from an offensive into a defensive position and lines of communication were seriously threatened.

Against this background, on 16 June 1943, Prime Minister Tojo made a speech in the Diet wherein, inter alia, he stated that in view of the fact that the people of Java had shown their readiness to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration, they should be given participation in the government. On this occasion Tojo also promised so-called independence to Burma and to the Philippines.

In pursuance of this promise, Prime Minister Tojo visited the Southern Regions in person.

Enroute to Java, Tojo called at Manila and Singapore, repeating the promise of "independence" for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no "independence" was promised, but only participation in the government. The promise was coupled with the conditions that there should be complete co-operation with the Japanese Military Administration in order to win ultimate victory.

Following this promise, in August 1943, an Indonesian was appointed Chief of the Syuumubu (Department of Religious Affairs), but actual control remained in the hands of Japanese section heads; and two others were appointed Syuutyoo (Chief of a Residency) in the two smallest Residencies of

Java, with actual power in the hands of the Japanese Vice-Chief. Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially appointed to lower positions,

istrative Corps and were accorded corresponding Japanese rank.

The "San-yo Seido" (Adviser System) was introduced, and Indonesians were nominated to be adviser to seven Departments. The San-yo only acted when questions were referred to him for advice.

In all Residencies and also in the Special Municipality of Batavia an advisory body, the Sangi Kai, was established to advise the Resident in matters of local government, by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance prescribed the numbers of members of each Sangi Kai to be appointed and elected, respectively. The "elections" were indirect with nomination of the candidates not public and the ballot not secret. The function of the Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local government put to it by the Syuutyoo with the right to make suggestions on the referred subject. It could only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and sittings were opened and closed on his orders. Officials of the Syuutyoo office could attend and participate.

The sessions were only public for the opening address, which was drafted and censored beforehand, and for the closing session. The sessions proper were held behind closed doors. At the final session motions, discussed and settled during the closed meetings, were put to a mock vote and always passed unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer than four to five days. The Chairman was appointed from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo. Every Sangi Kai sent representatives to the Tyuuo Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

This was established on 5 September 1943, by Ordinance No. 36, "for the speedy and efficient execution of the measures of the Military Government." Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated in advance by the Commander-in-Chief. Of the remainder, eighteen were "elected" by the various Sangi Kai, and two were nominated by the Sultanates. The procedure was the same as that of the local Sangi Kai. They were only empowered to offer advice in respect to questions put by the Commander-in-Chief



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or the Resident, and to make suggestions relating thereto.

The actual direction of affairs rested with the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuuoo Sangi-In Zimu Kyoku Tyoo, who was a Japanese, as were also the other officials of his office. The function of this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing correspondence as well as to exercise internal supervision over the activities of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In. The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and the first Head was the then private secretary of Prime Minister Tojo.

Similarly, the Secretary of the local Advisory Council was always a Japanese from the Syuutyoo's office. From the very beginning these organizations were used as an instrument of Japanese propaganda to recruit labour and "Volunteers" for the military organizations and to encourage the population to increase agricultural output and to deliver the crops to the Military Government.

As a further local participation measure wider administrative powers were given to the Sultans of Central-Java in elementary education, local government at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

Almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Central Advisory Council, as was later officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese Military Administration took the view that the Indonesian population of Java ought to give concrete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister Tojo's promise now that it had been translated into fact, and that it was their duty to demonstrate their preparedness to support the Japanese Military Administration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

The Propaganda service ensured that it should appear to the outside world that the inhabitants themselves were desirous of having their own army.

At the end of August 1943, an old friend of Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed "with his own blood," to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permission to set up a Volunteers' Corps as the first of a large series of such requests. The Commander-in-Chief declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that he considered, moreover, that the population of Java was very rightly desirous

of offering some return for Tojo's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated 3 October 1943, he instituted the Kyodo Boosei Giyu Gun (Army of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland). The aim of the Corps was "to call upon the original inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence of Greater East Asia."

Art. 4 laid down:

"The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of defending the homeland, and it is its duty to partake in the defence of the home country in the respective Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the Dai Nippon Army."

By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form part of the Japanese Army and would have its own officers, but it would be trained by Japanese instructors. It would not be used outside Java and would consist of volunteers.

Recruiting for the first levy started immediately, but with the following levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each new levy each Regency was told how many "volunteers" were required in order to bring formations up to strength. One of the chief activities of Japanese propaganda was to encourage enlistment in this corps. In October 1943 the training of the "officers" was started and lasted three months.

The object was to form one or more battalions of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu. At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road junctions, bridges and other strategically important points. Weapons were only supplied to these "volunteers" for the duration of the drills, and training mostly took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a special section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army, an intelligence organization, was charged with training, and at the same time made use of it both for spying upon the new volunteers as well as using them as spies.



Prior to this, the Japanese had made use of Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the occupation many Indonesian soldiers were partly recruited and partly compelled to serve as a "Heiho" (auxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the Japanese Army and were issued a Japanese uniform. They were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and to guard camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho were sent off the island.

The Japanese Navy similarly made use of Indonesian Heiho.

Both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho were taught to speak Japanese. Commands were issued in Japanese, and the regulations were written in Japanese. They wore Japanese insignia. An important part of the training was instruction in "Seisin" (Spirit).

One of the important aims of Japanese propaganda was the increase of farming crops and their delivery to the Japanese Military Administration. The island of Java had to provide large quantities of food for the Japanese occupation troops and troops fighting in the East. Besides the Japanese army of occupation was laying up large stocks of supplies. Java, which before the war had barely been able to meet the essential food requirements of its own population, was expected to produce more. This increase in production was obstructed by the lack of proper supervision over irrigation works, due to the replacement of interned Dutch experts by insufficiently trained Japanese, and by haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the pursuance of their ends in forcing the production of desired agricultural commodities unsuitable to the climate and geographic conditions. All this further reduced the area available for food crops.

It became less and less advantageous for the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Japanese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Government to stabilize the price of rice at a proper level. As the Japanese military guilder decreased in its purchasing value, the official price for rice soon fell far below its former value relative to other commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with the proceeds of his rice became virtually unobtainable.

The Japanese authorities ordered that 60% of the harvest of food produce had to be delivered to them. They took far-reaching measures to combat the black market in rice and other food products, such as the imposing of closed regional economic areas, enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing of rice - except for individual consumption - in other than "coordinated" mills was prohibited.

The propaganda service exerted all its powers to persuade the farmers to cultivate wider areas in order to obtain more produce. It also tried to persuade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the Japanese Military Administration.

Not only in Java, but throughout the Southern Regions, Japan used labour everywhere, for the building of military fortifications, airfields, strategic railways, etc. Java was a source for such labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propaganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlistment of these coolies. In this at first the Japanese were successful. When the inhabitants learned how these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their desire to work for them practically disappeared. This became worse when the coolies sent out of Java did not return, and no news whatever was received from them.

The Japanese thereafter adopted conscription, whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself, and for labour outside that island.

In 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous campaign in which the "Prajurit Ekonomi" (the economic warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had to be greatly appreciated. The recruiting of the coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one of these was that the houses of relatives left behind were provided with a sign "Prajurit Pekerja", and it was pointed out to the public that one should honour such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was said henceforth to guarantee special protection. Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed certain privileges in the distribution of scarce commodities, such



as clothing, - a privilege enjoyed only after all government officials had received their share.

These labourers received less care than the prisoners of war and internees, and their condition was aggravated by their ignorance of hygienic precautions and medical care. While the correct figures of those who were transported outside Java as Romushas are not known, the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation indicate a figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since the war's end. Most of the returnees suffered inhumane maltreatment. Accommodation, food, medical care were not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent altogether. During certain periods, "romushas" who had died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

In religious matters the propaganda service made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from the population.

These activities were especially directed at influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large majority of the population, while propaganda among other religions was of far less importance. Priests and preachers of an "enemy race" were forbidden to conduct services except for people of an "enemy race". If an "enemy" priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among the congregation he was to see to it that the latter left on penalty of very severe punishment.

From the very outset the Japanese made an effort to establish one organization for the Islamites to convey the Japanese aims to the people and to induce a maximum war effort through voluntary cooperation. Several attempts in that direction by the Japanese failed at first because of discord in Islamic circles in regard to religious principles. In November 1943 the Japanese succeeded in uniting the Moslem unions into one mother organization, the "Mashumi" (abbreviation for "Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia" - Consultative Council of Indonesian Islamites).

This coordinated the Mohammedan intellectuals. In addition there was a large number of Oelwas (expounders of the Koran) and Kiais (teachers on religious matters), not closely connected with Islamic intellectuals, but who exercised a considerable influence in the villages.

From the very beginning the Syuumubu tried to obtain influence amongst the population through these kiais and oelamas. As far back as July 1942 the then Japanese Head of the Syuumubu began to travel about Java and held meetings in each Syuu (Residency) for about 500 or 600 kiais and oelamas who had been ordered to attend by the local administration in each place. He spoke on Japanese views and aims in the usual vein and then tried to sound the opinion of his audience. He was assisted by five Japanese in Arabian dress bearing the title of Hadji in combination with Arabian and their own Japanese names. Following this tour there was a great meeting of representatives of all scholars and teachers on religion from all residencies at Batavia on 7 December 1942. The Gunseikan made a speech in which the Japanese policy in regard to the Islamites in Java was explained.

This policy embodied three principles. First, the Japanese army declared itself to be the protector of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be respected.

For the second point the Gunseikan declared that religious associations would soon be authorized to carry on their activities and that they had the noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East Asia and the support of the Military Administration.

For the third point, the Gunseikan declared that the cooperation of the Islamic community in respect to education was acceptable in so far as it was directed at full support to the Japanese Army and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious education would be permitted and officially supported with books and other facilities.

The Syuumubu established a permanent training centre in Batavia where courses lasting three weeks in Japanese ideology were given to groups of sixty kiais and oelamas each.

These courses were also used to test whether Japanese propaganda had any effect, and afforded a means of selecting suitable collaborators. These accomplices carried the propaganda to the simple rural population, and were responsible for the production and delivery of sufficient rice for a sufficient supply of labourers and for enlistments as "volunteer" or heiho.



The Japanese adopted the old device of working on the fanaticism of Islamites, and they tried to persuade the kiais and oelamas to declare the Greater East Asia War as a "sabil" (holy) war against the kafir (unbeliever). When the point that the Japanese were themselves unbelievers was raised, the "common ancestry," the "common race" and the "destiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians" were pointed out.

In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department) responsible, and he was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular kiais of Java. He accepted this post and spent one day in Batavia, but immediately returned to his religious institution, leaving the direction of the Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

From November 1943 the Mashumi became the organization through which the Japanese authorities ruled the Islamic intellectual world, and through it carried on propaganda for Japanese ideals, sounded public opinion and executed espionage.

The relationship between the Mashumi and the Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last the Mashumi was for all purposes directed by the Syuumubu.

Besides this the Japanese established Syuumuka (Religious Affairs Sections) in every Syuu under locally prominent Kiais. They had the duty of making Military Administration policy understood in the villages. These agencies were gradually extended even to the smallest local subdivisions under a local Kiai.

The Syuumubu issued a publication called "Asshu'lah," edited in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese, but printed in Arab script, the only script the orthodox kiais could read. This periodical was distributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

The Japanese also made several efforts to coordinate the Chinese who although comparatively few in number, were the mainstay of the middle class. The Japanese first tried to induce leading officials of the many Chinese associations (which had all been dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization, but the effort completely failed.

The Japanese decided in August 1943 to establish the Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few prominent pro-Nanking Chinese.

The Kakyoo Sookai was organized along the customary lines, with its leaders appointed by the Japanese authorities, and close cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration as the prime object. No action was taken on their own initiative and the organization was used to disseminate Japanese propaganda and as an espionage organization.

At the same time the Japanese made certain concessions, such as permission for limited Chinese private school education, and for sending small remittances to their families in Japanese-occupied parts of China. This latter permission was not kept.

The Eurasians, who occupied mainly the middle strata of technical and administrative occupations, were at first ostracized. Japanese replaced them in the higher ranks, but not nearly enough were available for the more numerous intermediate ranks, and trained Indonesians were insufficient in numbers.

The first effort to secure the cooperation of the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. The Eurasians who had been regarded as "aliens," gradually began to be treated as belonging to the indigenous population next to the Indonesian group. The Japanese stipulated, however, that the Eurasians had to realize that from then on they were to feel and act as members of the Greater East Asia community under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce their Western ancestry.

The Japanese promised the Eurasians to admit a number of their children to village schools which had so far been reserved for Indonesian children. Separate schools for Eurasian children remained forbidden.

In the beginning of 1944 the Japanese decided to dissolve the Futaba and to replace it by an organization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

According to the Japanese it had failed to reach the simple villager, who comprised about 80% of the total population of Java and supplied the manpower for army and labor services and the production of food crops for the Japanese. The movement became too strongly nationalistic.



The new organization followed a pattern used in Japan and combined the propaganda machinery with the organization for the distribution of essential supplies. Starting in January 1944, the whole of Java was divided into small communities of about 20 houses each, called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' associations). These Tonari Gumi were organized on centralized lines. They were headed by a lumityoo, who was appointed from above and who was responsible for the execution of the orders given to him. All existing associations, social, fire precautionary, agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

The duties of this institution were very extensive. Not only distribution, but also regular training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the community had to lecture at least once a week to his people on Japanese ideology and the practical application thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims in regard to the population were extolled according to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service. This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene.

Other meetings were held for larger units (called *aza*; a village was divided into two or more *aza*) once a month. One member of each family had to attend these meetings.

All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi, including non-interned Eurasians, had to be members of the organization. Only membership gave distribution facilities.

On March 9, 1944, when the Tonari Gumi were working satisfactorily, the Putera was officially dissolved and the "Jawa Hookoo Kai" (Corporation for Communal Services in Java), comprising all Asiatic groups was officially installed. This corporation remained as the instrument of Japanese control until August 31, 1945, when it was dissolved.

According to the official explanation accompanying the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding it, the Jawa Hookoo Kai was set up as an organ of the Military Administration to carry out its instructions in an atmosphere of 'friendly cooperation' with all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to see that these instructions reached all the people and it was to work in close relationship with the Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for

seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive support of the Military Administration. According to this explanation the Jawa Hookoo Kai was in fact an executive body, based on the principle of complete coordination of all inhabitants and was, therefore, an organization of the entire populace.

The central direction of the Jawa Hookoo Kai was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and consisted of Japanese exclusively. The Executive Bureau under the supervision of the central direction had several Indonesians. Branches were established in all localities. The Ku Hookoo Kai, the smallest union, supervised one or more *ra* which in turn supervised a number of Tonari Gumi.

The leader of these local Hookoo Kai was the head of the local administration, assisted by a council (Kaigi), appointed by him. A session of the Kaigi had to be held at least every six months, when ways and means of promoting assistance to the Military Government had to be discussed.

The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the Jawa Hookoo Kai. Their task was:

- a. active support to police and Keibedon (village guards) in the defence of their country and during air raids, against enemy parachutists, enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.
- b. to make the inhabitants understand the aims of laws, regulations, etc., of the Military Administration.
- c. stimulation of increased food production; encouragement of delivery of these products to the authorities; the distribution of daily necessities.
- d. general support to the Military Administration, e.g., by protecting members of families of Heiho (auxiliary troops), volunteers and romushas (coolies) who had left their villages.
- e. mutual help and assistance.

The Jawa Hookoo Kai absorbed all organizations pursuing similar aims, regardless of nationality, including the Japanese. The Huzin Kai (Women's Corporation), the Masumi (the Islamic Corporation), the Kakyoo Sookai (Corporation of Chinese), the Tai Tku Kai (Sports Corporation), the Keimin Bunka Sidosya (Cultural Corporation), etc., mentioned before, were all incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.



The activities by the Eurasians for their mutual support brought on systematic prosecution by the Kempei-tai. Dozens of their leaders died in prison during the occupation as a result of ill-treatment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or sentences by courts martial.

Anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured in such a way that false confessions were a daily occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh victims within the clutches of the Kempei-tai. A typical example of this happened in 1944 in Pontianak on the west coast of Borneo, where more than 1200 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the local nobility, were executed on an entirely unfounded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kempei. Greatest care had to be taken in speaking since spies were around everywhere. There are hundreds of cases where people of all races were most cruelly tortured on the strength of reports of a usually entirely innocent conversation, by means of the "water-cure", electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa constrictors, etc.

Outside Java the same policy was adhered to in regard to political and religious activities. Here again, following Tojo's promise, a number of prominent cooperative Indonesians were appointed to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to the Sangi In (local Advisory Councils) were established but this process was considerably slower than in Java. Territories administered by the Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes, Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuso Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuso Sangi-In for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in February 1945. No organization similar to the Putera was permitted in spite of requests from Indonesian intellectuals.

Compared with Java, propaganda in the other islands was more concentrated on the younger generation.

"Volunteers Corps" similar to the Giyu Gun were established.

The four basic aims of Japanese propaganda were given full play during the course of 1944. Using the slogan of "Asia for the Asians" and teaching

religious hatred, the Japanese worked upon all sections of society by holding courses of instruction. The first group to be dealt with was that of school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads of villages, minor officials of the civil service, higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and personnel of all government offices. Even the smallest group was given attention in turn.

This propaganda, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions and the distress and hardships suffered by the population.

The Japanese clearly realized the potential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in some other direction by way of distraction from Japan's occupation. There was a constantly increasing campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially against the United States and Britain, which countries, together with Holland were held responsible for all the sufferings of the population.



DOC. NO. 2750

## IV. FOURTH PHASE

September 1944 - August 1945.

The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile had considerably changed. The break-through at Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very foundations of the Japanese defense. The TOJO cabinet was succeeded by the KOISO cabinet, which recognized that it had to face the isolation of the Southern Regions, and the necessity for the Japanese troops there to stand by themselves, and that it was more and more important to gain popular cooperation.

When the way in which TOJO's promise was going to be realized became known in August 1943, disappointment was expressed rather clearly among those prominent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in Japan's promises. The Japanese were warned that they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspirations in the Southern Regions if they were to retain the full cooperation from this group.

On 7 September 1944, in the Diet, Prime Minister KOISO, after having promised Korea and Formosa equality of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, made a promise of independence for the East Indies. (Exhibit No. 277).

In this speech it was not made clear exactly what region would gain independence when granted.

The promise of independence was conditioned on the people defending their own territory for the support of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence was only defined by reference to membership in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an application of the Hakko Ichiu ideal.

Previously, towards the end of August 1944, the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed confidentially of the contents of this statement, and issued certain secret orders to various Japanese organizations. Those orders, Prosecution documents Nos. 2756 and 2757, were recovered in the building, used by the Gunseikanbu during the Japanese occupation of Batavi

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The promise made on 7 September 1944 by Premier Koiso was announced in Java by the Commander-in-Chief in the following words:

"As for the nation that will be set up in the future, it will be a just and true nation that will become a link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere and has the duty to contribute in the development of Greater East Asia under the leadership of Dai Nippon.

"Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise the standard of the nation that will be set up so that it will become one of the Greater East Asiatic nations in the true sense, then it is very necessary that they train themselves ceaselessly to become a Greater East Asiatic people until the final victory is achieved, i.e., by thoroughly convincing themselves as a Greater East Asiatic people.

"Suppose the final victory will not be won, then the construction of Greater East Asia can not be materialized, and as a matter of course, the East Indies will not get their independence.

"Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all their efforts to win the final victory in a sphere of perfect friendship between all nationalities.

"They must patiently endure all hardships and they also must remove all obstacles that might come up in the future.

"And therefore, while waiting for the arrival of the moment of the glorious independence, all the inhabitants must work hard for the continuance of this war. With such an attitude the duties for the future can be fulfilled."

The "gratitude" of the Indonesians for Koiso's promise remained the theme on which the Japanese propaganda continued to play for months to come.



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At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters were instructed to advise the Ministry of War as to what area should be declared "independent" the date on which it was to take place, and the form of the new government and state.

The Military Government of Java in reply submitted a report entitled "Gist of Measures for Guiding Independence", in which it was proposed to make Java independent first. Measures suggested to strengthen the national consciousness were the creation of the Ken Kok'u Gakuin (Academy for the Building of the State), and increased participation in the administration.

Only two practical steps were taken at first to carry out Koiso's promise. On 8 September 1944 the population was allowed henceforward to fly the Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag but only on certain specified holidays, subject to strict regulations as to place and size. On Government buildings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was to be flown. On that same date permission was given to sing the "Indonesia Raya"-song (Song of Great Indonesia) as the national anthem.

On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief convoked a special session of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the question of how the Indonesians could show to Japan and her army their intense gratitude for the promise of future independence, and how the will of the people "to fight to bring about the destruction of America and England could still further be enhanced."

Another extraordinary session of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In was held on 17 November 1944, and a motion was adopted to lay down a so-called "Pancha Dharma" (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a "compass" for the Indonesian population.

This "Pancha Dharma" reads as follows:

"For the Indonesian people, to wit:

- "1. We, along with other nations in Greater East Asia, are in this war one in life and death with Dai Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all sincerity because this present war stands up for justice and righteousness.

2. We found an Indonesian State that is independent, unified, sovereign, just, and prosperous and that always will value the spiritual merits of Dai-Nippon, and that will live as a true member in the family-sphere of Greater East Asia.
3. We will sincerely endeavour to achieve a glorious greatness by way of keeping up and elevating our own civilization and culture, by helping to develop the Asiatic culture and by beautifying the world's culture.
4. While maintaining strong and lasting friendly relations with the nations of Greater East Asia, we serve our country and people with all our heart and with an unwavering mind while we will always believe in God Almighty.
5. With a united and burning desire we strive for the achievement of an ever-lasting World Peace based on the family-conception of the whole mankind according to the principle of Hakko Ichiu."

On 1 December 1944 participation in the Administration was extended to the appointment of Indonesian "Huku-Syuutyokan" (Vice Governors) in several Syuu, and of more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisers) to the various Departments of the Gunseikanbu. A Sanyo-Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established to meet regularly to advise the Gunseikanbu in the periods when the Tyuuso Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was not in session.

Meanwhile the propaganda service had introduced a new slogan for the "Bonteng Borjuangan Jawa" (Java One Fortress). The object was to bring the population to the maximum war effort in view of the threat of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air Raid Defence and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine but besides, the population was worked upon by the powerful propaganda machinery and trained in guerilla fighting. They were instructed in the methods of destroying small enemy formations with primitive weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass action.



During a propaganda meeting in Batavia offices of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Van der Plas (a prominent Dutch administrator) were burned after having been paraded through the whole town. American, British, and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration. Religious propaganda urged the Mohammedans to declare Holy War on the Occidental Powers.

Three new semi-military organizations were established during this period, and the Tonari Gumi, finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboodanin the defence of the village. On no occasion were these simple villagers ever told that such action on their part in war time would constitute a violation of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the opposing party to treat them as 'franc tireurs'.

This training had an unintended result. One night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer Defence Corps at Blitar (East-Java) made a surprise attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured the arms as well as key-points in the town, e.g., Kompei HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange, etc. Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued, the victims being all non-Indonesians and included Japanese. In the course of the next days the movement was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out by violence and bloodshed.

There was also increasing resistance against Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially against the delivery of agricultural produce and the recruiting of native labor.

In order to overcome this resistance, strong measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian officials who were held responsible for the poor results in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substituted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamite politicians. These new officials had come to the fore through the Java Hookoo Kai, or through the religious courses. The new arrivals in the Indonesian administrative corps were not fully competent, and they always had Japanese advisers. Approximately one-third of the corps was staffed with nationalists favourably disposed towards the Japanese. Required delivery of foodstuff and recruitment of coolies and volunteers were not achieved by many Ken.

The Japanese realized that they were increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of the people and that they would have to bear the consequences of their own propaganda.

In September 1942 already, Count Hideo Kodama, then advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of Java visited Tokyo to try to arouse interest in local views concerning the East Indies. In November 1943 Sukarno was sent to Japan and pressed Premier Tojo to grant independence, but obtained no definite answer. At the end of 1944, Hayashi, the then highest civil advisor to the Java Military Government went to Tokyo with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief in Java to try and persuade Japan to support puppet-independence for the East Indies.

A Kon Koku Gakuin (Academy for the Building of the State) was instituted on 29 April 1945 with the object of influencing the minds of the future "leaders" of the "independent" state and of imbuing them with ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this leadership.

Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945, a conference took place at Singapore, attended by Chiefs of General Affairs Departments of all areas under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising Java and Sumatra and commanded by Itagaki. At this conference the Soemabutyoo of Java explained to what extent the national consciousness of the Indonesians had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact that there was no other way to regain the confidence of the population but by carrying out the promise of independence.

Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Headquarters on "independence." Java promptly responded with a proposition to declare the whole of the Netherlands East Indies independent within a year. Singapore dodged the issue and said that it was not yet time to initiate independence.

Subsequently, on 26 May 1945, at the instigation of Itagaki, a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed to convene a "Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin" (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This committee was installed on 28 May 1945,



and took a solemn oath of loyalty to live and to die with Japan.

"Naval" territories (Borneo, the Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented at this conference, and measures discussed only related to "Army" areas which narrowed down to Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged behind that of Java, and it was not until February 1945 that a Central Advisory Council for Sumatra was installed.

The Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence consisted of approximately 60 members, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one Eurasian. A Japanese was Deputy Chairman, and seven others were "special members". The Committee had an Administrative Bureau with a Japanese Deputy Chief.

The Ordinance founding this Committee required that its findings had to be reported to the Gunseikan. Later, a new "Committee for the Preparation of Independence" would be formed. It was clearly stipulated that the "Committee for Study" was to confine itself to study and was not empowered to make any decision.

The Committee met twice, from 29 May to 2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings were not open to the public. Among other things, a constitution resembling that of the Philippine puppet-state was drafted.

There was disappointment when it was learned that the Committee had no power to make decisions and had to restrict itself to Java.

On 17 July 1945, the Supreme War Direction Council decided to adopt the policy of granting "independence" to the East Indies as soon as possible. (Iros. Doc. No. 2759, Court Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_).

This decision reached Java on 21 July 1945. According to directives from Tokyo, the territory of the new state was to comprise the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a "Committee for the Preparation for Independence" was to be set up in the near future.

Emphasis was laid upon the necessity for safeguarding the requirements for military operations. The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon, which had submitted in June 1945 that the establishment of the puppet state should not take place before the middle of 1946, and that the abovenamed Committee should at the earliest be set up towards the

end of 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at Itagaki's Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held of the Soomubutyoo (Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions concerned. At this Conference a scheme was drawn up for guiding preparations for so-called independence, wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

#### V. THE FIFTH PHASE

August-September 1945.

In the beginning of August 1945, Field Marshal Terauchi received telegraphic orders from Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian puppet-state as much as possible, and to create this state in September 1945. In pursuance of this order, on 7 August 1945 Terauchi decreed the establishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (Committee for the Preparation for Independence).

This was effected by proclamation of the same date, reading as follows:

"Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese Southern Army).

"Concerning the 'Committee for the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia'.

"Based on the proclamation of the Japanese Government of 7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun has consistently been taking measures to guide the Indonesians. Owing to the spiritual awakening of the people up to this moment, they have all succeeded in achieving much and fast progress in their training for government and for the defence of the country with burning enthusiasm.

"In response to the activity and the wholehearted efforts of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun expresses its approval of the installation towards the middle of August of a Committee for the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee shall accelerate all measures concerning the final preparations for the installation of the Government of an independent Indonesia.

12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945."

On the same day on which the proclamation of Marshal Terauchi was published in Java, the Saikoo Sikiken (Commander-in-Chief) of Java also



issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was stated:

"The desire to become an independent nation has now reached a high point and is flaring up all over Indonesia. It was in response to the expression of this desire that the Dai Nippon Teikoku solemnly promised to grant her independence, in accordance with the basic principle of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the ideals of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole population has exerted itself to its utmost to honour the national obligations and the stronger became their determination to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that the foundations for their independence could be built up fully and speedily. And now, as an independent nation, constituting a link in the chain of the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place in the battle-line for the common defence of Greater East Asia."

The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government) on this occasion stated the following:

"The independence of Indonesia as a member of the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, is based upon humanitarian principles so as to contribute in the formation of a new world order. Therefore, the lofty ideals of the Indonesians and their intense enthusiasm conform with the basic ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit of Hakko Ichiu.

"A new nation will have to meet some essential requirements: it must have sufficient strength, while its administrative machinery should be organized in a smooth and simple way. Therefore, the first duty is to bring the war now being faced by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To this end the Indonesian nation must develop its war-potential to its full extent, and together with Dai Nippon fight unceasingly to achieve final victory in this Greater East Asia War."

A few days of silence on the subject of independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued to elaborate upon the common ties of destiny between Japan and Indonesia: "To live or die with Japan".

Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including Sukarno, was flown to Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11 August. They were told by the latter that it was originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese Government. On account of difficulties and dangers of communications and pressure of time, the Field Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the Imperial Government.

The main points were:

- a. The Japanese Government had been pleased to institute a Committee for the Preparation for Independence.
- b. The territory of the New State would include the entire Netherlands East Indies.
- c. The date when independence would be proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon as preparations were completed.
- d. The independent Government would be installed first in the island where preparations had been first completed. Subsequently this Government would be gradually extended to include areas where preparations had been completed.
- e. All Japanese demands in connection with the military situation were to be complied with.
- f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the Committee, which further consisted of thirteen representatives from Java, three from Sumatra and five from territories under naval occupation. Those members were appointed on nomination by local Japanese military commanders.

On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java reported the news of Sukarno's return, and he was welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the Commander-



in-Chief and many of the military and Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile the Committee members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali, whose names were now published, were flown to Java, after having received their instructions from the military or naval authorities of those areas.

Originally the first meeting of the Committee was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August, however, members of the Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation.

During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945, the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth leaders, prominent during that period, met at the residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Maeda. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred with the Soemabutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department) and Maeda. It was decided to proclaim independence the next morning.

The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for the Study of Preparations for Independence) was hastily altered, and on the following morning the Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda service on the verandah of his house.

The population of Java was still uninformed, except through rumour, about the capitulation of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been unfitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from Tokyo. On instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat secret.

The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese propaganda service, and the local broadcasting stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no mention of anything but the announcement of independence and the proclamation of the constitution.

On 21 August 1945, the papers published, next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia, the following words:

"Dai Nippon is and will always be a friend to Indonesia, immutably and forever. We never will forget our oath; united, in life and in death."

Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese authorities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has been called the "stolen week".

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筆者履歴ノ履歴書ノ

私ノ姓名ハ KLAAS A. DE WEERD / クラース・アー・デ・ヴェールト

ト言ヒ、王國和蘭印度軍豫備砲兵少佐デアル。

私ハ一九〇四年ノ明治三十七年ノ四月六日、和蘭國 LIMBURG / リンブルク州、ROERMOND / レーメルンデニ生レタ。國籍ハ和蘭國人デアル。

ライデン大學（和蘭）ニ於テ法律學ヲ修メタ後、一九二九年ノ昭和四年ノ八月二十八日、SOURABAYA / ジャバ（ジャワ）ノ一掃護士事務所ニ入り、一九三七年ノ昭和十二年ノ半ニ迄、WEST-JAVA / 西ジャバ、VALI / バリ及ビボボルネオ東南ノ諸裁判所ニ於テ掃護士ノ實務ニ携ヘツタ。

一九三八年ノ昭和十三年ノ休職ヲ得テ和蘭ニ暫クヲ過シタ後、在 BATAVIA / バタヴィヤ、和蘭領印度政廳、司法省、勞務局（勞務法制課）ニ一年近ク勤務シタ。

一九三九年ノ昭和十四年ノ初頭ヨリ、MEIDAN / メタン（スマトラ）ノ一掃護士事務所ノ共同經營者トナツタ。

一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ十二月十二日、王國和蘭印度軍豫備將校トシテ應召、此ノ身分ノ下ニ WEST-JAVA / 西ジャバノ第一師團參謀部ニ勤務シタ。

王國和蘭印度軍ノ降伏後、私ハ日本軍ノ俘虜トナリ以後一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ九月中旬ニ至

I.



PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b0d74f/>

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馬來語或ハ（翻譯セラレタ）日本語ノ新聞紙ヲ讀  
ンダリ、又馬來ノ日本ノ地方放送ヲ密カニ聴取シ  
タリシテ、蘭領東印度ニ於ケル情勢進展ノ實情ニ  
恰ニ通レヌ様ニシテキタ。此ノ間、私ハ絶エズ新  
來若ヤ其ノ他ノアラユル利用シ得ル徑路ヲ通ジテ  
情報ヤ觀察ノ交換ヲ行ツタ。

一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ八月十五日以降ハ、  
私ハ再び定期的に馬來語新聞紙ヲ入手スルヤウニ  
ナツタ。又同年九月初旬私ハ自分ノ檔案記錄及ビ  
目錄ヲ一揃ヒ全部、其ノ隱匿場所カラ取出シタ。  
同月中頃、私ハ收審所カラ解放サレ、日本軍ノ占  
領ニ關スル資料蒐集ト云フ私ノ仕事ヲ急成スルタ  
メ、N. I. U. A. (蘭領印度民政府) 司令長  
官ノ政務部一之ハ後ニ聯合軍軍政府民事部ジヤワ  
支部ト稱セラレタニ配屬サレタ。此ノ目的ノ爲  
ニ、私ノ指揮下ニ、二十名ノ職員ヲ擁スル特別ノ  
一課ガ創設サレタ。此ノ課ハ一九四六年ノ昭和二  
十一年ノ一月、和蘭軍情報部 (本部在バタビヤ)  
ノ一特別部門トナツタ。

簡述ノN. B. F. I. S. /ノ和蘭軍情報部  
ノ對日事務課、S. B. A. T. I. O. (東南  
アジア翻譯通譯部隊) 其ノ他諸官署ノ緊密ナ協力  
ノ下ニ、私ハ日本軍ノ占領ニ關スル利用可能ノ資

III.



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料ヲ蒐集シタ。之等資料ハ種々ノモノカラ得ラレ  
タガ、就中、随々完全ニ集メタ新聞紙、在ジヤワ  
第十六号ノ官報タル「オサム カンボウ」ノ全篇  
占領期間中ニ刊行サレタ他ノ諸島嶼ニ於ケル官報  
ノカナリ完全ナ全集、更ニ、日本人、和蘭人、イ  
ンドネシア人及ビ其ノ他軍民當附者及ビ私人ノ報  
告並ビニ調査、押收シタ日本及ビ馬來ノ公式及ビ  
非公式文書類、日本及ビインドネシアノ當事者ニ  
對スル訪問記録等ノ中ニ収録セラレシモノデアル

一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ五月、私ハ蘭領東  
印度檢事總長ノ事務局ニ参加シ、日本ノ第一級戰  
争犯罪答疑者ヲ東京國際軍事裁判所ニ起訴スル準  
備ニ必要ナ文書類ヲ蒐集スル特殊任務ニ服シ、此  
ノ資格ノ下ニ日本軍ノ東印度占領ニ關スル資料ノ  
蒐集ト云フ私ノ仕事ヲ續ケタ。

一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月中頃、私ハ蘭  
領東印度檢事總長ノ一代表者トシテ東京ヘ到着、  
同地ニ於テ、更ニ資料ノ探索ヲ續ケタ。

斯ク蒐集シタ情報ニヨリ私ハ此處ニ添附ノ「日  
本軍ノ蘭領印度占領」ト題セル報告ヲ作成シタノ  
デアル。

IV.

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文書第貳七五〇號

婦護士、R・N・I・A／和蘭王國蘭印軍／少佐

／K.A. DE WEERD／

K・A・デ・ヴェールト 既章備陳述書

題

日本軍／蘭領印度占領

國際檢察部 和 蘭 課

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／十二月



日本軍ノ關領印度占領

緒言

日本軍ノ關領東印度占領ハ便宜上時間的順序ニ依リ次ノ五期ニ分ツコトシタ。即チ

I. 一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ三月ヨリ八月ニ至ル期間、即チ過渡期ト稱シ得ル期間。

II. 第二期、即チ日本側ニヨル統治ノ基礎強化ヲ待望トスル自一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ八月至一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ七月ノ期間。

III. 一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ七月ヨリ一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノ九月ニ至ル期間。即チ數多クノ約束ニ依リ住民ヲ味方ニツケントスル企圖ニ基キ統治ガ行ハレタル期間。

IV. 一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノ九月ヨリ一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ八月初メ迄ノ期間。コノ期間ニ於テハ將來ヲ約束スル政策ガ實ニ進展セラレタ。

V. 一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ八月初メヨリ一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ九月末ニ至ル期間。即チ最後ノ關頭ニ於テ、南方ニ日本ト友好關係ヲ持スル一國家ヲ創設セントスル企テガ試ミラレタ期間。

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石ニ述ベタ各期ノ區分ハ多少勝手ニ決メテアル。  
從ツテ之等ノ限界ハ大体ノ目安ト見ナケレバナラ  
ス。時ニハ理解ヲ易カラシメルタメ、竝ル期間ノ  
聯帶ガ他ノ期間ニ連マタガツテキテモ、其ノ問題  
全般ヲ悉皆其ノ期間ノモノトシテ取扱ツタ。  
日本ノ南方地區關係ノ政策ハ總テノ他點ニ於ケ  
ルト同様通ネク東京ニ於テ決定サレタノデアアルカ  
ラ、確實カニ其ノ地方々々ニ從ツテ些細ナ變更ガ  
加ヘラレタニ過ギズ、ソレモ實地適用上ニ於テノ  
ミ變更ガ行ハレタモノデ、其ノ原則自体ニ於テデ  
ハナシ。

從ツテジャバ／＼AVA／ニ於テ起ツタ事ヲ根本  
トシテ論ジ、印度ノ他ノ地域ニ於テハジャ  
バニ於ケル場合ニ比シ重要ナル差異ノアル變ツ  
タ點ノミニ就テ記述スルニ止メル。



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3.

## 第一、過渡期

一九四二年／昭和十七年／初頭ヨリ

同年八月頃迄

東印度諸島到ル所ニ於テ其ノ目的ノタメニ急造サレタ獄舎ヤ收容所ニ官界及ビ商工業界等ノ西歐系有力者ガ即時且組織的ニ悉ク抑留サレタ。

當時未ダ日本人ニ依ツテ代替スルコトノ出来ナカッタ西歐人ノ場合ニハ一時的ニ除外例ガ設ケラレタ彼等ニ代ヘル日本人ガ到着スルヤ否ヤ、是等ノ人々モ亦抑留サレタ。殘ル少數ノ勤勞者達ノ一群モ別ノ幾ツカノ收容所ニ抑留サレテ外界トノ接觸ガ出来ルダケ制限サレタ。

尙多數ノ著名ナ中國人達ガ主トシテ過去ニ於テ蔣介石政權ヲ支持シタトノ理由及ビ反日的態度ヲ持スルト言フ嫌疑ノタメ抑留サレタ。

抑留方針ハ時ガ經ツニツレ更ニ嚴重トナリ、加之、一九四二年／昭和十七年／七月以降斯カル措置ハ漸次西歐人婦女子達ニモ及ブ様ニナツタ。

一九四三年／昭和十八年／末迄ニ此ノ情勢ハ稍ヤ平靜ニ歸ツタ。斯クテ年齢六十五歳或ヒハ七十歳ヲ越ユル男女ノ少數ノ例外ヲ除キ、蘭印諸島生レニアラザル西歐人ハ男女共總テ抑留サレテシマツタト言ヒ得ルノデアル。其ノ上蘭印生レノ西歐人デ今猶西歐世界トノ緊密ナ關係ヲ明カニ示ス者ハ悉ク抑留サ

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レ又西歐ニ對スル同情ヲ持ツモノト「疑ヒ」ヲカケ  
ラレタモノハ亞細亞人デモ幾ツカノ收容所ニ拘禁サ  
レタノデアツタ。一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ九月一  
日現在ノ日本ノ公式報告書ニ據ルト六二、五三二名  
(即チ男子二〇、六七六名、女子二八、一六九名、  
小人約一三、六八七名)ガ「ジャヴァ」(JAWA)ニ  
抑留サレテ居タ。此ノ外ニ西歐人軍關係者ヘ總テ俘  
虜トサレタノデアツタ。コレヘ其ノ數四萬五千名ニ  
及ビ内六一〇七名ヲ除キ、彼等ハ奴隸勞働ノタメ、  
「ジャヴァ」(JAWA)カラ何處ヘカ徵用サレテイッ  
タノデアル。

從前ノ西歐人社會ニ就テ言ヘバ次ノ三ツノ「グルー  
プ」ノミガ依然「自由」デアツタ。即チ樞軸國國籍  
者達ノ一群(彼等ハ祖國ノ敗亡後迄抑留ヲ免レテイタ)  
少數ノ中立國人及非抑留歐亞混血人ノ一群デアル。  
是等「グルーブ」ニ屬スルモノヘ嚴重ナル監視ノ下  
ニ置カレテ居ツタノデアリ且ツ他ノ種々ノ方法ニ依  
リ其ノ「自由」ノ行使ヲ阻止サレタ。

コノ抑留サレテイ西歐人社會ヘ非常ニ嚴シイ壓迫ヲ  
加ヘラレタ。

加之彼等ハ日本軍憲兵及其ノ手先ノ徒ニ依ツテ不絶  
監視サレ、幾百ノ犠牲者ヲ出シタ不斷ノ廣範圍ニ亘  
ル逮捕及ビ裁判審理ニ依ツテ威嚇サレタ。ソシテ意  
兵ニ依ル訊問及ビ日本軍軍法會議ノ處置ノ結果トシ



テ犧牲者達ハ凡ユル權利ヲ剝奪サレテ專斷的ニ處待  
ト兵糧攻メニ身ヲ委カシタ。

西歐人ハ出來得ル限り公私ノ別ナク其ノ占メテ居ル  
地位ヲ追ヘレ新ニ就職スルコトガ出來テクナツテ、  
コノ社會ノ此ノ部分ニ屬スルモノノ大部ハ生計ノ資  
ヲ得ル途ヲ斷タレテ仕舞ツタ。銀行ノ總テノ預金ガ  
直グ様凍結セラレ、西歐人系ノ諸銀行ハ清算セラレ  
而シテ清算上支拂ヒ得ル部分ハ西歐人達ヨリ取上ゲ  
テシマツタ。少數ノ抑留サレザル西歐人達ハ事實上  
自分等ノ所有品全部ヲ除々ニ賣ル以外ニ方法ガ無イ  
トイフ羽目ニ立到ツタ。日本兵ハ氣ノ向ク儘ニ何デ  
モ徵發シ多クノ場合何等代償ヲ支拂ヘナカツタノデ  
彼等ハ更ニ苦難ヲ嘗メタノデアツタ。日本軍官憲ハ  
強制登録及登録料金支拂（歐洲人ニ對シテハ一五〇  
ギルダー、中國人及他ノ非インドネシア亞細亞人ニ  
對シテハ七五ギルダー）ノ制ヲ採用シタノデ是等  
社會ニ屬スル人々ニ對スル情勢ハ一層惡化シタ。  
是ト共ニ西歐ノ諸國語、間モナク公用及商用ノ通信  
ニ、其ノ使用ガ禁ゼラレ或ル地域デハ家庭内ニ在ッ  
テスラモ西歐語ヲ話スコトガ禁ゼラレタ。家庭デ西  
歐語ヲ使用シタ者ハ憲兵ニ疑ハレ憲兵隊ノ取ル處置  
ヲ受ケタ。

是ト同時ニ日本軍ハ直チニ總テノ學校ヲ閉鎖シ始メ  
タ。第二ノ期間中西歐系ノ諸學校ト教育トハ明確ニ

禁止サレテイタ。

一九四二年／昭和十七年／四月、東印度諸島以外カ  
 テノ無線放送聴取ニ對スル禁令ガ公布サレタ。コノ  
 禁止ハ海外ヨリノ短波放送ノ受信ニ適セザルヤウニ  
 スルタメニ凡テノ無線受信機ノ強制封印措置及ビ登  
 録ニ依リ實施サレタ。一九四二年／昭和十七年／七  
 月、日本軍法會議ニ依リ若干ノ宣告ガ下サレ公示  
 サレタ。之ニ依リ右禁令ニモ拘ハラズ海外放送ヲ聴  
 取シ且或ヒハ之ニ依ル「ニュース」ヲ流布シタル若  
 干數ノ人々ハ就中死刑ノ宣告ヲ受ケタノデアツタ。  
 日本軍ノ全占領期間ヲ通ジ此ノ禁止ヲ遵守スル事  
 ヲ怠リタル疑アル人々ハ憲兵ニ依リ定期的ニ拘引サ  
 レ拷問サレ又往々ニシテ裁判サレタノデアツタ。  
 敵國語ニテ書カレタ或ル指定書翰ヲ多數所有スル  
 コトハ要所罰犯罪行為ヲ構成スルモノトサレタ。斯  
 カル書籍ハ差出スヲ要シタ而シテ燒棄サレタノデア  
 ツタ。

古キ幾多ノ記念碑――過去ニ於ケル西歐勢力ヲ想起  
 セシメルモノ――其或ルモノハ何レヘカ撤去サレ、或  
 ヒハ一部破壊サレ或ヒハ倉庫ニ收藏サレタノデアツタ  
 大部分ノ地域ニ於テハ街路及ビ都會ノ名稱ハ日本  
 語名或ヒハ時トシテ馬來語名ニ變ヘラレタ。

店舗、商社、商標等ノ名稱ハ最早歐文デハ表現セ  
 ラレザルニ至ツタ。斯クテ是等ハ日本語又ハ馬來語



7.

Doc 2750.

デ奮カルルヲ要シタノデアツタ。  
・ 憲兵ノ隊的ノ措置ヘ管ニ西欧人社會ノミナラズ、  
其他ノ社會ノ人々ニ對シテモ實行サレタノデ、民主  
的或ヒハ親西欧的同情ノ表現ヘ一切箝封サレタノデ  
アツタ。

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コレ迄各種団体が行政問題ニ關シソノ意見ヲ自由ニ  
發表スルコトノ出來タ一切ノ既存諸會議ハ廢止セラ  
レタノデアツタ。

最初ニ解体セラルルコトニナツタモノハ一九一八年  
ノ大正七年ノニ創立セラレタ人民會議ニシテ、コレ  
ハ立法及ビ豫算上ノ機能ヲ運営シテ居タモノデアツタ。  
次ニジャヴァ／＼CHAM／ニ於テハ地方參事會、市參事  
會及ビ同様立法並ビニ豫算審議權ヲ持ツテキタ攝政  
參議會ガ廢止サレタノデアツタ。

ジャヴァ以外ノ地域ニ於テモ亦人民ニ各自其ノ國  
ノ行政ニ參與スル機會ヲ與ヘルタメ民主的基礎ノ上  
ニ設立セラレタ各種參事會ガ掃蕩セラレテシマ  
ツタ。

一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ四月二十九日附日本軍ジ  
ャヴァ最高司令官命令第十四號ニ依リ既存セル凡テ  
ノ裁判所ハ廢止セラレ、ソノ代リニ日本軍ノ「軍政  
法院」(グンセイ・ホーイン)ガ設立セラレタ。コ  
ノ新司法部ハ臨時ノモノデアリ、後ニ確定的機構ガ  
コレニ代ツタ。

控訴ニ對シ何等規定ガ設ケラレテキナカツタ。一  
切ノ未了訴件ニ對スル下級裁判所ノ判決ハ控訴法廷  
ニ依リ確認サレタルモノト看做ス旨聲明サレタ。

一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ三月八日並ニ二十日日



Doc 2750

附ノ日本草ジャウア最高司令官命令第二號並ニ第三號ハ凡テノ會合、結社等ヲ禁止シタ。

一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ七月十五日ノ命令第二十三號ニ依リコノ禁止令ハ明確ニ維持セラレタノミナラズ凡テノ議長ハソレソレ自分ノ結社ヲ解散スル様ニ命ゼラレタ。

除外サレタ唯一ノ団体ハ運動、娯樂及ビ科學、文化、慈善並ニ配給ニ關スル機關デアツタ。

禁止サレナカツタ団体デモ彼等ノ活動ハ制限サレタ。

即チ、警察ノ檢閲ニ服サネバナラナカツタシ、警察ノ許可及ビ登録ヲ得テカラテナケレバ彼等ハ活動ヲスルコトガ出來ナカツタ。

事實、日本側ノ指導ヲ受ケ入レタ団体及ビ宣傳目的

ニ用フルコトガ出來ル団体例ヘバ <sup>INDONESIA</sup> インドネシア <sup>SHORE</sup> インドネシア人

運動聯盟(ノ如キモノ)ノミガ活動スル事ヲ許サレテ

キタ狀態デアツタ。

當初カラ日本側當局者ハ非常ニ大規模ノ宣傳機關ヲ樹立シタ。

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シヤリニ其先ニ上置シタ諸部はニ續イテ前衛隊  
ガ到着シタ。日本ノ第十六軍（治部隊）ノ宣傳班  
（「バリサン宣傳隊」）ニ編入サレテキタコレ等  
ノ日本軍宣傳班員ハ不満ヲ抱イテキルト知ラレテ  
キタインドネシヤ人や中國人ノ政治家達ト直接接  
觸關係ヲ作ラント試ミタ。コレ等不満ノ士ノ援助  
ヲ得テ一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ四月所謂「タイ  
ガエイ」運動ガ創立サレタ。インドネシヤ人ノ諸  
地方委員會ガコノ運動ノ活動ヲ遂行スルタメ創設  
セラレタ。シカシコノ様な委員會ハ地方日本軍宣  
傳班員達ニ依リ企畫セラレタ活動ヲ遂行スル以外  
ニ何等ノ機能ヲ持ツテキナカツタ。コレ等、宣傳  
班員達ハ凡ユル輿論發表手段ノ支配權ヲ直チニ握  
ツテシマツタ。公、私ノラヂオ放送映畫事業並ニ  
全新聞ハ直チニ彼等ノ支配下ニ置カレタ。占領後  
約二ヶ月間、コレ等ノ放送並ニ新聞ハ尙「オラン  
ダ」語ヲ放送サレ、印刷サレル事ヲ許サレテキタ。  
宣傳隊ガ充分ニ編成セラレルヤ否ヤ凡テノ新聞紙  
ハ禁セラレ、コレニ代ツテ日本軍宣傳班ニ依リ價  
重ニ選バレタ「インドネシヤ」人及ビ中國人ノ指  
導ノ下ニ「マレー」語ヲ書レタ新シイ新聞ガ紹介  
セラレタ。天長節（一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ四  
月二十九日）ニシヤワニ於ケル最初ノ新「マレ

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「語」日刊新聞「<sup>ASIA RAYA</sup>アシヤ ラヤ」(大亞細亞)ガ  
設立セラレ、一九四五年/昭和二十年/九月九日  
ニ到ル迄日本宣傳ノ最も重要ナ發表機關トシテ規  
則正シク刊行ラ續ケタ。最初ソレハ日本ノ指導下  
ニアツタガ、「インドネシヤ」人ノ幹部ガ充實シ  
タコトガ明ニナツテカラハ指導權ハ正式ニ彼等ノ  
手ニ渡サレタ。シカシ實際ハ指導權ガ尙日本人ノ  
手ニ殘ツテキタ。

「ジャワ」ノ他ノ数ヶ所モ同モ無クコレニ倣ツ  
タノデ遂ニ日本軍管理ノ「マレー」語新聞ハ「ジ  
ヤワ」ハ五ヶ所デ發行セラレルニ到ツタ。ソノ外  
ニ日本語新聞「<sup>JAVA SHINBU</sup>ジャワ新聞」ガ「<sup>BAFARIA</sup>バタビヤ」デ發  
行セラレタ。

日本ハソノ宣傳ニ於テ自國ヲ「解放者」ト呼ビ  
日本ハ「新秩序」建設ノタメニ來タノダト述ベタ。  
「新ジャワ」ハ日本ノ指導ノ下ニ「大東亞共榮圈」  
ノ立派ナ一員トナルタメニ教育サレルノダト述ベ  
タ。日本軍ハ嚴重ナ檢閲制度ヲ設ケタガ此ノ檢閲  
制度ハ、郵便、電信、電話等總ベテノ通信關係ニ  
布カレタノミナラズ之ハ寫眞商ガ現像ノタメ預カ  
ツテ居タ寫眞ニ迄及ンダ。

更ニ總ベテノ公式ノ發言モ檢閲ヲ免レ得ナカツ  
タ。此ノ檢閲ハ、ラヂオ放送、新聞ノミニ止マラ

11.

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「語」日刊新聞「<sup>ASIA RAYA</sup>アジヤ ヲヤ」(大亞細亞)ガ  
設立セラレ、一九四五年/昭和二十年/九月九日  
ニ到ル迄日本宣傳ノ最も重要ナ發表機關トシテ規  
則正シク刊行ラ續ケタ。最初ソレハ日本ノ指導下  
ニアツタガ、「インドネシヤ」人ノ幹部ガ充實シ  
タコトガ因ニナツテカラハ指導權ハ正式ニ彼等ノ  
手ニ渡サレタ。シカシ實際ハ指導權ガ尙日本人ノ  
手ニ殘ツテキタ。

「ジャワ」ノ他ノ徴ケ所モ間モ無クコレニ倣ツ  
タノデ遂ニ日本軍管理ノ「マレー」語新聞ハ「ジ  
ヤワ」ハ五ヶ所デ發行セラレルニ到ツタ。ソノ外  
ニ日本語新聞「<sup>JAVA SHINBU</sup>ジャワ新聞」ガ「<sup>BATAVIA</sup>バタビヤ」デ發  
行セラレタ。

日本ハソノ宣傳ニ於テ自國ヲ「解放者」ト呼ビ  
日本ハ「新秩序」建設ノタメニ來タノダト述ベタ。  
「新ジャワ」ハ日本ノ指導ノ下ニ「大東亞共榮圈」  
ノ立派ナ一員トナルタメニ教育サレルノダト述べ  
タ。日本軍ハ嚴重ナ檢閲制度ヲ設ケタガ此ノ檢閲  
制度ハ、郵便、電信、電話等總ベテノ通信關係ニ  
布カレタノミナラズ之ハ寫眞商ガ現像ノタメ預カ  
ツテ居タ寫眞ニ迄及ンダ。

更ニ總ベテノ公式ノ發言モ檢閲ヲ免レ得ナカツ  
タ。此ノ檢閲ハ、ラヂオ放送、新聞ノミニ止マラ

11.



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ズ、演劇、説教等ニ迄及シタ。演劇會社等ハ逐次  
宣傳事業部ノ手中ニ歸スルニ至ツタ。

書籍ノ刊行ニ於テモ檢閲ヲ免レ得ナカツタ。ソ  
シテ占領期間中ハ宣傳事業部ヨリ出ヅル事業ノミ  
ガ行ヘレタノデアル。

コレヲノ方法ニヨリ日本人ハ輿論ノ發表ヲ總テ  
統制シタ。

當期ニ於テ南方地區ノ日本化ガ始メラレタ。例  
ヘバ官廳諸機關、事務所、等ノ名稱ニ對シ急速ニ  
日本語ガ導入サレ此ノ使用ハ占領期間中徐々ニ普  
及シテユキ、タメニ、遂ニハ馬來語ノ新聞ハ日本  
語デ表示シタ事務所、機關、設立物、國體、理念  
等ヲ知ラナイナラバ殆ド讀ムコトハ不可能トナル  
ニ至ツタ。

日本ノ關係當局者ハ年度ニ關スル日本ノ方法、  
日本ノ時間制及日本ノ會計年度制ヲ取入レタ。

警官ハ帽子ノ徽章トシテ日本ノ國旗ノ印ヲ付ケ  
タ。同敎信者ニトツテ不快ナ天皇崇拜ガ行ヘレ、  
總ベテ公式ノ集合、會合ハ義務的ノ東京宮城遙拜  
ヲ以テ始メラレタ。大抵ノ會合ノ終リニハ「天皇  
陛下萬歲」ガ唱ヘラレタ。日本ノ總ベテノ祝賀日  
ガ導入サレタ。

日本國旗ノ外ハドシテ旗モ掲揚ヲ許サレズ、日本

12.

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ノ祝賀日ニハ嚴格ナ規則ニモツテ日本ノ國旗ヲ  
ラユル公私ノ建物ニ掲揚セネバナラナカツタ。

和蘭、又ハ聯合國諸政府ノ者ハ管領ハ禁止セラ  
レ、此等ハ提出サレネバナラズ燒キ捨てラレタ。

日本ノ皇室ノ方々ノ肖像其地ノ畫像ノ所持ニ關シ  
テハ、「不敬」ニ亘ル事ヲ嚴ニ戒シメルタメ規定  
ヲ設ケ取締ラレテキタ。

郵便切手及收入印紙ニハ「大日本」ト記サレ後  
ニ馬來語ト日本語デ「大日本」ト刷リ込マレタ新  
シイ郵便切手ト收入印紙ガ發行サレタ。

日本人ハ直チニ日本語ダケヲ教授スル學校ヲ設  
立シ始メタ。其ノ後インドネシヤ人ニ對スル學校  
ガ再開サレタ時日本ノ要求ニ應ズルタメ課程ガ修  
正サレタ。其ノ新計畫中ノ重要課目ハ日本語、日  
本ノ唱歌、日本ノ舞踊等デアツタ。

財政經濟分野ニ於テハ或地域ハ陸軍、或地域ハ  
海軍ノ管轄デアツタ事實ニ拘ラズ東印度諸島ニ適  
用サレタ諸計畫ハ相似タミノデアツタ。「ジャバ」  
／ JAVA ／ ト「スマトラ」／ SUMATRA ／ ハ日本陸軍  
ノ種々ナル部隊ニ依ツテ占領サレ、又「セレベス」



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／ CELEBES ／ 「モルネオ」 ／ BORNEO ／ 「モルツカ」  
諸島 ／ THE MOLUCCAS ／ 「チモール」 ／ TIMOR ／ 等  
ハ日本海軍ニ依ツテ占領サレテキタガ  
事實上相互間ニ何等ノ連絡モ存在シナカツタ。ソ  
レニモ拘ハラズ基本原則ハ全ク同一デアツタ。  
一九四二年／昭和十七年／三月七日附在「ジャ  
ワ」／ジャバ／日本軍司令長官ノ最初ノ布告第一號  
ハ「日本政府、半ギルダールト和蘭語ノ文字ノア  
ル日本軍票ヲ採用シタ。紙幣ハソノ他ノ額面ノモ  
ノモ同様發行サレタ。東印度諸島ノギルダール貨ハ  
圓貨ノ價值ニ引下ゲラレタ。最初ノ中ハ既ニ流通  
中ノ紙幣モ流通ヲ許容サレタ。併シ後ニ到ツテ、  
即チコノ舊通貨ガ市場ニ於テ日本軍ノ占領通貨ヨ  
リモカナリ高イ價值ヲ持ツニ至ツタ時、舊通貨ハ  
回收サレ、ソレヲ所持スレバ罰サレルコトニナツ  
タ。日本ノ紙幣ハ種々ナ占領地域ニヨツテ差異ヲ  
示シテ居ツタ。最初ハ「馬來」／ MALAYA ／ ト司  
軍政下ニイッテ「スマトラ」／ SUMATRA ／ ニ於テ  
ハ、「ジャバ」／ JAVA ／ ニ於テ發行サレタ紙幣  
ノ場合ト同シ地模様ニ同シ文字ガ記サレテキタガ、  
ソレハ英語デアツタ。然ルニ東印度ノ他ノ地域及  
葡領「チモール」／ TIMOR ／ デハ和蘭文字ノモノ  
ガ用ヒラレタ。

14.

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一九四四年／昭和十九年／ニハ日本文字ト馬來文字ヲ用ヒタ新タナル紙幣ガ圖案サレ「バタヴィア」／BAFAVIA／デ印刷サレタ。コノ紙幣ハ何等裏附ナク無制限ニ發行サレ、ソレガ間モナク「インフレーション」ヲ惹起シタ。コノ「インフレーション」ハ一九四三年／昭和十八年／初頭ニ始マリ加速度的ニ膨張ラ續ケ終ニ一九四五年／昭和二十年／ノ中頃迄ニハコノ紙幣ハ元ノ購買價值ノ僅カニ約四十分ノ一ノ價值シカ持タナクナツテシマツタ。

官立、私設ノ全銀行ハ直チニ閉鎖サレタ。一九四二年／昭和十七年／及ビ一九四三年／昭和十八年／中、ジャワ銀行發券銀行及ビ私立銀行ハ清算サレタ。大部分「インドネシア」人ヲ顧客トスル郵便貯金銀行ト一般庶民信用金庫ハ日本名ノ下ニ而シテ日本側ノ監督ノ下ニ再開サレタガ閉鎖當時ニ於ル資金殘高ハ凍結サレタママデアツタ。後ニ到リ「インドネシア」人顧客ノ現金預金ハ一部凍結ヲ解カレタガ他方西洋人、抑留者及ビ入監者ノ預金ハ凍結サレタ儘日本側ニヨリ設立サレタ「敵産管理部」(F)ニ移サレタ。コノ(F)ハ敵國人財産ノ「管理」ニ任ジタ。コノ機關ハ殆ド全部ノ沒收財産ヲ清算シ、其所有者ガ知レタトキ日本



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紙幣ニヨリ清算高ラソノ所有者ノ貸方ニ計上シタ。

其ノ後一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ五月以後コノ清算ハ急イデ行ヘレタ。例ヘバ、バタヴィアノBAHIA / デハ屢々憲兵隊員ガ、所謂公開競賣ノ買手デアツタ。而シテ日本軍占領貨幣ノ代金ハ一般市場ニ於テノ同シ品物ニ對スル同シ紙幣ノ實際價格ト何等合理的關係ヲ持ツテキナカツタノデアル。

西洋人輸入業者ノ凡ユル手持商品、並ニ動産ノ形ニ於ル個人ノ所有物、又西洋人所有ノ支拂請求權（同收可能トナルトキ）ハ前記敵産管理部ノ手デ日本紙幣ヲモツテスル請求權ニ振替ヘラレテ終ツタ。「敵産」ノ所有ハ犯罪ヲ構成シ所有者ハ皆ソノ引渡ヲ余儀ナクサレタ。留置サレテキナイ歐亞混血人デスラ敵國人ト考ヘラレ、從ツテ彼等ニ支拂ヘルベキ貸貸料ハ日本側ニ支拂ヘレネバナラナカツタ。落札サレナカツタ財産ハ要求ニ依ツテ日本人官民及彼等ノ被保護者ニ引渡サレタ。

16.

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戰前英國領印度ニ於テハ大資本ハ主トシテ西洋人ノ  
出資ニ依リ元ハ農産企業及ビ諸種ノ工業ニ投資サ  
レテキタ。農産企業（「ジャヴァ」<sup>Java</sup>）糖業  
聯合會内ニ組織サレタ製糖工場ヲ除クハ「栽培  
企業管理公團」ノ下ニ日本人ニ依ツテ經營サレタ。  
コノ機構ハ印度管理部下ニアル英國農業事業ノ監  
理及ビ「インドネシヤ」又ハ支那ノ資本ニ依リ運  
用サレテキルモノモ含メテ他ノ一切ノ農業事業ノ  
統制ノ任ニ當ツタ。所有者ノ利益ニハ少シノ注意  
モ拂ハレナカツタ。コノ國體ノ取ツタ方針ハ嚴重  
ナル戰爭目的遂行ノ方策ニ指向サレ又、大東亞共  
榮國ノ要求スル生産ノ維持ニ指向サレテキタ。  
直接戰爭遂行ニ重要テナイ企業及ビ工業ハ何時テ  
モ可能ナ限リ他ノ生産ニ切込ヘラレタリ、又ハ、  
ソレガ實行シ難イ時ソノ維持ガ、戰後大東亞共榮  
國ニ於イテ必要ト豫想セラレル事ヨリ見テ價值ア  
リト認メラル、場合ハ持續サレタ。茶、糖、綿、ノ  
農産ハ非常ナ損害ヲ蒙ムツタ。何故カナラバ、日  
本側ハ占領ノ後期ニ於イテ、食料收穫ヲ優先的ニ  
シタ。

茶ノ木ヤ護謄ノ木ハ刈ラレテ新トシテ用ヒラレ、  
是等ノ土地ハ食料收穫面積ノ増加ノ爲土着農夫ニ  
分配セラレタ。



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西洋人所有ノ農産業ノ大部分ハ清算サレタ。  
全砂糖工業ハ六又ハ七ノ「ブロックト」シテ日本  
ノ大製糖會社ニ割當テラレ、前記団体ノ指導監  
會ノ下ニ是等製糖會社ニ依リ、開發サレタ。  
砂糖生産ハ非力ニ減ラサレ、作業休止ノ砂糖工場  
ニ屬スル機械ハ工場ガアルコール、アタノール、  
其他ノ如ク戦争目的ノ爲ニ一層重要ナル他ノ物資  
ノ製造ニ轉換サレテキナイ時ハ其一部分ガ屑鐵ト  
サレ、撥出サレル通金ニアツタ。

西洋人ニ屬スル不動産ノ所有ハ日本軍ノ創設シタ  
「不動産管理公團」／FUDOSANKANRIKODAN／ニ日本  
軍ニ依ツテ譲渡サレタ。  
該公團ハ其財産ヲ要求ニ従ヒ榮幸用並ニ個人用ノ  
目的用ニ供スル爲日本ノ軍、民當局ニ引渡シタ。

不動産所有權ヲ思ヒ切ツテ變更シタ。  
所謂個人所有ノ土地ハ一九四二年六月一日付ジャ  
ヴァ日本軍最高指揮官布告第十七號ニヨリ所有者  
ニ何等ノ補償ヲ支拂ハズ軍政府ニヨツテ專有セラ  
レタ。

他ノ島嶼ニ於イテモ同様デ、例ヘバ「セレベス」

18.

／＼OHLERES／島ニ於イテハ一九四三年／昭和十八年／三月二十日付民政府令第十一號ニヨリ、斯クノ如キ沒收ガ行ハレタ。

公益事業ハ個人ノ所有ノモノモ含ミ軍政府ニヨツテ押收サレ、補償金モナシニ運営サレ、然シテ或場合ノ如キハ、日本ノ個人兩社ニ分配サレタ事ガアツタ。

私營ノ鐵道市街鐵道及ビ乘合自動車會社ハ國有鐵道ニ合併サレタ。

私營鐵道會社ノ施設ノ大部分ハ「ビルマ・シヤム」鐵道ニ積出サレタ。鐵道ノ監督ハ陸軍總局／＼RHD YU SOKYOKU／ノ許ニ統一サレ、以前個人會社ニヨツテ獨立ニ行ハレテキタ作業ハ、凡テ痕跡ニ至ル迄抹殺サレタ。此等ノ會社ノ従業員ハ合同セシメラレ、日本ノ階級名稱ヤ用語ガ採用サレタ。

個人及ビ半官ノ瓦斯及ビ動力會社並ニ個人ノ所有テアツタ鐵山會社ハ接收サレテ軍政府又ハ日本人兩社ノ何レカニヨツテ操業サレタ。

東印度ノ天然資源開發ノ政策ハ一部ハ軍政府自身ニヨリ又、一部ハ日本人ノ若干ノ大商社ニ附與サレタ獨占權ヲ通シ、又ハ日本ノ「國策會社」ニヨ



ツテ實行サレタ。

専ラ政府ノ所有ト運営ニ係ル銀行テアル南方開發銀行／＼・南方開發金庫ノ設リカノ  
主要ナル機能ハ南方地域ノ天然資源ノ開發及ビ開拓ニ對スル融資及ビ同地域ノ通貨及ビ金融ノ統制デアツタ。

同銀行ハ大東亞省ニヨツテ監督セラレ、南方地域ニ於イテハ日本軍ニ對スル會計係ノ役ヲ務メタ。  
日本政府モ又南方地域ノ天然資源ヲ色々ナ日本人出願者ノ間ニ分配シ、各自ニ、此等ノ地域ノ一部ヲ適當獨占權ヲ附與シテ割當テタ。

南方地域ニ於ケル鐵道事業ノ獨占權ハ、地方代理店ガ最初ニ事業ヲ始メテ千タノニモ拘ハラズ同盟ニ許可サレタ。南方地域ニ於ケル新開ノ獨占事業ハ日本ノ大新聞各社ノ間ニ分ケラレタ。

銀行界ニ於イテモ橫濱正金銀行及ビ臺灣銀行ガ「ジャヴァ」ニ於テ事業ヲ行フ特權ヲ與ヘラレ總テノ西洋人ノ私營銀行ヲ接收シタ。

此等ノ銀行ノ閉鎖及ビ日本人ノ銀行ノ創業ハ、

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21.

既中銀行ノ債務者ガ無理ヲ定イラレテ行ヘレタ。  
即チ、債務者ガ西洋人ノ銀行ニ對シ担保トセル資  
産ニヨツテ裏付ケラレタル新債權ヲ日本ノ銀行ニ  
申シ出テ、其ノ債務ニ對シ、一九四二年ノ昭和十  
七年ノ十一月二十五日ニ請求シ付ル旨申シ渡サレ  
タ。



二 第二段 緒

目一九四二年 至一九四三年

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只今申上ゲタ期間ニ於ケル日本國行政機關ハ比較的簡單ナモノデアツタ。爪哇派遣日本軍司令官附參謀長ハ軍政長官ヲ兼ネテオリ又彼ハ簡單ナ中央機關及東爪哇、西爪哇並中央爪哇各地ニ於ケル行政ノ任ニ當ツテキタ三人ノ陸軍尉校ニ依ツテ補佐サレテキタ。行政ハ各占領分遣隊ノ指揮官ニ依リ地方即ニ運営サレタ。

東京ニ於テ立派サレタ原來ハ國民對行政工業科學及經濟方面ニ於ケル日本人専門家ヨリ成ル團體ヲ直接占領部隊ニ依リテ派遣スルコトヲ考案シテキタ。然シ一九四二年八月上旬マデハ正親ノ行政體ガ假機關ヲ引繼ガナカツタ。

最初ハ軍ノ一部デアツタ軍政部ハ次イテ獨立機關タルコトニ進展シタ。其ノ機能ノ大要ハ一九四二年三月七日附日本軍司令官布告第一號ニ規定サレタガ右布告ニ於テ同司令官ハ從來總督ガ行使シテキタ一切ノ權限ヲ掌握シテシマツタ。

軍政ハ軍政官指導ノ下ニ九ツノ部ニ分レテキタ。

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其ノ各部ハ即チ、總務部一指導並ニ政策樹立機關一  
內務部、財務部、司法部、警務部、交通部、産業部、會計  
監督部並ビニ宣傳部デアツタ。

之ニ加ヘテ各種事項ヲ取扱フ爲其ノ都度、部ノ地  
位ニハ至ラナイガ軍政官ノ下ニ在リ部ト同僚ノ獨立  
權ヲ持ツタニ、三ノ局及其ノ他ノ政府機關ガ設置サ  
レタ。即チ警察部、造船部、財産管理部、實業聯合會  
等ガ之デアツタ。

時々或ル進展ノ變更ガ行ハレタガ是ハ其ノ邊境ニ  
ハ影響ヲ及ボスコトハナカツタ。

戰前ニ於ケル中央行政機關ハ日本ニ於ツテ徹底的  
ニ而モ全面的ニ改變サレタ。

總務部トカ宣傳部トカ云フモノハ、何レモ以前ニ  
ハ存在シナカツタ。戰前ノ機關ニ於ケル警察ハ內務  
部ニ屬シテ居リ他國公衆衛生、教育、及ビ勞務ハ（  
現在デハ內務部）ハ別個ノ部若クハ局ニ依ツテ取扱  
ハレテキタ。宗教ハ教育及宗教部ニ依ツテ取扱ハレ  
テキタノデアル。

內閣官房、印度國委託、及總督ノ内閣等ハ皆委ラ消  
シテ了ツタ。新日本部局ト名稱ニ於テ同一ナル以前



ノ一設行政ノ各部局（例ヘバ司法部ノ如キ）ハ日本式ニ再組織サレタ。

日本郵政局ニ於ケル重要ナル地位ハ全部日本人ニ依ツテ占メラレテキタ。日本郵公報ニ依レバ一九四五年九月一日現在ニ二萬三千二百四十二名ノ日本人ガ爪哇ニ於ケル軍政監部ニ附ハレテキタノデアアルガ之レハ該地正式駐在常員總數ノ半バニ達スル數デア

ル。  
司法部ハ東京ニ於ケル帝國政府ニ依ツテ、又ハ兩万々面最高指揮官、爪哇派遣軍司令官及軍政長官ニ依ツテ行使サレタ。最初二ツノ機關ニ關スル法令並ニ布告ハ現地ニ於テハ發表サレナカッタガ數千人ノモノガ是等法令並ニ布告ニ依ツテ逮捕サレ、拷問サレ、罰セラレタノデアアル。又最後ニ甲上ゲタ二ツノ機關ニ關スル法令並ニ布告ハ爪哇ニ於テ日本語及馬來語ニ依ツテ印刷サレタ。月三回發行ノ公報、治官報ニ發表サレタ。秘密布告ノ或ルモノハ日本語版ノミニ發表ハレタノデアアル。後ニ出來タ參議院ハ、立法機關ニ何等影響ヲ及ボス所ハナカッタ。

一九四二年／昭和十七年／八月五日附、爪哇軍司令官ノ發シタル布告第二七號ハ地方行政ノ完全ナル

新制度ヲ制定シタモノデ、之ニ依リ爪哇ハ地理的ニ  
以前ノ「區劃」ト同等ナ十七ノ「州」及「バタビヤ」  
「カラナル」ツノ「特別市」ニ分レタ。中部爪哇ニ  
於ケル四ツノ侯地ハ二ツノ侯地事務局ニ分ツテ治メ  
ラレタ。

以前ノ西、中央、東爪哇ノ諸「プロヴィンス」ハ  
併棄サレタ。一九四五年ノ昭和二十一年ノ初期爪  
哇在留ノ總領事官ハ、三ヶ所ニ軍政支那ヲ設置シタ。  
之等ハ總領事官ガ公式聲明ニ指稱シタ通り、以前ノ  
「プロヴィンス」ト地理的ニハ同一デアルガ實態ニ  
於テハ全ク異ツテキタ。

之等ノ全地方機關ガ以前ノ地方分權的の地方自治ニ  
代リ、嚴格ナ中央集權的の組織ノ軍政監督ニ直屬シタ。  
地方會議ハ、該布告ニハアゲラレテ居ラズ、地方  
行政ニ人民ガ參與スルコトハ廢止サレタ。州ハ、日  
本式ニ小單位ニ分劃サレタ。之ニハ縣、郡、村、區  
市及ヒ市區ノ如キ日本語ノ名稱ガ與ヘラレタ。

此ノ第二期中ニ、舊制度ニ於テ行政的の諸團體ノ機能  
ヲ定メタ組織的の法律ハ廢サレ、日本ノ規定ガ之  
ニ代リ、中央集權的の新行政ハ、之ニ基イタノデアツ  
タ。

州長（以前ノ「レジデント」ニ相當スル）及ヒ他



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ノ地方官吏ノ地位ハ、一面ニ於テハ相當ニ強化セラレ、又他面、以前ニ増シテ中央行政ニ從屬セシメラレタ。獨裁主義ガ創メラレタ。之等ノ官吏ハ其ノ上官ニ對シテノミ責任ヲ負ヒ、任務遂行ニ當リ廣範圍ノ自由ヲ得 管束權ヲ持テ、又其ノ職員ニ對シテ殆ンド無制限ノ懲戒權ヲ有シタノデアリタ。彼等ハ、上官ニヨリ施行サレタ布告ニ補足シテ、規則及ビ夫等ノ條令ニ含まレテキナイ事項ニ關スル規則ヲ發スル權限ガ與ヘラレテキタ。

但、彼等ハ其ノ上官ノ命ニ支配サレ、且凡ユル場合ニ於テ上官ニ對シ責任ガアツタ。

日本人州長及ビ同様ナ當局者ノ職務ニ任レバ、日本人ノ念頭ニアツタ目的トハ根本的形態ニ於テ臺灣朝鮮ニ於テ行ハレタト同様ナ行政機構ヲ樹立スル事ニアツタ。

現在支配者タル四人ノ「サルタン」ハ持統サレタガ、世襲的ニ其ノ肩書ヲ有スル者トシテデハナク、凡テノ文官ガ爲セルト同様日本軍隊ニ對スル忠誠ヲ誓フ義務ヲ負フ新タニ附與サレタ侯トシテデアツタ。

新制度ノ重要地位ハ、日本人ニ占メラレタ。上ハ軍政監部ヨリ下ハ州廳ニ至ル迄、職員ハ殆ンド日本

26.

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人デアツタ。縣廳以下ハ、「インドネシア」人職員  
ガ殆ド全部置サレタ。然シ年ラ、縣長ハ、一九四四  
年以降日本人顧問ニ補佐サレタ。

治（オサム）集團ノ形成ハ、後ニ於テ東條首相ノ  
對東ニ従ヒ變更サレタ。然シ指導的地位ハ、日本人  
ノ手ニ依然留ラレ「インドネシア」人が重要ナ地位  
ニ居タ時ハ、常ニ日本人ノ本軍ノ執行官ガキタノデ  
アル。

一九四五年ノ昭和二十年ノニナツテ始メテ日本官  
吏ハ實權ヲ「インドネシア」人ノ官更ニ譲ツタ。

宣傳部ニヨリ發行サレタ日本人官更ノ經歷書ニ依  
レバ、此ノ集團ハ主トシテ殖民地タル臺灣、朝鮮カ  
ラ集メラレテ居リ、或ル者ハ日本内地ニ於テ行政事  
務ニタツサハツテキタ者デアツタ。

爪哇以外ノ島々ノ新行政機構ノ確立ガ同様ノ線ニ  
添ツテ行ハレタ。

最初ノ段階ニ於テハ「スマトラ」ト馬來ハ新嘉坡  
駐在ノ陸軍司令官ノ許ニアル一行政單位ヲナシテキ  
タガ後ニナツテ「スマトラ」ハ則ノ軍政監部ノ許ニ  
置カレタ。第十六及二十五章（夫々爪哇及ビ「スマ

27.



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トラー)ハ、最後ノ段階ニ於テ坂垣征四郎ニ統率サ  
サレタ新嘉坡ニ司令部ヲ置ク第七地區軍ノ指揮下ニ  
アル事トナツタ。此ノ第七地區軍ハ兩万戰壕ニアツ  
テ寺内元帥ニ統率サレタ。

軍政監部ハ、通商ノ命令系統ヲ通ジテ發セラレタ  
ル命令及ビ陸軍省ヨリ直接發セラレタル命令ノ双方  
ニ從ツテ事ヲナシタ。

「セレベス」・「ボルネオ」並ニ「バリー」及ビ「  
マカツサル」海峽ヲ南北ニ通ズル線以東ノ凡テノ島  
ニ於テハ日本海軍ガ勢力ヲ有シテキタ。名稱ハ異ツ  
テキタガ、實質ハ異ツテキナカツタ。中央集權的行  
政ノ同ジ原則ガ用ヒラレ、日本人ト「インドネシア」  
人ノ關係ハ同様デアツタ。

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海軍占領下ノ領土ノ行政（民政）ハ「セレベス」  
「マツクアイサル」ノ民政府（司令部）ニ於テ行ハ  
レタ。此ノ民政府ハ「スラバヤ」ニ司令部ノ在ツ  
タ第二兩方艦隊司令官ノ指揮下ニ在ツタ。此ノ司  
令部ハ「シンガポール」駐在ノ第七南方艦隊司令  
官ノ統率下ニ在ツタ。

行政ノ再組織ト同様ニ司法機構モ全然改變サレ  
タ。従前ノ裁判所ニ替ル爲メニ第一期ニ設置サレ  
タ所ノ軍政法院ニ加ヘテ、軍會議即チ日本軍人其  
他軍法會議ニ對ケラルベキ者及軍律會議即チ軍令  
ノ違反ヲ取扱フ軍法會議ガ存在シテキタ。

軍政法院自体モ亦此ノ軍政條令及規約ノ違反並  
ニ軍政府ニヨツテ效力アルモノト宣明サレタ舊軍  
令ヲ取扱フ管轄權ヲ有シテキタ。此ノ管轄權ハ軍  
律會議ト共ニ扱ハレタ。

一九四二年九月二十六日附爪哇最高指揮官ノ軍  
令第十四號ハ軍政法院ニ其ノ最終的形式ヲ與ヘタ。  
孰レモ日本的名稱ヲ附シタ八種ノ裁判所ガ設置セ  
ラレ其ノ中ニ最高法院（上訴ノ最終法廷）及高等  
法院（上訴ノ中間法廷）ヲ包含シ、兩院ノ職員ハ  
最初ニ於テハ全部日本人デアツタ。下級裁判所ハ  
地方的行政組織ニ一致スル舊案裁判所、地方裁判  
所及其他區裁判所並ニ二ノ特別宗教裁判所ニヨツ  
テ構成サレ、孰レモ「インドネシア」人ニヨツテ

29.



運営セラレ中間上訴裁判所ニヨツテ直接監督セラレ  
タ。

各裁判所ニ檢察局ガ附置セラレタ。此制度ハ司法  
部ノ下ニ強力ニ中央集權的デアツタ。後日ニ至リ檢  
察局ハ司法部カラ分離サレ、治安部ト改名サレタ。警  
察部ノ下ニ警察ト合併サレタ。

「インドネシア」人ニヨリ構成セラレ、其ノ開廷  
ニ際シ憲兵ノ代表者ガ臨席シ檢察局ノ代表者ノ次ニ  
着席シタ。

初メノ頃ハ從來ノ刑罰法規ガ用ヒラレタ。此ノ刑  
法ハ極メテ民主的ナ地盤ヲ持ツモノナルコトガ分ツ  
タ。テ、一九四四年ニ廣イ範圍ノ解釋ヲ許ス不明確  
ナ言葉ヲ以テ犯罪行為ヲ定義スル新刑罰法規ガ日本  
人ニ依ツテ採用サレタ。特殊ノ諸犯罪ニ就イテハ重  
イ最低刑ガ規定セラレタ。

日本ノ占領期間中日本ノ行政機關ガ屢々「インド  
ネシア」人裁判所ノ審理ニ干渉シタコトガアツタ。  
事實上刑ヲ定メルノハ刑事審理ニ臨席シテキル憲兵  
ノ代表者デアツタ。審理中ハ日本語及馬來語ノミガ  
許容サレタ。軍事裁判所ノモノノ審理ハ日本語テ行  
ハレ而シテ適切ナ通譯ハ減多ニ利用シ得ラレナカツ  
タ。

東印度ノ他ノ島嶼ニ於テモ裁判權ハ同様ナ方法デ  
行使セラレタ。従前ノ裁判所ガ廢止サレ新シイ日本  
ノ裁判所ガ出來タ。

占領ノ當初ニ於テハ日本當局ハ爪哇ノ「スカブミ」  
ニ於ケル警察學校ヲ接收シタ。又各州ノ首都ニ  
於テ日本人ノ指導ニ依ル警察官ノ永久的訓練制度ガ  
確立サレタ。最後ニ既ニ勤務ニ就イテ居ル者  
ニ對シ、大東亞ノ理想及日本ノ力ヲ教ヘル宣傳

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課目が定期的ニ講ゼラレタ。輕微ナ違反行爲ヲ片附ケル爲現場或ハ警察署ニ於テ肉体的虐待ヲ爲ス日本ノ制度ガ設置サレタ。輕微ナ犯罪ニ對スル制裁トシテ虐待ガ街上ニ於テ毎日目撃セラレタ。

「インドネシア」警察隊ノ或ル一部ハ憲兵ノ遣方ヲ採用シタ。

後ニ公安部トナツタ獨立シターツノ警察部ガ集中ノ線ニ沿ツテ設置サレタ。ソシテ凡ユル行政業務ハ日本人ニヨツテ繼承セラレタ。

現存ノ警察隊ハ不十分ナリト日本側當局ニヨツテ感ジラレタ。此ノ狀態ヲ改良スル爲メノ各種ノ方法ガ企テラレタ。

憲兵補即チ「インドネシア」人ニヨル憲兵ノ延長ニシテ憲兵隊員ニヨツテ訓練セラレタノガ組織サレタ。ソウシテ一般人カラハ怖レラレ且ツ嫌ハレタ。

一九四三年四月ニハ全テノ村ト都市ニ於テ補助警察隊トシテ警防團（部落警備隊ノ一種）ガ組織サレタ、此ハ正規ノ警察隊ヲ約一三〇萬程増強セシメタ。

警防團ハ各種ノ任務ヲ持ツテキタ。火事ヤ其他ノ災難ノ際ニハ活動セネバナラナカッタ。聯合國ノ墜落シタ飛行機ノ搭乗員、落下傘兵其ノ他ノ捕縛ニ於テ正規ノ警察ヲ援助セネバナラナカッタ。其地域ニ於テ二十四時間ノ警備任務ヲ行ヒ、大衆宣傳會ニハ



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大勢デ出掛ル事ヲ行ツタ。主ナル任務ハ間諜行爲ニ  
アツテ主トシテ敵ノ「スペイン」ニ對スル一般活動デ  
アツタ。

一九四五年ニハ此等ノ警防團ハ竹槍ノ如キ全ク不  
十分ナル武器デ通信連絡線ノ切斷敵小部隊ノ撃破等  
ノ「ゲリラ」活動ニ大衆ヲ訓練スル爲利用サレタ。  
此訓練ハ外人ニ對スル恐怖ト西洋人ニ對スル憎惡ト  
ヲ單純ナル農夫選ニ教ヘ而シテ是等外人ニ對スル殘  
虐行爲ノ野蠻ヲ發揮ヲ生ゼシタ。

警察ノ補助トシテ第三ノ団体ガ一九四五年初期ニ  
設置サレ警防隊ト呼ベレタ。此ノ警防隊ハ町ノミデ  
活動シ警防團ト同ジ目的ノ爲メ働イタ。其ノ要員ハ  
主トシテ中國人カラ召集サレタ。

彥兵補ハ憲兵ノ一部デアリ他方警防團ト警防隊ハ共  
ニ日本人ニヨツテ指導サレ且訓練サレタガ正式ナ陸  
軍編成ノ中ニハ加ツテハキナカツタ。最後ノコノ二  
ツノ要員ハ義勇隊員デアツタガ若シ所要ノ人員ガ滿  
サレナカツタトキニハ現餘ハ召集サレタノデアル。

刑務所制度モ同様ニ日本側ノ指示ニヨツテ再組織  
サレタ。新入者ノ訓練ト古参者ノ「改善」ノ爲メニ  
教育ガ實施セラレタ。日本的名稱標示ガ導入サレタ。  
囚人ノ取扱ハ非人道的デアツタ。

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33.

軍政部ハインドネシア人ノ學校ヲ再開スル爲ニ教育  
計畫ノ再組織ヲ始メタ。

・國民學校ノ初等教育ガ再組織サレタ。日本語、日  
本ノ唱歌ト舞臺ノ教育及ビ日本式ノ体操ガ採セラレ  
タ他ノ授業科目、即チ蘭方ト算術ノ教授ハ非能ニ短  
縮サレタ。其他ノ科目ハ廢止サレタ

夫々多様な授業科目ヲ有スル数社ノ中等學校ハ廢  
止サレ一定ノ科目ヲ有スル標準型中等學校ガ之ニ代  
ツタ。コノ學校ハ尋常科ト高等科トニ分レタ。科目  
ハ非能ニ簡單ニナツタ。即チ諸外國語ト一般歴史ハ  
削ラレ日本語ト日本歴史ガ之ニ代ツタ。蘭印諸島ノ  
歴史教科書ハ焼却サレ代リニ新教科書ガ使ハレルヨ  
リニナツタガソレハ日本人ト人道ガ同道ナルコト及  
日本トハ共同ノ運命ノ終ニ結ブレテキルコトラ強調  
シタモノデアツタ。

全然新タナ問題トシテハ青少年ニ大東亞共榮圈ノ  
理想ヲ教ヘルタメ「精神科」「精神ハ凡ユル物質的  
障礙ニ打勝テ得ル」トノ事デアツタ。青少年進ヘコ  
ノ精神デ、必要ナラバ竹槍ヲ持ツテ野草其他ノ近代  
兵器ト戦ヘト鼓吹サレタ。

職業學校ハ日本人ノ思想ニ適應スルヤウニ再組織



サレタ。

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バタビヤ醫科大學が「新生爪哇ノ建設」記念日一  
九四三年三月九日ニ「醫科大學」ノ名デ再開サレタ。  
最初ノ學校ハ日本人ノ教授デ九名ノ新任インドネシ  
ア人教授ガ輔佐シタガ大部分同校ノ以前ノ助教授達  
デアツタ。六ヶ月後コレラ九名ノインドネシア人教  
授ハ助教授ニ格下ゲサレ日本カラ新着ノ日本人教授  
ガ之ニ代リ日本語ヲ授ヘタ。日本語ノ授業ハ最初カ  
ラ強制的デアツタ。

學生ハ卒業後日本ノ軍政部ニ勤務スルコトラ誓約  
セシメラレタ。學生達ハ寄宿舎ニ入り日本ノ偉大ナ  
ルコト、大東亞共榮圈ノ理想トラ講義シテ聞カセタ  
トコロノ特ニ任命サレタ日本人監督者ノ下デ嚴格ナ  
半軍隊式訓練ヲ受ケタ。

ソノ醫科大學ノ授業課程ハ六年カラ四年ニ短縮サ  
レタ。

文科、法科及工科ノ大學ハ再開サレテカツタ。乍  
然一九四四年、前ト同様三月九日ニ三年制ヲ課目ガ  
制限サレタ一種高等職業學校ノ様ナモノガ開カレタ。  
學生達ハ上述同様ノ日課ヲ受ケタ。

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法科大學ノ代リニ文官ト法律家ヲ養成スルタメノ  
一年制ノ教育カ行ハレタ。

多クノ時間ガ大東亞共榮圈ノ理想ト日本ノ偉大サ  
ヲ教ヘルコトノ爲メニ費サレタ。學生ニ對スル同僚  
ナ一律化カ施行サレタ。日本語ノ教授ガ一重要部門  
ヲ占メタ。

私的教育ハ長期間禁ゼラレタ。一九四三年及一九  
四四年ニインドネシア人ト中国人ニ對シ二、三ノ取  
ル從來ノ私立學校ガ再び組織スルコトラ許サレタ併  
シ其ノ學課ハ公定ノ範疇ニ從ハネバナラナカツタ。

西洋ノ教育並ニ西洋人ニ教育スルコトハ占領地全  
部ニ亘リ禁止サレタ。此ノ禁止ハ嚴重ニ實施サレタ。  
而シテ單ニ西洋人ニ教育ラシタ疑カアルト言フ事ダ  
ケデ越兵ニ捕ヘラレルニ充分デアツタ。

大勢ノインドネシア大學生、大學卒業生及インド  
ネシア社會ノ優秀ナ人々ガ日本ニ派遣セラレタ。全  
島カラ新聞記者ノ一行ガ大東亞新聞記者會議ニ出席  
ノ爲メ日本ニ連レテ行カレタ。

社會ノ總べてノ部門ガ「フアシスト」化シタ團體  
ニ組織サレタ。

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社會ヲ組織化シ政治的ニ統合スルコトガ凡ユル民族  
的及政治的團體並ニ殆ンド總テノ職業層及商業從  
事者、殆ンド總テノ社會經濟部門、總テノ文化團體  
總テノ宗教團體、青年層、體育團體及婦人運動ノ中  
ニ實施セラレタ。

日本ノ當局ハ是等ノ組織ヲ通ジテ或特殊ノ社會團  
體ヲ確實ニ把握シテ居タソシテ其ノ會員ヨリ軍又ハ  
軍政府ニ對スル助力ト支援ヲ掌握スル爲ニ、是等ノ  
組織ヲ用ヒタ。

××××

××××

夫等ノ團體ハ民衆大會中定期的ニ大舉出動ヲ命ゼ  
ラレタ、又會員間ニ宣傳ヲ行フ爲ニ利用サレタ。

日本人ハコレヲノ團體ヲ與ニ變化ニ通ジ又間諜行  
爲ヲ行フ爲ニ用ヒタ。宣傳部ハコレヲノ組織ト密接  
ナ關係ヲ保ツテキタ。コレヲノ組織ニ於ケル「イン  
ドネシア」官吏ノ演説ハ單ニ事前檢閲ヲ受ケタノミ  
デナク、普通ハ宣傳部ニ依ツテ起草サレサヘシタ。  
是等ノ團體ハ軍政監部ノ嚴密、嚴重ナ監督下ニアツ  
タ。

同一ノ目的ニ供セラレ、同一ノ方針ニ從ツテ是等

36.

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諸種ノ団体ハ、構成サレタ。瓜哇日本總司令官ニ依  
ツテ公布サレタ布告ニ從ツテ設立サレタ。コノ布告  
ノ第一條ハ殆ンド凡テノ団体ニ對シテ同一デアリ、  
団体ノ設立目的ハ日本軍政府ヘノ支持デアルト述べ  
ラレテキタ。

コレヲノ団体ノ理事ハ日本當局ニ依リ任命サレタ。  
支部理事ハ中央部理事ニ對シ責任カアツタ。兩者共  
日本當局ニヨリ任命或ハ承認サレタ顧問會ニ依リ、  
補佐サレテ居タ。

一団体内ノ執行機關ハソノ會員ヲ束縛スル規定ヲ  
作ル權限ヲ與ヘラレテ居リ、會員タルコトハ或集團  
内ノ全員ニ對シテ義務トサレテキタ。

代表的ナ例ハ、一九四三年八月三日付瓜哇總司令  
官布告第二十八號ニ依ツテ設立サレタ瓜哇醫學奉公  
會（瓜哇在住營業者ニ依ル奉公団体）ニ於ケル醫師  
齒科醫師、藥劑師ノ団体デアル。ソレハ左ノ事項ヲ  
有シテ居タ。

第一條、瓜哇醫學奉公會ハ瓜哇ニ於テ醫業ニ從事ス  
ル者ノ知識及人格ヲ陶冶シ、ソノ治療及ビ衛生管  
理ノ能力ヲ擴充、昂揚シ、依ツテ醫學ニ於テ大日  
本軍ニ最大ノ貢獻ヲナサンガタメ、彼等ヲ統合ス

37.



ル目的ヲ以テ設立サル。

第四條、日本國民ニ非サル瓜哇在住ノ醫師、齒科醫  
師並ビニ醫術登録者ハ、敵國人ヲ除キ醫學奉公會  
會員タラザルベカラズ。

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第八條、第七條ニ掲ゲラレタル事柄以外ニモ、  
醫事奉公會ハ軍政官ノ命ニ依リ、軍政實施ニ  
必要ナル特殊業務ヲ行フ。

第九條、醫事奉公會々長ハ軍政官ノ承認ヲ得テ、  
第七、八條ニ規定セラレタル業務ヲ執行スル  
タメニ必要ナル命令及ビ指圖ヲ行フコトヲ得。

第二十一條、醫事奉公會ハ軍政官ノ監督ヲ受ク。  
支部職員ノ業務ハ州長官ノ監督ヲ受ク。

辯護士、新聞記者、並ビニ全部トハ言ハヌマデモ、  
大部分ノ他ノ職業モ同様ニ單一團體ニ組織セラレ  
タ。

經濟活動ノ全分野ニ於テモ強制組合員制、一方的  
統制規則統一目的及ビ日本人ノ理事者等、同様ノ  
有様デアツタ。

凡テノ藝術家及ビ學者ハ、居民文化指導社ニ組織  
サレタ。純東洋的ナ美術表現ノ重要性ガ強調サレ、  
西洋的ナ影響ハ有害ナリト考ヘラレタ。繪畫其ノ  
他ノ藝術作品ハ、ソノ藝術的價值ヲ問ハズ、單ニ  
大東亞共榮圈ニ對スル功績ヲ以テ問題トサレ、評  
價サレタ。コノ團體ハ一九四三年三月ニ設立サレ、  
他ノ團體ト同様ノ性格ヲ持ツテ居タ。即チ日本人  
理事者、陸軍及ビ軍政府ニ對スル強制的支持、其



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醫事奉公會ハ軍政官ノ命ニ依リ、軍政實施ニ  
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理事者、陸軍及ビ軍政府ニ對スル強制的支持、其

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他デアツタ。

日本人ハ青年ノ精神訓練ヲ極メテ重要視シ、コノ  
事業ヲ完全ニ彼等ノ手中ニ收メタ。インドネシヤ  
青年運動ハ最初ハ公認サレタガ、一九四三年中頃  
禁止サレタ。



一九四二年十二月早々、爪哇ノ日本軍司令官ハ大東亞共榮國ノ善良ナル住民タルタメノ青少年ノ訓練ハ日本ガ及ブ限りノ事ヲ爲シテモ尙充分トヘイヘヌ程コノ上ナク重要ナモノデアルト宣言シタ。青少年ノ指導竝ニ訓練ノ事ハ専ラ日本人ノミノ仕事トサレテキタ。コノ管理機關ハ一九四三年四月ノ爪哇青年團ノ創立ヲ以テ設立サレタ。

爪哇青年團設立ノ目的ハ左ノヤウニ記サレテキタ。「爪哇青少年ガ當然軍政府ト協力シ大東亞共榮國建設ニ助力スルヤウ彼等ノ自覺ヲ促ガスタメ彼等ヲ指導訓練スル事ヲ要ス」

各州ニ地方指導者養成ノ爲ノ日本側ニ依ル訓練ノ中心ガ設定サレ中央訓練所ガ「バタヴィア」近在ニ開設サレタ。之ガ總テ日本人ノ指導命令下ニアツタ。後ニ各縣各市ニソレゾレ大凡大隊程度ノ人數ノ青年團ガ組織サレタ。或工場ハ自ラノ青年團ヲ作ツタ。是等ノ青年團ハ軍事的色彩ヲ持テ爪哇聯合青年團ニ編入サレ、日本陸軍將校竝ニ軍政府員ニ指揮サレタ。年齡限度ハ十四才乃至二十五才ニ定メラレ、モシ義勇兵ガ不足スルト更ニ多クノ者ガ徵發サレタ。健康狀態好適者ダケガ入團ヲ許可サレ、ソレ等ノ者ハ大東亞共榮國建設ニ對スル熱意ニ就キ試験サレタ。正式ノ訓練ハ日本語ノ會話及ビ書方ノ教授、精神訓練、軍事訓練、日本式体育、對空防禦、日本音樂、

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舞踊等カラ成ツテキマシタ。

一九四三年九月ニ組織サレタ防衛義勇軍ニ對スル人員ノ大部分ヘ青年團ヨリ供與サレタ。コノ青年團設立直後他ノ青少年團體ヘ一切禁止サレタ。運動モ亦統制サレタ。一九四三年八月二十一日體育會ガ結成サレタ。ソノ體育會ヘ他ノ諸國ト同様ノ構想ノモノデアツタ。コレニ適用サルベキ布告ノ公式解説ニ次ノヤウニ述べラレテル。



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「爪哇體育會」ハ事務所僱員カラ學費ニ至ル迄、  
爪哇ニ於ケル全大東亞同胞ノ運動界ト奮闘及青  
年口ノ運動界ヲ包括スルモノデアル。我々ノ心身  
鍛鍊ノ上ニ、紀律ヲ學ビ之ヲ向上セシメル上ニ、  
勤勞精神及勤勞意欲強化ノ上ニ、如何ニ運動ガ重  
要ナルカラ想ヘバ本體育會ハ大東亞戰爭ニ對シ大  
ナル重要任務ヲモツモノデアル。

各縣各市ニ一ヶ所ヅツ文部ガ設ケラレタ。コレ  
ヲ文部ハソレソレノ州ニ於テ組織サレソレラガ又  
爪哇體育會ニ從屬シテキタ。

爪哇ノ「インドネシア」婦人ハ一九四三年八月  
中ニ創立セラレタル婦人會ニ編入サレタ。

其ノ目的及ビ業務ハ左ノ如ク定メラレタ。

「本機關ノ目的ハ原住民ノ婦人ノ地位ニ相應シ  
キ努力ヲ以テ大日本軍ヲ援助シ且ツ婦徳ヲ向上セ  
シムルニ在リ。軍政府ノ行動ヲ援助スルタメ事業  
部ガ婦人會内ニ設ケラレテ居ル。此機關ハ戦後ノ  
状態及ビ貯蓄、教育、公衆、公衆ノ衛生ノ方面ニ  
於ケル状態ノ改善ニ必要ナル事業ヲ遂行シナケレ  
ベナラナイ。

戰爭中國防ノ努力ニ與スル婦人ノ資力ニ於ケル  
ソノ自覺ヲ深メルタメ先ヅ第一助トシテ婦人會ハ  
講演會及ビ講座ヲ開クコト及ビ將來發展有リタル

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44.

トキ、其ノ業務ガ成ル可ク立派ニ遂行シ得ラル、  
意ニ訓練實施ニ當ツテハ吾年圖及ヒ舊防口ト密接  
ナル連絡ヲ保ツコトガ許サル、デアラウー  
他ノ島嶼ニ於ケル進展ハ時爪哇ニ於ケルモノト

同様デアツタ

然シモツト進歩ノ遅レテル人々ノ間ニ生活シテ  
キル日本人ハ彼等日本人自身ノ間デモ其ノ能率  
差ガ低ク同時ニ日本人ノ倉庫ヲ殺害ニシテ兵站  
地タル爪哇ニ於ケルヨリモ遠方人ノ協力ニ頼ル所  
少ナカツタメ彼等ハヨリ單純ナ形デ政治的統合  
ノ工作ニ取り對ツタノデアル。



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### 三、第三段階

自一九四三年（昭和十八年）七月至一九四四年（昭和十九年）九月。

第一期間ノ頃既ニ、日本當局ハ或ル活動ヲシテ居タノデアルガ然シ地方的ニ採ラレタ政策ハ、在「バタビ」海軍造船將校ニヨツテ所謂「日和見」主義トシテ特質ヲ示シテキルモノデアッタ。

占領直後、一種ノ禁止ガ一九四二年（昭和十七年）三月八日附爪哇ノ軍司官布告第二號第二條デ規定セラレ、次ノ如ク記載サレテキル。

「差當リ左ノ事項ヲ禁止ス

(イ) 結社、集合、逆宣傳、及貼紙」

一九四二年（昭和十七年）三月二十日附布告第三號ニヨリ更ニ「言論、行動、示唆又ハ宣傳ニシテ政治ニ關スルモノ」ヲ禁止シタ。

此ノ禁止ニ依リ、或「インドネシア」人國家主義指導者ハ、一九四二年（昭和十七年）四月意兵ニ逮捕セラレ、其ノ中ノ僅カ數人ガ相當時日ヲ經タ後、漸ク釋放サレタニ過ギナイ。

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一九四二年（昭和十七年）十二月ヨリ一九四三年（昭和十八年）一月ニカケ、排日的ト解シ得ル種ノ地下工作ニ従事セル「インドネシア」人ニ對シ大規模ナ檢舉ガ行ヘレタ。此等ノ人々ハ死刑ヲ宣告サレタ者或ハ獄死セル者ヲ除キ、一九四五年（昭和二十年）九月迄釋放サレナカッタノデアル。一九四三年（昭和十八年）一月以後ニ於テサヘ尙、憲兵ハ周到ニ凡ユル地下工作ヲ監視偵察シ續ケ、其ノ結果實ニ莫大ナ犠牲者ヲ出シテキル。

一九四二年（昭和十七年）日本ハ三亞運動ニ着手シタ。此ノ名稱ハ、次ノ標語ヲ表ヘシタ大キナ、ビラ上ニ發表セラレタノデアル。

|         |     |
|---------|-----|
| 亞細亞ノ保護者 | 日本、 |
| 亞細亞ノ指導者 | 日本、 |
| 亞細亞ノ光   | 日本、 |

亞細亞ノ爲メノＡＡＡハ他ノ文字ヨリ大キク又一層目立ツ色デ印刷サレテアツタ、本運動丹誠ノ主題ハ「亞細亞人ノ爲ノ亞細亞」デアツタ「白色人種ニ屬スル外國人」及ビ「西洋ノ開發者」ニ對スル憎惡デアツタ。之ニ反シ、日本人

46.



ハ「インドネシア」人ト同人種同祖先デアルト説  
カレタノデアツタ。

「日本人ト同一祖先ヲ持チ同一人種デアル」「インドネシア」人」ト云フ詞ハ一九四二年（昭和十七年）三月七日附日本軍司令官布告第一號第一條ニ出テ居ルノデアアル。西洋勢力ハ東洋精神ノ腐敗ナリト言ヘレタノデアアル。日本ハ亞細亞民族ノ救済者ナリト云ヘレ、又日本ノ「親心」指導精神下ノ大東亞共榮國ハ、亞細亞諸國民ヲ解放スルモノデアルト言ヘレタ。「新シイ爪哇」又ハ「爪哇ノ新秩序」ト云フ標語ハ別トシテ、大東亞共榮國ノ爪哇ニ對スル意味ハ説明サレナカツタ。「インドネシア」ナル語ヲ政治的意味ニ用ヒルコトハ許サレナカツタ。多クノ公式發表ニハ「インドネシア」人ハ「原住民」ト言ヘレテ居タノデアアル。

三亞運動全盛ノ間ニ「インドネシア」人界特ニ從來ノ統治及ビ其ノ統治ノ獨立準備ノ速度ニ不消ヲ持ツテ居ル者ニ對スル一層ノ接觸ガ求メラレタ。

此等ノ中ノ主ナルモノハ、一九四二年（昭和十七年）七月ニ憲兵隊ガ爪哇ニ運レテ來タ（技師）「スカルノ」デアツテ、彼ハ他ノ三名ノ國家主義者ト共ニ所謂「アンバト・セラнкаイ」（四葉ノ「クローバ」）ヲ組織シタ、此ノ人々ハ日本ノ監督下ニ於テ日本ニ協力セントスル國家主義者ノ指導者トナツタ。此ノ四ツノ「セラнкаイ」ハ、日本ノ約束中ニ、彼等ノ希求セル速カナル獨立ヲ得ル手段ノアルヲ知ツタデアツタ。彼等ハ此等ノ約束ヲ信ジ、日本軍政監部トノ完全ナ協力ヲ提唱シタデアツタ。

日本軍ハ又以前ノ統治ニ對シ何等ノ不満足ヲモ抱イテ居ラズ、其ノ下ニアツテ高官ニ就イテ居タ「インドネシア」知識人ノ「グループ」ニモ接近ヲ求メタ。日本軍司令官ハ一九四二年（昭和十七年）十二月ニ「舊慣制度調査委員會」ナルモノヲ設立シタ。即チ「該地ノ慣習及ビ舊政治制度ヲ調査研究シテ爪哇統治ニ資スル爲」デアツタ。議長ヲ含ム九名ノ日本人ト、「西葉ノ「クローバ」」以前ノ諸部長、以前ノ教授及ビ人民委員會ノ會員ヲ包含スル十名ノ「インドネシア」人ガ此ノ委員會ニ席ヲ占メタデアツタ。此レハ重要ナ



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ル役割ヲ演ジタコトハ無ク、一九四三年（昭和十八年）十一月日本側ニヨツテ廢止サレタ。

「四」「セランカイ」ニ依ツテ日本當局ニ對シテナサレタ最初ノ要求ハ、黨組織ノ許可デアッタ。此ノ要求ハ、一九四二年（昭和十七年）十二月八日迄審議中デアッタガ、眞珠灣ノ記念式ニ際シ「ベタビヤ」ニ於テ一大宣傳會ガ催サレタ節、軍司令官ハ「インドネシア」人ノ爲ニ單一政黨ノミヲ許可スル旨公ニ約束シタノデアッタ。

本約束ノ履行ハ東京ヨリノ茲定ヲ待タナケレベナラスモノデアッタ。

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一九四三年（昭和十八年）三月九日「ブテラ」運動が創メラレタ。其ノ名稱ハ「ブサット・テナガ・ラヤット」ト言フ語ノ象徴的ノ略稱デ、同名稱ハ「国民精神刀ノ中心」ト言フコトヲ示シ、一方「ブテラ」ハ「勇士ノ息子」ヲ意味スルモノデアール。

其ノ目的及方針ハ前ニ述ビタル語口体ノ夫ト大体同ジデアツタガ、只此ノ民衆運動ノ名前ガ日本語デナク馬來語デアール點ダケガ違ツテキタ。「ブテラ」ハ政體デハナク單ニ指導者ト顧問會議トヲ持ツタ運動デアツタ。

指導者達ハ軍司令官ニ依ツテ任命サレ、日本人ト「インドネシア」人トガ略々同數ノ顧問會議ノ援助ヲ受ケタ。此ノ「インドネシア」人ハ軍政廳ノ承認ヲ受ケテ指導者ノ長ガ指名スルノデアール。各地方ノ指導者ハ日本軍ノ承認ヲ受ケテ指導者ノ長ニ依ツテ任命サレタ。

「ブテラ」ノ組織ハ軍司令官ノ定メル規則ニ依ツテ管セラレ、ソノ目的ハ日本軍ニ依ツテ公式ニ次ノ様ニ發表サレテキタ。

「民衆ノ力ト勢力トラ振ヒ起ス目的ハ大東亞ニ於ケル終極ノ勝利ヲ獲得スベキアラユル手段ヲ支持スルコトニ外アラナイ。

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此ノ運動ノ爲スベキ仕事ハ大日本軍政監部ノ政  
策ト緊密ニ結び付ケラレテ居ルノデアルカラ、  
總テノ指導者ハ彼等ガ大日本軍ノ狙ヒト目的ト  
ヲ充分ニ知り且之ヲ信ジナケレバナラヌト謂フ  
コトヲ念頭ニ置カナケレバナラナイ。」

此ノ演説ニ於テ「ブテラ」ノ指導者達ハ更ニ次ノ  
ヤウニ言ヒ聞カサレタ。

「現在ノ情勢ニ於テ現ニ存スル諸制約ヲ充分ニ  
知ル様當ニ全カラ盡シ、一般民衆ヲ迷ハセル様  
ナコトヲシテハナラヌ。余ハ貴下方ガ此ノ運動  
ノ狙ヒト目的トヲ實行スル爲ニ全カラ盡スト共  
ニ、大東亞共榮國ノ成立ニ協力シ、大東亞共榮  
國構成國家ノ一員タルベキ新爪哇ヲ建設セラレ  
ンコトヲ希望スル」

「ブテラ」ノ機能ハ以下ノ十項目中ニ公式ニ定メ  
ラレテ居タ。

- 一、「インドネシア」人民ニ新爪哇建設ニ關ス  
ル其ノ義務ト責任トラ銘記サセルコト。
- 二、西洋勢力ヲ除去スルコト。
- 三、大東亞防衛ニ参加スルコト。
- 四、窮乏ノ勝利獲得ノ爲必要ナル一切ノ精神的  
肉体的訓練ニ耐エル自己訓練ノ精神ヲ培養  
スルコト。

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五、日本人及び「インドネシア」人間ノ相互理  
解ヲ深メルコト。

六、日云語研究ヲ奨励スルコト。

七、「インドネシア」人民ノ標準ヲ高メ、其ノ  
知能及び人格ヲ磨養スルコト。

八、人民体位ノ向上ノ爲、保健及び「スポーツ」  
ヲ奨励スルコト。

九、節約、貯蓄ヲ奨励スルコト。

十、壹分野ニ於ケル生産増強ヲ奨励シ、勞働愛  
ノ精神ヲ發達セシメルコト。

「ブテラ」ハ「インドネシア」人ヲ對象トシタモ  
ノデアツタ。日本人ニ依ツテ實ラサレタ新社會階  
級組織ハ次ノ階級カラ成立ツモノデアツタ。一、日  
本人、二、「インドネシア」人、三、其ノ他ノ亞細亞  
人、四、「インドネシア」人ト他ノ區分ニ屬スルモ  
ノトノ混血人、五、歐洲人。是ニ依テ「インドネシ  
ヤ」人ハ「原住民」デアル爲待遇ヲ有スル郡類ト  
シテ待遇セラレ、一方三乃至五ノ區分ノモノハ外  
國人トシテノ待遇ヲ受ケ、歐洲人及以亞混血人ハ  
最モ惡イ待遇ヲ受ケタ。

「ブテラ」ノ設置ト略々同シ頃、所謂「外國人」  
ノ旅行制限ガ強化サレタ。更ニ如何ナル人モ自分  
ノ居住地以外ノ若ク宿泊サセル時ハ直チニ警察ニ

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届ケ出ルヤウニ命ゼラレタ。更ニ爪哇島南岸一帯  
ト東面南端ヲ含ム「立入禁止地區」ガ設定サレ、  
同地區ニハ「外國人」ハ全然入ル事ヲ許サレズ、  
「インドネシヤ」人チサヘモ之ニハ通行權ヲ與シ  
タ。

「ブテラ」ニ對スル最初ノ非信ナ熱意ハ、人民  
ガ期待ヲカケテ居タ此ノ口條ノ活動ガ日本ノ宣傳  
機關ニ依ツテ規定サレタ根本原則ニ全面的ニ制限  
サレテシマフコトガ明カニナツテ來タ時、衰ヘテ  
シマツタ。最初計畫サレタ「ブテラ」ノ青年運動  
ガ禁止サレ、日本官憲ガソノ代ニ彼等自身ノ青年  
運動ヲ創設シタ時ノ失望ハ非常ニ大キカツタ。

一方、東印度以外デハ大變化ガ起ツテ居タ、即  
チ日本ハ攻勢カラ守勢ヲ取ルコトヲ餘儀ナクサレ、  
進路略ハ重大ナ脅威ヲ受ケテ居タ。

コノ背景ニ就シテ、一九四三年（昭和十八年）  
六月十六日、東條首相ハ帝國議會ニ於テ演説ヲ行  
ツタ。ソノ中、就中、彼ハ爪哇ノ人民ガ進ンデ日  
本軍政監郡エ勵力ヲ示シ來リシ事實ニ言ミ、彼等  
ハ政治ニ參加スル事ヲ具ヘラルベキデアルト述べ  
タノデアル。此ノ際東條首相ハ亦巨國獨立ヲ如何  
及ビ比價實ニ納シタノデアル。

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此ノ約束ニ從ツテ東條首相ハ自カラ南方地域ヲ防レタ。

爪哇ヘノ途上、東條ハ馬尼刺及新嘉坡ヲ防レ比律賓及緬甸ニ對シテ獨立ノ約束ヲ繰リ返シテキルノデアル。爪哇ニ於テハ獨立ハ許サレズ唯政治ヘノ參與ノミガ約サレタノデアツタ。右約束ニハ之ニ關聯シテ終局ノ勝利ヲ博スル爲日本軍政監部ニ完全ニ協力スルト言フ條件ガアツタノデアル。

此ノ約束ニ從ツテ一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ八月二日インドネシア人ハ宗務部長ニ任命サレタ。但シ實權ハ相變ラズ該課ノ長タリシ日本人ノ手ニ在ツタ。ソシテ他ノ二名ノ者ハ爪哇ノ二ツノ最モ小サイ行政區ノ州長ニ任命サレタ。但シ實權ハ日本人ノ副州長ガ掌握シテキタ。更ニ多数ノ「インドネシア」人ガ低地位ニ公式ニ任命サレタガ右ノ地位ハ元ニ之等ノ人々ガ欲イテキタ地位デアツタ。ソシテ彼等ハ日本治集團ニ編入サレ日本ノ相當官ノ位階ヲ與ヘラレテキタ。

「參與制度」ナルモノガ設ケラレ「インドネシア」人ハ七部ノ參與ニ薦舉サレタ。參與ハ唯問題

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ガ自分ニ諮詢サレタ時ニ於テノミ其ノ役ヲ勤メタ  
ノデアアル。

凡ユル行政區及「バタビヤ」ノ特別市ニ其行政  
官ニ變シテ地方政治ニ關スル助言ヲ具ヘル爲顧問  
機關タル參議會ガ一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ九月  
五日附置司令官置政令第三十七號ニ依リ設置サレ  
タ。此ノ政令ハ任命サレ選舉サルベキ各參議會ノ  
議員數ヲ各々規定シタ。

選舉ハ間接デ候補者ノ指名ハ公開デナク又投票  
ハ秘密デハナカツタ。

參議會ノ職務ハ州長ニ依ツテ提出サレル地方政  
治ニ關スル質問ニ答ヘ又提出サレタ問題ニ關シテ  
提案スル權限ヲ有シテ居タ。其レハ州長ヨリノ命  
令ガアル場合ニノミ會合スルコトガ出來タ。會議  
ノ開會及閉會ハ州長ノ命令ニ依ツテ行ハレタ。州  
廳ノ官吏達ハ會議ニ出席シ討論ニ參加スルコトガ  
出來タ。

會議ガ公ニ行ハレタノハ開會演說ノ時ト閉會ノ  
時デアリ此ノ開會演說ハ前以テ起草サレ抄寫サレ  
タノデアアル。實質上ノ會議ハ秘密ニ行ハレタノデ  
アル。最後ノ會議ニ於テ、秘密會ニ於テ討論決定  
サレタ提議ハ模擬投票ニ附セラレタ。夫故凡ユル

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提議ハ常ニ滿場一致ヲ以テ議決サレタ。會議ハ殆  
ト四、五日以上續イタコトヘナイ。議長ハ議員ノ  
中カラ州長ノ任命ニ依ツテ定メラレタ。各參議會  
ハ爪哇ノ中央諮問機關タル中央參議院ニ代表者ヲ  
送ツタ。是ハ一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ九月五日  
ニ軍政令第三十六號ニ依リ「軍政ノ強力適切ナル  
進展ヲ期スル爲」設置サレタ。四十三名ノ議員中  
二十三名ハ軍司令官ニ依ツテ任命サレタ。其ノ中  
ノ中十八名ハ各行政區參議會ニ依ツテ選舉サレタ。  
二名ノ議員ハ同僚君主領ニ依リ任命サレタ。其手  
續ハ地方參議會ノモノト同ジデアツタ。

彼等ハ軍司令官或ハ州長ノ提出セル質問ニ對シ  
助言ヲ與ヘ其ニ關スル提言ヲ爲ス權限ノミヲ與ヘ  
ラレテキタノデアアル。事務ノ實際上ノ指揮權ハ中  
央參議院事務局長ノ手ニ在ツタノデアアル。彼ハ彼  
ノ局ノ他ノ職員ト同ジク日本人デアツタ。同局ノ  
職務ハ中央參議院ノ活動ノ内部的監督及ビ信託ノ  
出入ヲ取扱フ事デアツタ。局長及職員ハ軍司令官  
ニ依ツテ任命サレタモノデアリ。最初ノ局長ハ東條  
首相ノ私設秘書デアツタ。

同様ニ參議會ノ書記ハ常ニ州廳ヨリノ日本人デ  
アツタ。

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全ク最初ヨリ、此ノ組織ハ各軍事組織ノ爲勞働力  
及志願者ヲ動員スルト共ニ住民ヲ激勵シテ農産物  
ノ生産増強及軍政監部ヘ是等農産物ヲ供出サセル  
目的デ日本軍ノ宣傳機關トシテ用ヒラレタノデア  
ル。

尙此ノ外ノ地方參與方策トシテハ初等教育、低水  
準ノ地方行政、公共衛生及農業等ニ於テ從來ヨリ  
廢汎ナ行政權力ガ中央爪哇ノ同教君主ニ與ヘラレ  
タ事デアル。

中央參議院ノ設立ト殆ンド同時ニ、後ニナツテ  
軍司令官ガ公式ニ聲明シタ様ニ、日本軍政監部ハ  
東條首相ノ約束ガ今ヤ事實トナツテ現ハレタノデ  
アルカラ、爪哇ノ「インドネシア」民衆ハ之ガ感  
謝ノ意ヲ具體的ニ表明スベキデアルト共ニ、日本  
軍政ヲ喜ンデ支援スルコトヲ示ス爲ニ義勇隊ヲ組  
織スルコトハ彼等ノ義務デアルトノ意見ヲ抱イテ  
キタノデアル。

右宣傳部ハ原住民自體、彼等ノ軍隊ヲ持ツコト  
ヲ希望シテ居ル様ニ外ノ世界ニ見エルグラウト保  
證シタ。

一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ八月ノ終ニ「スカ  
ル」ノ一舊友ガ義勇軍ヲ組織スル許可ガ得度イト  
軍司令官ニ對シテ「自己ノ血液ヲ以テ」署名シタ

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款願書ヲ、多數ノ此ノ様ナ款願書ヲ提出シタ者ノ  
中デ第一ニ提出シタ。軍司令官ハ一九四三年／昭和  
十八年／十月初ニ、彼ハ是等ノ款願ハ許可シ度  
イ氣持ヲ有スルコト及爪哇民衆ガ東條ノ約束ニ對  
シテ何等カ報ヒ度イト希望スルノハ至極尤モト思  
フト聲明シタ。一九四三年／昭和十八年／十月三  
日付、軍政令第四十四號ニ依リ、彼ハ郷土防衛軍  
ヲ設置シタ。

此ノ軍ノ目的ハ「大東亞共同防衛ノ精神ニ則リ  
爪哇防衛ノ爲、原住民（即チ「インドネシア」人）  
ヲ糾合」スルコトデアツタ。

第四條ニ曰ク。「爪哇防衛義勇軍ハ郷土防衛精神  
ニ徴シ、（大日本軍ノ指導ノ下ニ）／括弧内原文  
ニナシ、英譯ニ在リ／米英蘭ニ對シ各州郷土ノ防  
衛ニ任ズ」ト。

此ノ軍政令ニ基キ、義勇軍ハ爪哇軍司令官ニ依  
ツテ統率セラレタ。此ノ軍ハ日本軍ノ一部ヲナス  
モノニ非ザルコトトソレ自身ノ將校團ヲ持ツテハ  
キルガ日本人ノ指揮官ニ依ツテ訓練サレルコトガ  
強調サレタ。其ノ軍ハ爪哇以外ニハ使用サレズ、  
亦義勇兵ヲ以テ組織サレルコトデアツタ。

最初ノ兵員徵募ガ直チニ始マツタ。然シ兵員徵  
募ヲ續ケテミルト熱意ガ不充分ト見エタノデ、新

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規徵募毎ニ義勇軍ノ陣容ヲ強化スルタメニ幾人ノ「志願兵」ヲ必要トスルカタ各行政地區ガ通告ヲ受ケタ。日本軍ノ宣傳ノ主ナル活動ハ此ノ軍ノ徵募ニ應ズル様ニ激勵スル事デアツタ。

一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ十月「將校」ノ養成ガ始メラレテ之ハ三ヶ月間續ケラレタ。

其ノ目的ハ一州ニツキ約千名ヨリナル一乃至數個ノ大隊ヲ作り、ソレヲ合セテ州防衛ノ一部隊ヲ編成スルコトデアツタ。日本降服ノ時ニ此ノ目的ハ達セラレタ。州ノ防衛ニ於ケル義勇軍ノ任務ハ主トシテ道路ノ交叉點、橋梁、及ヒ他ノ戰略上重要ナル地點ノ防衛デアツタ。武裝ハ、是等義勇兵ニ對シテハ訓練ノ期間ダケ支給サレ、教育ハ主トシテ木銃テ行ハレタ。

別班、即チ日本第十六軍司令部ノ特別班ハ諜報機關デアツタガ、訓練ノ任ヲ負フト同時ニソレヲ「スパイ」トシテ使フノハ勿論新志願兵ヲ探偵スルコトニモ利用シタノデアル。

是ヨリ前、日本軍ハ「インドネシヤ」人ヲ補助部隊トシテ利用シテ居タ。占領直後、多クノ「インドネシヤ」兵ガ或ハ徵募サレ、或ハ「兵補」(補助兵)トシテ勤務スルコトヲ余儀ナクサレタノデアツタ。

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是等ノ部隊ハ日本軍ノ一部ヲ構成スルモノデア  
ツテ、日本ノ軍庫ガ給與サレテキタ。彼等ハ主ト  
シテ軍需品補給ヤ女及ヒ一役人抑留者ガ占メテ居  
ル虚空所ヲ警備スル爲ニ使ハレタ。兵補部隊ハ外  
地ニ派遣サレタ。

日本海軍モ同様ニ「インドネシヤ」人ノ兵補部  
隊ヲ利用シタ。

義勇軍モ兵補部隊モ日本語ヲ話スコトヲ教ヘラ  
レタ。命令ハ日本語ヲ發セラレ、亦規則ハ日本語  
ヲ書カレタ。彼等ハ日本ノ徽章ヲツケテキタ。訓  
練ノ重要點ハ「精神」教育デアツタ。

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日本ノ宣傳ノ重要ナ目的ノ一ハ、農産物ノ増産  
及ビソノ日本軍政監部ヘノ供出デアツタ。  
爪哇島ハ日本占領軍及ビ東洋テ戦ヒツツアツタ日  
本軍ノ爲ニ食糧ヲ供給スル必要ガアツタ。其ノ上  
日本占領軍ハ多量ノ食糧ヲ貯蔵シテ居タ。以前ニ  
ハ島民自身ノ主要食糧ノ需要ヲ辛シテ滿タシテ來  
タ爪哇ハ増産ヲ期待サレタ。此ノ増産ハ攻撃サレ  
タ和蘭ノ専門家ニ代ツテ十分テ訓練ヲ經テ居ナイ  
日本人ガ引進イダ爲ノ灌漑作業ニ對スル適當ナ監  
督ノ排除及ビ氣候ト地理的條件ニ適セザル農産物  
ヲ欲シ、之ガ生産ヲ強固セシムル爲ノ目的達成ニ  
日本軍ガ採ツタ出賃目ノ方法トニ依リ阻害サレタ。  
是等一切ノ事ガ一段ト食用作物ノ作物面積ヲ減少  
セシメタ。

普通ノ百姓ニトツテハ其ノ生産物ヲ日本ノ當局  
ニ渡スコトガ段々利益デナクナツテ來タ。當初カ  
ラ日本人ハ米ノ値段ヲ適當ナ水準ニ安定サセル爲  
ニ蘭印政府ノ政策ヲ採用シタ。

日本ノ「ギルダール」軍票ガ購買力ヲ減ジタ結果公  
定ノ米價ハ間モナク他ノ商品トノ比較ニ於テ其ノ  
以前ノ價值ヨリ遙カニ低イモノトナツタ。

百姓ガ米ヲ賣ツタ収益デ買フコトヲ常トシタ品物  
ハ事實上買ヘナカツタ。

日本當局ハ食料生産品收穫ノ六割ハ之ヲ當局ニ供

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61.

日本ノ宣傳ノ重要ナ目的ノ一ハ、農産物ノ増産  
及ビソノ日本軍政監部ヘノ供出デアツタ。  
爪哇島ハ日本占領軍及ビ東洋テ戦ヒツツアツタ日  
本軍ノ爲ニ食糧ヲ供給スル必要ガアツタ。其ノ上  
日本占領軍ハ多量ノ食糧ヲ貯蔵シテ居タ。以前ニ  
ハ島民自身ノ主要食糧ノ需要ヲ辛ジテ済タシテ來  
タ爪哇ハ増産ヲ期待サレタ。此ノ増産ハ攻撃サレ  
タ和蘭ノ専門家ニ代ツテ十分テ訓練ヲ經テ居ナイ  
日本人ガ引越イダ爲ノ灌漑作業ニ對スル適當ナ監  
督ノ排除及ビ氣候ト地理的條件ニ適セザル農産物  
ヲ欲シ、之ガ生産ヲ強制セシムル爲ノ目的達成ニ  
日本軍ガ採ツタ出鱈目ノ方法トニ依リ阻害サレタ。  
是等一切ノ事ガ一段ト食用作物ノ作物面積ヲ減少  
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普通ノ百姓ニトツテハ其ノ生産物ヲ日本ノ當局  
ニ渡スコトガ段々利益デナクナツテ來タ。當初カ  
ラ日本人ハ米ノ値段ヲ適當ナ水準ニ安定サセル爲  
ニ印政府ノ政策ヲ採用シタ。

日本ノ「ギルダール」軍票ガ購買力ヲ減ジタ結果公  
定ノ米價ハ間モナク他ノ商品トノ比較ニ於テ其ノ  
以前ノ價值ヨリ遙カニ低イモノトナツタ。

百姓ガ米ヲ賣ツタ収益デ買フコトヲ當トシタ品物  
ハ事實上買ヘナカツタ。

日本當局ハ食料生産品收穫ノ六割ハ之ヲ當局ニ供



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出シテケレバナラヌト云フ命令ヲ出シタ。當局ハ  
街衢ニ關所ヲ設ケテ通行サレタ地方別封鎖經濟地  
帯ノ設定ノ如キ米ヤ他ノ食料生産品ノ販賣引ヲ取  
締ル爲ノ遠大ナ手段ヲ執ツタ。個人消費ヲ除キ一  
共働一製材所以外デノ米ノ販賣ハ禁止サレタ。  
宣傳部ハ一層多クノ宣傳ヲ待ンガ爲、一層廣イ地  
域ヲ耕作スルヤウ農夫ヲ説キ込ム爲其ノ全力ヲ注  
イダ。宣傳部ハ又住民ニ其ノ農作物ヲ日本軍政監  
部ニ渡スコトノ説ヲ勞力シタ。

爪哇ノミナラズ全南方地域ヲ通シテ、日本ハ到  
ル處ニ於テ軍事要塞、飛行場、戦術訓練所ノ構築ノ  
爲勞力ヲ使用シタ。

爪哇ハ新ナル勞力ノ供源地デアツタ。當初ヨリ日  
本ノ宣傳ハ、之等苦力ノ自發的應募ノ獎勵ニ大重  
トナツタノデアツタ。日本側ハ最初之ニ成功シタ。  
之等ノ苦力が日本軍ニ何ノヤウニ扱ハレテキルカ  
ヲ人民ガ知ルヤ彼等ノ爲ニ働カントスル欲求ハ益  
ク消エテシマツタ。之ハ爪哇ヨリ外地ヘ送ラレタ  
苦力が歸ラズ爾後彼等ヨリ何等ノ便リモナキニ及  
ンデ更ニ惡化シタノデアツタ。

日本軍ハ其ノ徴發集團ヲ採用シ之ニヨツテ各行  
政區ハ爪哇内ノ仕事並ニ其ノ島以外ノ地ノ勞働ノ  
爲ニ何名ノ苦力ヲ徴發スベキカラ通告サレタノデ  
アツタ。

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一九四三年（昭和十八年）ニ直轄部ハ活潑ナ運動ヲ開始シタ。コノ運動デ「ブラヂユリット・エコノミ」（經濟界ノ勇者）ハ、日本軍ノ爲ニ働クコトニ依ツテ神聖ナ仕事ヲ果シテキルモノデアルトサレタ。苦力ト關フ語ヲロニスルコトモ最早許サレナカッタ。苦力モ亦軍人デアリ、ソシテ戦争努力ニ對スル其ノ貢獻ハ大イニ賞讃サレネバナラナカッタ。

苦力ノ徵集ハ凡ユル手段ヲ盡シテナサレタ。其ノ一ツトシテ後ニ強サレタ親戚ノ家ニハ「ブラヂユリット・ベカイヤ」ト記サレタ標札ガ與ヘラレ、公衆ニ此ノ様ナ家ト其居住者ニハ敬意ヲ拂ヘネバナラナイト指示サレ、一方又此ノ標札ハ爾後特別ノ保護ガ與ヘラレルコトヲ保證スルト言ヘレタノデアル。尙是等ノ親戚達ハ理窟上ハ衣類ノ様ナ乏シイ日用品ノ配給ニハ或特權一總テノ政府官吏ガ彼等ノ分前ヲ受ケ終ツタ後ニシカ持テナカッタ特權一ヲ有シタ。

是等勞働者ノ面倒ヲ見テ貰フ事ハ悍然ヤ抑留者ノソレヨリモ薄ク、且ツ彼等ガ衛生上ノ豫防策ヤ醫療ニ無智デアツタノデ其ノ事情ヲ更ニ惡化サセタノデアツタ。勞務者トシテ爪哇カラ外ニ移送サレタ者ノ正確ナ數字ハ判ラナイガ降服後日本人ノ公式推算ニハ二十七萬人ト言フ數字ヲ表示シ、戦争終結以來復歸シタモノハ七萬人ニ達シナカッタ。

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64.

節選者ノ大部分ハ残忍ナ處待ヲ受ケテキタノデア  
ツタ。宿泊設備、食糧醫療手當ハ全く不充分デア  
ツタバカリデナク又多クノ場合皆無デアツタ。  
或ル期間中「」勞務者「」デ試死シタリ傳染性疾患デ  
死亡シタモノガ毎日或ル收容所カラハ馬車デ運ブ  
程多致ニ搬ビ去ラレタ。

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宗教問題ニ關シ、宣傳部ハ民衆ノ完全ナル協力ヲ得ントシテ努力シタノデアアル。

是等活動ハ特ニ、民衆ノ大多數ヲ形成スル同教徒ノ感化ニ向ケラレタガ、他ノ同教徒間ニ於ケル宣傳ハ遙カニ重要ノ度ガ低イモノデアツタ。「敵國人」信侶若シクハ傳道者ハ「敵國人」以外ニ對シテハオ勤メラ行フコトヲ禁ジラレテキタ。「敵國人」信侶若シクハ傳道者ガ教會ノ會衆中ニ「インドネシヤ」人ヲ認メル時ハ、責任ヲ以テ嚴罰ニ處シテ立退カセラルコトニナツテキタ。

當初カラ日本人ハ、日本人ノ諸目的ヲ民衆ニ傳ヘ又、自發的協力ニ依リ最大限ノ戰爭努力ヲサセル爲、同教徒ノ爲ニ一ツノ機關ヲ設立スル事ニ努力シタノデアアル。

此ノ方面ニ於ケル日本人ノ幾ツカノ企圖ハ、最初ハ同教徒仲間ノ宗教上ノ主義ニ關スル不一致ノ爲ニ、失敗ニ歸シタノデアアル。一九四三年ノ昭和十八年十一月ニ、日本人ハ同教徒諸國體ヲ一ツノ親機關「マシユミ」(マヂエリス・シユラ・ムスリミン・インドネシヤ・インドネシヤ同教徒協議會ノ略語)ニ統合スルコトニ成功シタノデアアル。

此ノ事ハ同教徒智識階級ヲ同格ニシタ。更ニ又非常ニ多數ノ「ウラマ」(同教經典ノ唱道者)及「キア

65.



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イー（宗教問題ノ教師）ガ居テ、之等ハ同教徒智識階級トハ緊密ニ結ビツイテハ居ナカツタガ、村落ニ於テハ相當ノ勢力ヲ振ツテキタ。

頭初ヨリ、宗教部ハ是等「キアイ」及「ウラマ」ヲ通ジテ住民ノ間ニ勢力ヲ得ントシタ。一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ七月ニ邇ツテノ話デハアルガ、當時ノ日本人宗教部長ハ爪哇附近ヲ旅行シ始メ、各州ニ於テ地方行政部ニヨリ各所ニ出席スル様ニ命ゼラレタ約五百乃至六百「キアイ」及「ウラマ」ノ爲ニ會ヲ催シタ。部長ハ相變ラズノ詞子デ日本ノ見解、意圖ヲ開陳シタ後、聽衆ノ意見ヲ打診シタ。彼ハ「アラビヤ」名ト日本名ヲ混ゼタ「ハデー」ノ稱名ヲ持ツタ「アラビヤ」ノ衣裳ヲ着ケタ五人ノ日本人ノ援助ヲ受ケテ居タ。此ノ旅行ニ次イデ、一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ十二月七日「バタビヤ」ニ於テ、全行政區カラ集マツタ宗教ニ關スル有ラユル學者及教師ノ代表者ノ大會ガ催サレタ。軍政監ハ演說ヲ行ヒ、爪哇ニ於ケル同教徒ニ關スル日本ノ政策ヲ説明シタ。

此ノ政策ハ、三ツノ原則ヲ具體化シテキタ。第一ニ日本軍ハ同教ノ保護者デアリ、且「マホメット」教ハ尊重サレルト聲明シタ。

第二ノ點ハ、軍政監ハ宗教團體ガ間モ無クソノ活動ヲ行フ事ヲ許サレルデアラウシ又彼等ガ大東亞ノ

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67.

理想ヤ軍政監部ノ支援ヲ宣傳スル章イ使命ヲ有シテ  
キルコトヲ聲明シタ。

第三ノ點ハ、軍政監ハ教育ニ關スル同教社會ノ協  
力ハソレガ日本軍ヘノ全幅的的支持ニ向ケラレ且又大  
東亞共榮圈ノ理想ヲ鼓吹スルモノニ限り許容サレル  
旨ヲ言明シタ。斯ノ如キ制限ヲ加ヘラレテ、宗教教  
育ハ許可サレ又舊籍其ノ他ノ便宜ヲ以テ公式ニ支援  
サレルコトトナツタ。



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68.

宗務部ハ「ベタピア」ニ施設ノ訓練本部ヲ設立シ、此處デハ「キアイ」及ビ「ウラマ」各六十人ノ団体ニ對シ、三ヶ月間ニ亘ル日本の理念ニ關スル課程ガ與ヘラレタ。

是等ノ課程ハ又、日本ノ宣傳ガ效果的デアツタカ否カラ試験スル爲ニ用ヒラレタノデアリ、又ソレガ適當ナ共同者ヲ發見スルノ便ヲ與ヘタノデアル。

是等ノ共力者ガ單純ナ農民ニ對シ宣傳ヲ行ツタ、ソシテ彼等ハ充分ニ米ヲ生産シ供出セシメルコト、充分ニ勞働者ヲ供給スルコト、並ニ「志願兵」ヤ兵補ニ徵募スル責任ヲ負ツテキタ。日本人ハ同教徒ノ宣傳ニ傾キカケル古イ策略ヲ採用シ、「キアイ」ヤ「ウラマ」ニ大東亞戦争ハ「カフイヤー」不信者）ニ對抗スル「サビル」（聖ナル）戰デアルト宣言スルヤウ説伏セント努メタ。日本人自身ガ不信仰者デアルト云フ點ガ擧ゲラレルト「共通祖先」「共通民族」及ビ日本人並ニ「インドネシア」人ニ共通ナル運命等ガ強調サレタ。

一九四四年（昭和十九年）ノ初、宗教上ノ騒亂ガ「インドラマユ」地方及ビ「カルト」ニ起ツタ。日本軍ハ宗務部ノ「インドネシア」人指導者ニ責任ヲ負ハセ、彼ハ爪哇ノ最年長者デ最モ人氣ノア

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ル「キアイ」ノ一人ト交代サセラレタ。彼ハコノ  
職ヲ受諾シ「ズタビヤ」ニ一日滞在シタガ直ニ自  
分ノ宗教團體ニ歸リ、宗務部ノ指導ハ日本人課長  
等ニ委セタ。

一九四三年（昭和十八年）十一月以來「マシユ  
ミ」ハ日本軍當局ガ同教徒ノ智識階級ヲ支配スル  
團體トナリ、ソレヲ通シテ日本帝國理想ノ宣傳ヲ行  
ツタリ、兵隊ヲ打診シタリ、探偵活動ヲ行ツタ。

「マシユミ」ト宗務部トノ關係ハ絶エズ強化サ  
レ、遂ニ「マシユミ」ハ全テノ目的ニ關シ宗務部  
ノ指揮ヲ受ケルニ至ツタ。

コノ外ニ、日本軍ハ地方的ニ著名ナ「キアイ」  
ノ下ニ、各州ニ宗務課ヲ設ケタ。彼等ハ軍政政策  
ヲ村ニ了解サセル義務ヲ持ツテキタ。是等ノ機關  
ハ次第ニ地方ノ「キアイ」ノ管理下ニアル最小ノ  
地方地區ニ拡張サレタ。

馬來語、爪哇語「スンダ」語ヲ編輯シ、正統派  
ノ「キアイ」通ガ讀ミ得ル唯一ノ文字「アラブ」  
文字デ印刷シタ「アシユラー」ト云フ出版物ヲ宗  
務部ハ發行シタ。コノ刊行物ハ爪哇ノ全「キアイ」  
ニ無料デ配布サレタ。

日本軍ハ又彼ニ於テハ比較的少カツタガ、中産  
階級ノ中江デアツタ中口人ヲ共働セシムルコトニ

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70.

幾度カ努力シタ。日本軍ハ初メ、多クノ中國人囚  
徒（一九四二年（昭和十七年）三月一切解放サル）  
ノ主腦部達ヲ誘ツテ一大機關ヲ形成セシメントシ  
タガソノ努力ハ完全ナル失敗ニ歸シタノデアル。

日本軍ハ一九四三年（昭和十八年）八月、少數  
ノ著名ナ南京派中國人ノ支持ノ下ニ「華僑總會」  
ヲ設立スルニ決シタ。

「華僑總會」ハ常套的方針ニ則リ組織サレ、日  
本軍當局ニ依リ任命サレタ首腦部ヲ以テ主兵  
目的ハ日本軍政監部トノ緊密ナル協力デアツタ。  
如何ナル行動モ彼等自身ノ創意カラ執ラレタミノ  
テ用ヒラレタ。本國體ハ日本ノ宣傳ヲ普及スル爲ニ或ハ謀報機關トシ

同時期ニ日本軍ハ制限サレタ範圍内ニ於ケル中  
國人ノ私立學校教育ノ許可直ニ中國ニ於ケル日本  
軍占領地區ニ在ル家族ヘノ少額送金ノ許可ト云フ  
様ナ或ル限歩ヲシタガコノ後ノ方ノ許可ハ守ラレ  
ナカツタ。

主トシテ技術的及ビ行政方面ノ業務ノ中堅ヲ占  
メテキタ歐亞混血人ハ最初ハ放逐サレ、日本人ガ  
高イ地位ニ於テハ彼等ト交代シタガ、ヨリ多クノ  
中間的地位ニ就クニハ十分デナカツタ、又訓練サ  
レタ「インドネシヤ」人ハソノ數ニ於テ不充分デ  
アツタノデアル。

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歐亞混血人種ノ協力ヲ確保セントスル最初ノ努  
力ハ、一九四三年ノ昭和十八年ノ九月ニ爲サレタ。  
「異國人」ト看做サレテ居タ歐亞混血人ハ次第ニ  
「インドネシア」人種ノ次ニ位スル土着住民ニ属  
スルモノトシテ取扱ハレル様ニナツタ。然シ日本  
人ハ歐亞混血人ニ對シテ今後ハ日本指導下ニ大東  
亞社會ノ一員トシテノ感情ヲ持チ且行動セネバナ  
ラヌコトヲ自覺シ又西洋人ノ祖先ヲ抛棄セネバナ  
ラヌコトヲ親定シタ。

日本人ハ、歐亞混血人ニ今迄ハ「インドネシア」  
人子弟ニノミ充テラレテ居タ村ノ學校ヘ彼等ノ子  
弟數名ヲ入學サセルコトヲ約束シタ。歐亞混血人  
子弟ノ爲ノ別個ノ學校ハ禁止サレタ儘デアツタ。

一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノ始メ日本人ハ「ブ  
テラ」ヲ解散シ、之ニ代フルニ親睦究極ノ勝利ヲ  
達成スル爲ニ全亞細亞人ガ努力ヲ結集スル一ツノ  
機構ヲ以テスルニ決シタノデアル。

日本人ノ意見ニ依レバ「ブテラ」ハ單純ナ村民  
ニ手ヲ伸バヌコトニ失敗シタノデアツタ。而シテ  
此等農民ハ爪哇總人口ノ八割ヲ占メテ居リ、軍及  
勞役ノ爲ノ勞働力竝ニ日本人ノ爲ノ食用作物ノ生



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産ヲ供給シテ居タモノナノデアアル。此ノ運動ハ餘  
リニ強ク國家主義的ナモノニナツタ。新シイ機構  
ハ日本デ用キラレタ手本ニ則リ、宣傳機構ヲ必需  
品ノ配給機構ト結合シタノデアツタ。一九四四年  
ノ昭和十九年ノ一月カラ始メテ、爪哇全島ガ各  
々約二十戸ヨリ成ル隣組ト呼ベレル小部落ニ分割  
サレタ。是等隣組ハ中央集権的方針デ組織サレタ。  
組長ヲ頭トシ、組長ハ上カラ任命サレ、呉ヘラレ  
タ命令ノ實行ニ付キ責任ヲ負ツテ居タノデアアル。  
社交、火災豫防、農業等現存ノ總テノ団体ハ隣組  
ニ吸収サレタ。

此ノ制度ノ任務ハ非常ニ廣汎ニ互ルモノデアッ  
タ。配給ノコト許リデナク、防空及「ゲリラ」戦  
ノ正規ノ訓練モ亦ソノ責務デアツタ。ノミナラズ  
隣組長ハ隣組ノ人々ニ一通少クトモ一同ハ日本ノ  
「イデオロギー」ヤ其ノ實際適用ニ就イテ訓誡ヲ  
セネバナラナカツタ。此等ノ集會デ住民ニ團スル  
日本ノ目的ハ、日本宣傳部ノ指令ニ基イテ賞揚サ  
レタ。之ハ大抵ハ内幕ニキタ日本人ニ特別ニ訓練  
サレタ「インドネシア」人ニ依ツテ爲サレタ。

他ノ集會ハ一層大キナ單位（字ト稱シタ。一村  
ハ二又ハ三ノ字ニ分割サレタ。）デ月一同催サレ

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73.

タ。各家庭ノ一人ハ此等ノ集會ニ出席セネベナ  
ナカッタ。

抑留サレテ居ナイ欧亞混血人ヲ含ム一隣組地域  
ノ全住民ハ、此ノ機構ノ組合員タルコトヲ要シタ。  
組合員タルコトダケガ配給ノ便宜ヲ具ヘタ。

一九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノ三月九日、隣組が満  
足ナ活動状態ニ在ツタ時「アテラ」ハ公式ニ解散  
サレ、總テノ亞細亞人團體ヲ包含スル「爪哇奉公  
會」ガ公式ニ設立サレタ。此ノ團體ハ一九四五年  
ノ昭和二十年ノ八月三十一日ニ解散サレル迄日本  
人文記ノ道具トシテ存置シタ。

爪哇奉公會設立ニ關スル政令（一九四四年ノ昭  
和十九年ノ一月八日）ニ附隨シタ公式説明ニ依レ  
バ同會ハ全住民トノ「友誼的協力」ノ雰囲気ノ中  
ニ軍政監部ノ訓令ヲ實行スル爲ニ軍政監部ノ一機  
關トシテ設立セラレタモノデアツタ。此等ノ訓令  
ガ全住民ニ行キ渡ル様ニ面倒ヲミルノガ此ノ機構  
ノ任務デアリ、且其ハ隣組ト密接ナ聯繫ノ下ニ働  
クモノトナツテ居タ。其ノ指導者達ハ、誰モガ軍  
政監部ノ積極的支持ニ參加シテ居ルカドウカラ見  
ル責任ガアツタ。此ノ説明ニ依レバ、爪哇奉公會



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74.

ハ、尋常、全住民ノ完全ナ同位化ノ原則ニ基ク行  
政機關デアリ、從ツテ民衆全層ノ發達デアツタ。

爪哇華公會ノ中央主眼部ハ軍司令官ニ依ツテ任  
命サレ、日本人ノミデ構成サレテ居タ。中央主眼  
部ノ監督下ニ在ル行政局ニハ數名ノ「インドネシ  
ア」人ガ居タ。支部ハ各地方ニ設置サレタ。最小  
ノ單位デアル華公會ハ一ツ又ハ一ツ以上ノ字ノ  
アザノヲ監督シ字ハ又家族ノ關係ヲ監督シタ。

此等地方華公會會長ハ地方行政部ノ部長デアリ  
此ノ地方行政部ハ部長ノ任命シタ會議ニ依ツテ輔  
佐サレテ居タ。會議ハ少クトモ六ヶ月ニ一回、軍  
政府ニ對スル援助ヲ促進スル方法手段ヲ討論スル  
必要ガ生ジタ時ニ開催スルコトニナツテ居タ。

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隣組ハ爪哇奉公會ノ末梢組織ヲ成シテ居リ、其ノ職務ハ次ノ如クデアツタ。

イ、祖國防衛ノ爲、及ビ空襲時ニ敵艦下傘部隊、敵間諜、天災、火災及ビ犯罪ニ對シテ警察及ビ消防團ヘノ積極的援助。

ロ、住民ヲシテ軍政監部ノ法令、規則等ノ目的ヲ理解セシメルコト。

ハ、食糧増産ノ促進、是等食糧生産場ノ當局ヘノ供出ノ奨励及ビ日用必需品物資ノ配給。

ニ、軍政監部ヘノ一般的援助、例ヘバ、兵補部隊員、及ビ難村セル志願兵並ニ勞務者（苦力）ノ家族ヲ保護スル事。

ホ、相互扶助。

爪哇奉公會ハ日本人ヲモ含ミ國籍ノ如何ヲ問ハズ、同一目的ヲ追求スル一切ノ機關ヲ併呑シタノデアツタ。婦人會、「マレユミ」（同教徒團體）華僑總會、體育會、並ニ前述ノ居民文化指導社等ハ皆爪哇奉公會ニ合併サレタ。

相互扶助ノ爲ニ歐亞混血人達ニ依ツテ爲サレタ活動ハ、憲兵隊ニ依ル組織的指導ヲ惹起シタ。幾十人カノ指導者ハ日本軍ノ占領期間中ニ、虐待、飢餓、傳染病、（充分ナル衛生施設ナクシテ多人

75.



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76.

被投獄ノ爲メ起因ス) 或ハ軍法會議ノ判決ニヨリ  
獄中テ死亡シタノデアツタ。

如何ナル者モ一度嫌疑ヲ受ケタ者ハ諸ク拷問サ  
レ、爲ニ偽リノ白狀ハ毎日ノ出来事トナリ、此ガ  
又往々ニシテ新タナル犠牲者ヲ憲兵隊ノ毒牙ニカ  
カラセタノデアツタ。「ボルネオ」ノ西海岸ニア  
ル「ボンヂヤナツク」デ一九四四年ノ昭和十九年  
ノ其ノ代表的ナ例ガ起ツタ。其處デハ地方ノ貴  
族始メ、千二百余名ノ著名ナ「インドネシヤ」人  
及ビ中國人ガ全然無根拠ナ嫌疑ノ嫌疑デ處刑サレ  
タ。又爪哇ニ於テモ「インドネシヤ」人ハ絶エズ  
、憲兵ヲ怖レテ居タ。周圍到ル處ニ同謀ガ居タノデ  
話ス時ニハ最大ノ注意ガ拂ハレル必要ガアツタノ  
デアル。通常、全ク悪氣ノ無イ話ヲシタト云フ報  
告ニ基ヅキ「水責メ」懲罰、四肢ヲ縛シテ吊スコ  
ト、大蛇使用等惡メテ同謀ナ拷問ニ掛ケラレタ凡  
ソル人種ノ人達ノ幾百ノ例ガアル。

爪哇以外ニ於テモ政治及ビ宗教活動ニ關シテ同  
ジ政策ガ墨守サレタ。此處デモ亦、東條ノ約束ノ  
結果、多數ノ著名ナ協力的「インドネシヤ」人ハ  
軍政監部ノ職ニ任命サレタ。參議會ト同様ノ団体  
ガ設ケラレタガ、コノ經過ハ爪哇ヨリ相當後デア  
ツタ。夫レニ海軍ニ依リ統治サレタ薩領土ニ於テ

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ハ陸軍占領下ノ地域ヨリモ一層後レタ。海軍地區  
(「セレベス」、「ボルネオ」等)デハ中央參議  
院ガ組織サレル段階ニハ達ニ到ラナカツタ。然シ  
「スマトラ」ニ於テハ同島ノ中央參議院ガ「フオ  
ート・デ・コック」ニ一九四五年／昭和二十年／  
二月ニ設ケラレタ。「ブテラ」ニ類似シタ機構ハ  
「インドネシヤ」人知能階級ノ要請ニモ拘ラズ許  
可サレナカツタ。

爪哇ニ比較スルト、其ノ他ノ諸島ニ於テハ宣傳  
ハ青年層ニ一層集中セラレタ。

義勇軍ニ類似シタ「志願兵部隊」ガ設ケラレタ。

一九四四年／昭和十九年／中、日本ノ宣傳ノ四  
ツノ基本的目標ハ充分ニ達成サレタ。「軍閥軍人  
ノ爲ノ軍閥」ト云フ標語ヲ用ヒ、宗教的憎惡ヲ激  
ヘテ日本人ハ指導縣運ヲ設ケルコトニ依ツテ社會  
ノ各層ニ働きカケタ。最初ニ取り張ハレタ團體ハ  
學校教師ノ團體デアリ、其ノ後ニ警察官、村長、  
下級文官、高級官吏、醫師、藥劑師、海軍士、各  
官廳ノ職員ガ續イタ。極ク小サイ團體デサヘモ、  
順番ニ注意ヲ向ケラレタ。

此ノ宣傳ハ、如何ニ組織デアツタニシテモ一部  
ハ混沌タル狀態ト民衆ノ苦ンデ居タ貧窮困難ノ爲



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78.

ニ或ル程度マデ成功シタ。

日本人ハ、此ノ状態ノモタラス危険ノ可能ヲハ  
ツキリ認識シテ居タ。日本ノ占領カラ氣ヲ散ラス  
ト云フ方法ニ依リ之等ノ感情ヲ何か他ノ方向ニ向  
ケルノガ宣傳部ノ仕事デアツタ。西洋、特ニ合衆  
國ト英國トニ對スル絶エズ強化サレル憎惡運動ガ  
行ハレ、之等諸國ハ和蘭ト共ニ民衆ノ全苦惱ノ實  
任ヲ負ハサレタノデアツタ。

## IV 第四段階

一九四四年九月—一九四五年八月

爪哇域外ノ戰略的狀勢ハ其ノ間著シク變化シテキ  
 タ。「サイパン」ノ突破ハ既ニ起リソウニシテ日本  
 ノ防衛ノ基礎ソノモノヲ著シク振盪セシメタ。東條  
 内閣ハ小磯内閣ニヨツテ承ケ繼ガレ之ハ南方地域ノ  
 孤立及其處ノ日本軍隊ガ自力ニヨツテ立ツコトノ必  
 然性ニ直面セザルヲ得ナイコトヲ認メ、ソシテ一般  
 協力ヲ得ルコトガ一層重要デアルコトヲ認メタ。  
 日本ニ必要トスル住民ノ協力ハ從ツテ益々其ノ重  
 要性ヲ増シテ來タ。

東條ノ約束實現ノ方法ガ一九四三年八月ニ知ラレ  
 タトキ日本ノ約束ニ尙信頼ヲ寄セテキタ顯要ナ「イ  
 ンドネシア」人ノ間ニ絶望ハ寧ロ明白ニ表現セラレ  
 タ。此ノ民衆カラノ完全ナ協力ヲ維持セントスルナ  
 ラバ南方地域ニ於ケル國民的熱望ヲ滿足セシメルヤ  
 ウニ促進セネバナラヌトイフコトヲ日本側ハ警告サ  
 レタ。

一九四四年九月七日小磯首相ハ帝國議會ニ於テ朝  
 鮮及台灣ニ對シテ日本人ニヨツテ享有セラレタ權利  
 ト均等ヲ約束シタ後ニ東印度ニ對シテ獨立ノ約束ヲ  
 爲シタ。(法廷證書第二七七號)

此ノ演說ニ於テ獨立ガ許容サレタ場合ニ於テ何處  
 ノ地域ガ獨立ヲ獲得スルデアラウカトイフコトハ明



## IV 第四段階

一九四四年九月—一九四五年八月

爪哇域外ノ戰略的狀勢ハ其ノ間著シク變化シテキ  
 タ。「サイパン」ノ突破ハ既ニ起リソウニシテ日本  
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 ラバ南方地域ニ於ケル國民的熱望ヲ満足セシメルヤ  
 ウニ促進セネバナラヌトイフコトヲ日本側ハ警告サ  
 レタ。

一九四四年九月七日小磯首相ハ帝國議會ニ於テ朝  
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此ノ演說ニ於テ獨立ガ許容サレタ場合ニ於テ何處  
 ノ地域ガ獨立ヲ獲得スルデアラウカトイフコトハ明

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確ニセラレナカッタ。獨立ノ約束ハ民衆ガ大東亞共榮圈ノ支持ノ爲彼等ノ固有ノ領土ヲ防衛スルコトヲ條件トシテ與ヘラレタ。此ノ所謂獨立ノ範圍ハ八紘一字思想ノ一ノ適用トシテノ大東亞共榮圈ノ一員タルコトヲ引用スルコトノミニヨツテ説明セラレタ。之ヨリ先一九四四年八月末頃爪哇ニ於ケル第十六軍司令部ハ秘密裡ニ此ノ聲明ノ内容ニ付通報ヲ受ケ而シテ日本側諸機關ニ對シ或ル秘密命令ヲ發令シタ此等ノ命令書（檢察部書類第二七五六號及第二七五七號）ハ日本軍ノ「バタビア」占領期間中軍政監部ニヨツテ使用セラレタ建物ノ中ニ於テ發見セラレタ。



一九四四年九月七日小磯首相ニ依ツテ爲サレタ  
約東ハ爪哇デ總司令官ニヨリ次ノ如キ書葉デ發表  
サレタ。

「將來建設サレル、國家ニ關シテハ、ソノ國家  
ハ、大東亞共榮圈ノ一環トナリ且大日本ノ指  
導下ニ大東亞ノ發展ニ貢獻スル義務ヲ有スル  
公明正大ニシテ眞實ノ國家デアル。  
其故ニ、眞實ノ意味ニ於テ大東亞ノ國家ノ一  
トナランガ爲ニ、凡テノ住民ガ、將來建設サ  
レル國家ノ水準ヲ高メント欲スルナラバ、最  
後ノ勝利ガ得ラレルマデ即チ徹底的ニ大東亞  
ノ民ト自覺スル迄大東亞民トナラントシテ絶  
エス自ラ努力スル事ガ非常ニ必要デアル。  
最後ノ勝利ガ得ラレヌト假定シテ見ヨ。ソノ  
時、大東亞ノ建設ハ實現サレズ當然蘭印諸島  
ハソノ獨立ヲ達成シナイデアラウ。  
其故ニ、全住民ハ、凡ニ民族間ニ於ケル完  
全ナル友好國內ニテ最後ノ勝利ヲ得ル爲ニ全  
力ヲ傾注セネバナラヌ。彼等ハ凡テノ困難ヲ  
辛抱シテ耐エネバナラヌ又將來起リ得ベキ凡

テノ障害ヲモ除去シナケレバナラヌ。  
其故ニ、カノ光榮アル獨立ノ時機ノ到來ヲ待  
ツト同時ニ、全住民ハコノ戦争ノ繼續ノタメ  
ニ奮勵努力シナケレバナラヌ。斯カル態度ヲ  
以テコソ、將來ニ對スル義務ハ遂行サレ得ル  
ノデアアル。

小磯ノ約束ニ對スル、インドネシア人ノ「感謝」  
ガ依然論旨デアリソレニ就テ、日本ノ宣傳ハ此先  
數ヶ月間ニ亘リ實施續ケラレタ。

同時ニ、第十六軍司令部ハ、如何ナル地域ガ「  
獨立」ト宣言サルベキカ、是ガ起ル日附及ビ新政  
府竝ニ國家ノ形體ニ關シテ、陸軍省ニ意見ヲ具申  
スベク指令サレタ。爪哇ノ軍政府ハソノ返答ニ「  
獨立指導方策要綱」ト云フ報告ヲ提出シ、ソノ中  
デ爪哇ヲ最初ニ獨立トスベシト提案シタ。國民意  
識ヲ強化スル爲ニ提議サレタ施策ハ建國學院ノ建  
設（國家ヲ建設スル爲メノ學院）及ビ「行政參加  
」ノ増大デアッタ。

小磯ノ約束ヲ遂行スルニハ先ツ僅カニ二ツノ實  
質的手段ガ講ゼラレタ。一九四四年九月八日以後



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住民ハ場所ト大サニハ嚴重ナ規則ガアツタケレド  
モ或ル特定ノ休日ニノミ日本ノ國旗ト、インドネ  
シアノ國旗ヲ相並ベテ掲ゲルコトヲ許可サレタ。  
政府ノ官廳ノ建物ニハ日本國旗ノミガ掲揚サレル  
コトハナツテキタ。同日附テ國歌トシテ「インド  
ネシア、ラヤ」ノ歌（大インドネシアノ歌）ヲ許可  
ガ與ヘラント。

一九四四年九月十一日總司令官ハ將來ノ獨立ニ  
對スル約束ノ深甚ナル感謝ノ念ヲ、インドネシア  
人ガ如何ニシテ日本及ビ日本軍ニ衰ハスカ又米英  
打倒ヲ招來センガ爲ニ如何ニ人民ノ意志ヲ更ニ昂  
揚シ得ルカラ回答スル爲ニ中央參議院ノ特別會議  
ヲ招集シタ。

一九四四年十一月十七日更ニ中央參議院ノ臨時  
會議ガ舉行サレ、インドネシア住民ニ對スル「指  
針」トシテ所配「ベンチャ・ダールマ」（處世五  
則）ヲ規定スル動議ガ採用サレタ。

コノ「ベンチャ・ダールマ」ニハ次ノ如ク誓イ  
テアル。

「インドネシアノ住民ニ對シ、即チ

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- 一、我々ハ、大東亞ノ他ノ諸民族ト共ニ、コノ戦争ニ於テ大日本ト生死ヲ共ニシ且ツ今次戦争ガ正義ト公正ノタメニ起ツタモノデア  
ルガ故ニ、衷心ヨリ我々ノ努力ヲ獻ゲン。
- 二、我々ハ、獨立シ統一アリ、主權ヲ有シ公正  
ニシテ繁榮シ且ツ大日本ノ精神的功績ヲ常  
ニ尊ビ大東亞ノ友邦ノ眞ノ一員トシテ生キ  
ントスル、インドネシア國ヲ建設ス。
- 三、我々ハ、我々自身ノ文明ト文化ヲ維持向上  
スル事ニヨリ、アジアノ文化ノ發展ニ盡力  
スル事ニヨリ世界ノ文化ヲ美化スル事ニヨ  
ツテ光榮アル偉大サヲ得ンガ爲ニ衷心ヨリ  
努力セン。
- 四、大東亞諸民族ト緊密不變ノ友邦關係ヲ維持  
スルト共ニ、我々ハ全靈ト不動ノ精神ヲ以  
テ、全能ノ神ヲ常ニ信ジ、我々ノ國家ト人  
民ニ奉任ス
- 五、確固燃ユルガ如キ願望ヲ以テ、八紘一字ノ  
原則ニヨリ全人類ヲ一家トナス觀念ニ基キ

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恒久世界平和ノ達成ノタメニ我々ハ努力ス」  
一九四四年十二月一日行政ヘノ參與ハ數州  
ニ於ケル、インドネシア人「州長官」又  
更ニ數人ノ、インドネシア人ノ參與ガ軍政  
監部ノ各省ニ任命サレル事ニ及ボサレタ。  
中央參議院ガ開カレナイ期間中軍政監部ニ  
意見具申スル爲ニ定期的ニ會スル參與會議  
ガ設立サレタ。

其間宣傳班ハ「ベンテング・ベルワンガン・  
ジャワ」(爪哇ワーツノ要塞)ノ爲ニ新シイ標語  
ヲ掲ゲタ。今ヤ公然ト豫想セラレル聯合軍上陸ノ  
恐レアルニ鑑ミテ住民ヲ驅ツテ最高ノ戰爭努力ニ  
奉仕サセルコトガソノ目的デアツタ。防空ト消防  
ノ訓練ハ毎日ノ日課デアリ、其他住民ハ有力ナ宣  
傳機關ニ依ツテ影響セラレ「ゲリラ」戰ノ訓練ヲ  
受ケタ。原始的武器(火ニヨツテ硬クサレタ松木)密  
集機關トヲ以テ敵ノ小部隊ヲ突破スル方法ヲ彼  
等ハ教ヘラレタ。

「バタビヤ」ニ於ケル宣傳集會ニ於テ「ローズベ  
ルト」、「チアール」及「ベン・ダー・ブラス」  
(著名ナ和蘭行政官)ノ人像ガ全町ヲ行進サセラ  
レタ後焼カレタ。米國、英國及和蘭ノ國旗ガ「ベ

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ンキレテ路上ニ擡カレ、宣傳示威行進中行列ニ依  
ツテ隊圍サレタ。宗教的宣傳へ回教徒ノ西洋諸國  
ニ對スル神聖戰爭ヲ宣言スルヤウ驕リ立テタ。

此ノ期間ニ三ツノ新シイ半軍事的團體が組織サ  
レ、村寨防衛ニ、警防團ノ援軍トシテ隣組が最後  
ニ使用サレタ。戰時ニ於ケル彼等ノ仰ノ斯カル行  
動が陸軍法規ノ背反ヲ形成シ、對抗軍ヘ已ムナク  
彼等ヲ「偽國狙撃兵」トシテ取り扱ハザルヲ得ナ  
イト云フ事ヲ如何ナル場合ニモ是等單純ナル部落  
民ニ話サレタコトヘナカッタ。

コノ訓練ハ豫期セザル結果ヲモタラシタ。一九  
四五年二月ノ或夜「ブリタール」（東爪哇）ニ於ケ  
ル義勇防衛隊ノ一分隊が兵器庫警備ノ日本軍ヲ奇  
襲シテ、兵器ト共ニ意兵隊本部、電信、電話局等  
ノ町ノ主要點ヲ占領シタ。從ツテ殺人及強盜ノ大  
騒ギガ續イテ起ツタガ被害者ハ皆日本人ヲ含ム非  
「インドネシア」人デアッタ。次ノ數日中ニ其ノ  
運動ヘ或ハ妥協ニ依リ解決サレ、或ハ暴力ト流血  
ニ依リ鎮壓サレタ。



更ニ經濟的分野ニ於ケル日本側ノ規制殊ニ農產物ノ供出及原住民ノ勞務ニ對スル反抗ノ増加ガアツタ。此ノ反抗ニ打克ツ爲メニ徵募ノ貧弱ナ成績ニ責任ヲ負ハサレタ所ノ「インドネシア」人文官ニ對シテ強力ナ措置ガ執ラレタ。

多數ノ者ガ免職セラレ國家主義者及時ニハ回教徒ノ政治家ニヨツテ交替セラレタ。

此等ノ新シイ官吏ハ瓜哇奉公會ヲ通ジテ或ハ宗教的針路ヲ通シテ頭ニ立ツ様ニナツタ。「インドネシア」行政團體ニ於テノ新入者ハ完全ナ適任者デハナカツタ。ソウシテ彼等ニハ常ニ日本人ノ顧問ガアツタ。此ノ團體ノ約三分ノ一ハ日本側ニ好感ヲ有スル國家主義者達ヲ以テ職員ト爲シテ平タ。必要トセラレタ食糧ノ供出及苦力並ニ義勇隊員ノ徵募ハ多數ノ縣ニヨツテ達成スルコトガ出來ナカツタ。

日本側ハ住民ノ協力ニ依存スルコトガ増大シタコト及彼等自身ノ宣傳ノ結果ヲ甘受シナケレバナラナクナツタコトヲ認メタ。

既ニ一九四二年九月、時ノ瓜哇方面最高指揮官顧問兒玉秀雄伯爵ハ東京ヲ訪問シテ東印度ニ關スル現地ノ意嚮ニ興味ヲ喚起スベク試ミタ。一九四三年十一月ニハ「スカルノ」ハ日本ヘ派遣サレ東條首相ニ獨立ヲ強ク要請シタガ何等確答ヲ得ルコトガ出來ナ

カッタ。一九四四年ノ末頃時ノ瓜哇軍政府最高民間顧問林ハ瓜哇方面最高指揮官ノ承諾ヲ得テ日本ノ東印度僑僑獨立ノ支持ヲ懇懇スベク東京ヲ訪問シタ。一九四五年四月二十九日總領事院（國家建設ノ爲メノ學校）ガ設立サレタ。其ノ目的ハ「獨立」國家ノ將來ノ「指導者」ヲ思想ニ影響ヲ與ヘ且ツ又日本ニヨツテ指導サレル大東亞共榮圈ノ理想及此ノ指導者トシテノ正確ナ理念ヲ彼等ノ頭ニ浸込マセルコトデアッタ。

其ノ間瓜哇司令部ハ急遽ナ解決ヲ圖ルベク最高當局ニ迫ツタ。

一九四五年四月三十日會議ガ「シンガポール」ニ於テ開催サレ瓜哇及「スマトラ」ヲ含ム板垣ニヨツテ統率セラレタ第七方面軍ノ指揮下ニ在ル總テノ地取ノ總務部長ガ出席シタ。此ノ會議ニ於テ瓜哇ノ總務部長ハ現在ノ「インドネシア」人ノ國民意識ガ如何ナル程度迄充分覺醒セラレテヤルカラ説明シ且ツ獨立ノ約束ヲ實行スル外ニ住民ノ信頼ヲ回復スルノ道ノナイ事實ヲ強調シタ。

一九四五年五月十五日西貢ニ於ケル寺内元帥ノ司令部ハ「獨立」ニ關スル現地司令部ノ見解ヲ求メタ。瓜哇ハ一年以内ニ印度全部ニ對シ獨立ヲ宣言スベキ提議ヲ以テ速ニ回答ヲ寄セタ。



「シンガポール」ハ其ノ問題ヲ遅ケ獨立ヲ開始スル時機ニ非ズトイッタ。

其ノ後一九四五年五月二十日叙垣ノ變動ニヨツテ「シンガポール」ニ於テ全參謀長會議ガ開催セラレタ。其ノ會議ハ戦争ガ日本ニ不利ニナリツ、アルコトヲ認メタ。

瓜哇ハ「獨立調査準備委員」(獨立ノ爲メノ準備ヲ研究スル會)ヲ招集スルコトヲ許サレタ。此ノ委員會ハ一九四五年五月二十八日設置セラレ日本ト共ニ生キ共ニ死スル忠誠ヲ發願ニ宣誓シタ。

「海軍」地域(ボルネオ、セレベス、レッサール、スンダ)列島等ハ此ノ會議ニ代表サレテハキナカツタ。ソウシテ論議サレタ指圖ハ單ニ「陸軍」地域ノミニ係ハリソレハヤガテ瓜哇ニ局限サレタ。「スマトラ」ニ於テハ政治的發展ハ瓜哇ヨリモ遅レタ。ソウシテ一九四五年二月ニ至ル迄「スマトラ」ニ對シテ中央參議員ハ設立サレナカツタ。

獨立ノ爲メノ準備ヲ研究スル會ハ約六十名ノ委員ニヨリ構成サレタ。即チ四名ノ中國人、一名ノ印度人「アラビア」人及一名ノ歐亞人ヲ含ンデキタ。

日本人ガ其ノ委員長代理テアリ他ニ七名ノ「特別委員」ガアツタ。ソノ委員會ハ日本人ヲ部長代理トスル行政部ヲ有シテキタ。

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此ノ委員會ノ根底ヲ爲ス法令ハ委員會ノ決定ハ事  
政監ニ報告セラルベキコトヲ規定シタ。後ニ新ラシ  
イ「獨立準備ノ爲メノ會」ヲ組織サレルコトニナツ  
タ。研究ノ爲メノ委員會ニハ研究ニ局限シ如何ナ  
ル決定ヲモナス權限ヲ附與シナイコトガ明瞭ニ規定  
サレテモタ。

委員會ハ一九四五年五月二十九日から六月二日迄  
及同年七月十日から十六日迄ノ二回開催サレタ。  
此等ノ會合ハ一般ニ公開サレナカツタ。就中「フイ  
リツピン」僥倖國家ノ憲法ニ類似シタモノガ起草サ  
レタ。

委員會ガ決定ヲ爲ス何等ノ權限モナク又瓜哇自体  
ニ局限サレナケレバナラナイトイフコトガ知ラサレ  
タトキ失望ガ起キタ。



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一九四五年七月十七日最高指導會議ハ出來ル限  
リ遠ニ東印度ニ「獨立」ヲ許容スル政策ヲ採用ス  
ルコトニ決定シタ（檢察側書類第二七五九號法廷  
書證第 號）此ノ決定ハ一九四五年七月二十一  
日爪哇ニ到着シタ。東京カラノ指令ニ依レバ新國  
家ノ領土ハ東印度ノ全部ヲ包含スルモノトシ  
他方近キ將來ニ獨立準備委員會ガ設置サレルコト  
ニナツテキタ。

重點ハ軍作戦ノ要求ヲ保護セントスル必要性ニ  
置カレタ。傀儡國家ノ樹立ハ一九四六年中頃迄ハ  
行フベキニアラス又上記委員會ハ早クトモ一九四  
五年末頃ニ設置サルベキデアルト一九四五年六月  
ニ提言シタ在西亞南方軍總司令部ガ其ノ細目決定  
ヲ命ゼラレタ。

從ツテ一九四五年七月三十日「シンガポール」  
ニ在ル板垣ノ司令部デハ現地總務部長（軍政監部  
ノ各總務部長）ノ會議ガ開カレタ。此ノ會議ニ於  
テハ所謂「獨立」ノ準備ヲ指導スル爲メノ計劃ガ  
立テラレタ。ソレニヨレベ期日ハ一九四六年ノ春  
ト定メラレタ。

#### V. 第五段階 一九四五年八月、九月

一九四五年八月ノ始メ、寺內元帥ハ「インドネシ  
ア」傀儡國家設置ノ準備ヲ出來ル限リ急ギ此ノ國

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家ヲ一九四五年九月ニ創設スベシト云フ電信命令  
ヲ東京カラ受テ取ツタ。

此ノ命令ノ履行ニ付、一九四五年八月七日寺内ハ  
獨立準備委員會ノ制定ヲ布告シタ。

(獨立準備ノタメノ委員會)

此ノ創設ハ布告當日爲サレ次ノ如クデアル

#### 南方軍ノ布告

「インドネシア」獨立準備委員會ニ關スル件

「昨年九月七日ノ日本政府ノ宣言ニ基キ南方軍ハ  
終始一貫「インドネシア」人ヲ指導スル處置ヲ  
取り來ツタ。現今ニ至ル民衆ノ精神的覺醒ニ因  
リ彼等ハ燃ユルガ如キ熱ヲ以テソノ政治竝ビ  
ニ國防ノ訓令ニ迅速ナル進歩ヲ成シ多ク凡ユ  
ル面ニ遂グルニ成功シタ。

「民衆ノ活動及ビ一意専心ノ努力ニ應ジ南方軍ハ  
八月中旬「インドネシア」獨立準備委員會ノ設  
置ニ賛意ヲ表明スル。該委員會ハ獨立「インド  
ネシア」政府設置ノ爲メノ最終的準備ニ關スル  
凡ユル手段ヲ促進スル。

一九四五年八月七日十二時」

寺内元帥ノ布告ガ爪哇ニ於テ發表セラレタト同日  
ニ爪哇方面最高指揮官モ亦布告ヲ發シタガ、此ノ  
中ニハ就中次ノ如ク述べラレテキタ。

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「獨立國家タラントスル願望ハ今ヤ頂點ニ達シ全「インドネシア」中ニ燃エ上リツツアル。大日本帝國ハソノ根本原理即チ八紘一字ノ理想ニ從ツテ獨立ヲ許容スル事ヲ嚴肅ニ約シタノハ斯カル願望ノ表明ニ應ジタモノデアアル、此ノ約束以來全住民ハ全カラ擧ゲテ國家的義務ヲ引受ケルコトニ盡力シ彼等ノ獨立ノ基礎ガ完全且迅速ニ築キ上ゲラレル様ニ此ノ戦争ヲ成功裡ニ終焉セシムル決意ハ益々鞏固トナツタ。

而シテ今ヤ大東亞共榮圈連鎖ノ一環ヲ構成セル一ノ獨立國トシテ「インドネシア」ハ大東亞共同防衛ノ戦線ニ参加シ其ノ部署ニ就クノデアアル。」  
軍政官「軍政部部長」ハ此ノ際次ノ如ク述べタ。

「大東亞共榮圈ノ一員トシテノ「インドネシア」獨立ハ世界新秩序ノ形成ニ寄與セントスル人道主義的原理ニ基クモノデアアル。故ニ「インドネシア」人ノ崇高ナル理想及ビソノ強烈ナル熱狂ハ大日本帝國ノ根本理想即チ八紘一字ニ一致スルモノデアアル。

「新國家ハ幾許カノ必須要件ヲ備ヘナケレバナラナイ、ソレハ充分ナルカラ有スルコトト、ソノ行政機關ハ圓滑且簡素ニ組織サルベキデアアル。  
夫故第一ノ義務ハ目下「インドネシア」人ノ直面セル戦争ヲ成功裡ニ終焉セシムルコトデアアル。

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此ノ目的ノ爲ニ「インドネシア」國民ハソノ戦力ヲ最大限ニ發展セシメネベナラズ又大日本ト共ニ此ノ大東亞戦争ニ於テ最後ノ勝利ヲ獲得スル爲絶ヘマナク戦ハネベナラヌ。

獨立問題ニ付テハ數日間沈黙ノ日ガ續イタ。日本ノ宣傳ハ依然トシテ「日本ト生死ヲ共ニセヨ」ト云フ日本ト「インドネシア」ノ間ノ運命ノ一般的緊リヲ大キク取扱ツタ。



此ノ間、一九四五年八月九日「スカルノ」ヲ含ム三名ノ主要ナ「インドネシア」ノ國粹主義者達ノ使節ガ飛行機デ西貢ノ寺内ノ軍司令部ヘ送ラレ、八月十一日元帥ニヨツテ迎ヘラレタ。彼等ハ寺内カラ最初ハ、日本政府カラ直接勅命ヲ受ケサセル爲ニ使節ヲ東京ヘ派遣スル豫定デアツタガ、交通ノ困難ト危険及ビ時間ノ切迫シテキル關係上、帝國政府ニ代ツテ元帥ガ此ノ勅命ノ内容ヲ使節ニ傳達スベク指令ヲ受ケタト語ツタ。

#### 主眼點ハ

イ、日本政府ハ獨立準備委員ヲ創設スルコトヲ欲シ、迎テキタゾト。

ロ、新國家ノ領土ハ全島領東印度ヲ包含スルコト。

ハ、各領土ニ於テ獨立ガ宣言セラレル期日ハ準備完了次第帝國政府ノ裁量ニヨリ決定セラレルコト。

ニ、獨立政府ハ最初ニ準備ガ完了セル島嶼ニ先ヅ設置セテルコト。從ツテ此ノ政府ハ逐次準備ノ完了セル地域ヲ含ムベク擴大セラルルコト。ホ、戦局ニ關聯セル凡ユル日本ノ要求ニ應ズベキコト。

ヘ、「スカルノ」ガ委員會ノ議長ニ任ゼラレ、此ノ委員會ハ更ニ「爪哇」ヨリ十三名ノ代表、「スマトラ」ヨリ三名ノ代表及ビ海軍占領地

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ヨリ五名ノ代表ヨリ成ツテキタ。之等各員ハ各地日本軍指揮官ノ指名ニヨリ任命セラレタ。

一九四五年八月十四日瓜哇各新聞紙ハ「スカルノ」ノ歸還ヲ報ジタ。ソシテ「インドネシア」ノ新指導者トシテ、彼ハ最高指揮官及軍部並ニ「インドネシア」ノ當局筋ノ多クノ者カラ歓迎ヲ受ケタ一方、今ヤソノ名モ發表サレタ。「スマトラ」「ボルネオ」「セレベス諸島」及「バリ」ヨリノ之等諸地域ノ陸海軍當局ノ指令ヲ得タ後、飛行機ヲ瓜哇ニ行ツタ。

最初ハ委員會ノ第一回會合ヲ八月十九日ニ定メテキタ。

然シ年ヲ八月十五日委員會ノ會員達ハ悉カニ日本ノ降服ヲ知ラサレタ。

一九四五年八月十六日ノ夜カラ十七日ニ掛ケテ當時ノ餘々タル國粹主義者達及青年指導者達ニヨツテ増大シタ委員會ハ、日本海軍ノ連絡將校前田ノ郎デ會合シタ。「スカルノ」ハ會合ニ先立テ總務部長並ニ前田ト會談シテキタ。翌朝獨立ヲ宣言スルコトニ決定シタ。

獨立調查準備委員（獨立準備研究ノ爲五月ニ制定サレタ委員會）ニヨリ起草サレタ憲法ハ取り急ギ變更サレ、翌朝獨立ハ「スカルノ」ニヨリ日本

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軍宣傳班ニヨツテ、彼ノ露ノ「スランダム」ニ取リ付ケラレタ「マイクロフォン」ヲ通ジテ放送セラレタ。

瓜哇ノ住民達ハ露以外ニ日本ノ降服ニ付テハ未ダ何モ知ラナカツタ。「ラジオ」受信機ハ外國放送ヲ聴取出来ナイヨウニサレテ居リ、東京カラノサヘモ聴取出来ナカツタ。最高指揮官ノ命令ニヨリ日本軍宣傳班ハ日本ノ敗北ヲ秘シテキタ。

日本軍宣傳班ニヨリ統制サレテキタ新聞紙及ビ地方放送局ハ一九四五年八月十七日カラ二十一日迄獨立ノ宣言及ビ憲法發布ノ發表以外ハ何モ言フコトハナカツタ。

一九四五年八月二十一日新聞ハ降服ニ付テノ八月十四日ノ天皇ノ放送原文ニ次イデ瓜哇方面最高指揮官ノ布告ヲ發行シタガ、之ハ就中次ノ事ヲ含ンデキタ。

「大日本ハ變ラズ、永久ニ「インドネシア」ノ友デアリ亦將來モ友デアアルデアロウ。我々ハ生ニテモ死ニテモ協力シテ、ト云フ我々ノ誓ヲ決して忘レヌデアロウ」

一九四五年八月二十一日ニ至ル迄日本軍當局ハ日本ノ降伏ヲ秘密ニシテキタ。此ノ期間ハ「盗マレタ通聞」ト呼バレタ。

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